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ABSTRACT 
  In recent years, legal scholars have paid a great deal of attention to 
the emergence of constitutional courts and judicial review in 
democracies worldwide, yet an intriguing parallel development in 
democratic constitutionalism has gone largely unnoticed: the 
establishment of independent bodies which, like constitutional courts, 
are concerned with foundational commitments of liberal democracy, 
but which advance these commitments mainly through investigations 
and advice-giving. Lacking de jure authority to block the 
implementation of unconstitutional laws and policies, the new advice 
givers instead make their contributions ex ante, identifying problems 
that warrant legislative attention and helping to craft laws and 
regulations that respond to foundational aspirations. This Article 
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surveys the emergence of these “advisory counterparts” to 
constitutional courts and offers an account of their comparative 
advantage, relative to constitutional courts, as guardians of liberality. 
The Article also presents an initial treatment of the advisory 
counterparts’ characteristic limitations and dangers, and explores 
some associated questions of institutional design. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the years since World War II, the written, justiciable 
constitution has become a universal hallmark of democratic 
government.1 As Mark Tushnet quips, “[f]or all practical purposes, 
 
 1. See generally Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Introduction to DEFINING THE FIELD 
OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at xi (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 1999) 
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the Westminster model [of legislative supremacy] has been withdrawn 
from sale.”2 New and old, democracies everywhere are providing for 
some form of constitutional judicial review. 
Less widely appreciated is that many democracies are also 
establishing independent institutions which, like constitutional courts, 
are concerned with foundational commitments of liberal democracy, 
but which make their contribution not by adjudicating constitutional 
cases but by investigating societal conditions and governmental 
conduct, and suggesting policy reforms. Examples include human 
rights commissions, electoral commissions, information commissions, 
privacy commissions, and anticorruption commissions. Many of these 
bodies are purely advisory,3 although some also have specialized 
regulatory, administrative, or prosecutorial duties.4 Quite commonly 
they possess coercive powers of investigation, such as the subpoena.5 
And a few have been given a formal role in the legislative process—
for example, authority to trigger action on their proposals by the 
elected branches of government, or even to put questions directly to a 
referendum vote of the citizenry.6 
Notwithstanding such variations, all of these bodies may be said 
to function, in part, as advisory counterparts to constitutional courts. 
Advisory, in that they lack de jure authority to enjoin duly enacted 
legislation or regulations. Counterparts, in that they possess the sort 
of democracy-reinforcing, rights-safeguarding, and minority-
protecting missions that legal scholars are wont to ascribe to 
constitutional courts. To be sure, the symmetry here is inexact. Not all 
of the bodies I characterize as advisory counterparts derive their 
powers and mission from constitutional texts, nor are they obliged to 
anchor their recommendations to the language of a written 
 
[hereinafter DEFINING THE FIELD] (describing the study of comparative constitutional law in 
the context of the surge of constitutionalism); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World 
Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997) (contrasting American constitutionalism with the 
experiences of newer democracies). 
 2. Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights- and 
Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 814 (2003); see also Stephen 
Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001) 
(describing emerging forms of judicial review in the Westminster democracies). 
 3. This is typical of human rights commissions. See infra Part I.A. 
 4. This is true of many election commissions and a few privacy commissions. See infra 
Parts I.B, I.E. 
 5. See infra Part I. 
 6. See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
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constitution.7 The comparison to constitutional courts is nonetheless 
apt in functional terms, however, insofar as one accepts that an 
important reason for judicial review is to help secure the basic 
commitments of liberal democracy. 
Constitutional theorists have paid a great deal of attention to the 
global spread of constitutional courts, but they have largely 
overlooked the emergence of the advisory counterparts.8 This Article 
aims to lift the counterparts’ profile. The new advice-givers, I suggest, 
have the potential to make significant contributions to the project of 
sustaining and perhaps improving liberal democracy over time—and 
to do so in a manner that does not engender the countermajoritarian 
 
 7. The new advice-givers have been entrenched in a number of emerging-democracy 
constitutions. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROTECTORS OR PRETENDERS? GOVERNMENT 
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS IN AFRICA 28–58 (2001) (tracing the establishment in the 1990s 
of constitutionally entrenched human rights commissions in a number of African nations); INT’L 
COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, PERFORMANCE AND LEGITIMACY: NATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 59–62 (2000), available at http://www.ichrp.org/paper_files/102_p_01.pdf 
(discussing the constitutional entrenchment of human rights commissions in new democracies); 
RAFAEL LÓPEZ-PINTOR, ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES AS INSTITUTIONS OF 
GOVERNANCE 20 (2000) (noting that most independent electoral agencies are constitutionally 
entrenched); Birgit Lindsnaes & Lone Linholdt, National Human Rights Institutions: Standard-
setting and Achievements, in NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS: ARTICLES & 
WORKING PAPERS, INPUT TO THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 1, 14–15 (Birgit Lindsnaes et 
al. eds., 1st rev. ed. 2001) (noting that “[n]ational [human rights] institutions established by 
constitution . . . are mainly found in countries which have recently undergone constitutional 
reforms and which have been marked by grave human rights violations in the past”). 
Roughly analogous bodies have been established by statute in many of the older 
democracies. See INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra, at 64–67 (discussing the 
establishment by statute of human rights commissions in “stable democracies”). Near-to-home 
examples include the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (2000); the Election 
Assistance Commission, id. § 15381; and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Pub. 
L. No. 108-458, § 1061, 118 Stat. 3638, 3684 (2004) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 601). 
 8. Indicative is the lack of attention to the advice-giving role of independent but 
nonjudicial bodies in recent works on constitutional design by Cass Sunstein, CASS SUNSTEIN, 
DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO (2001), and Bruce Ackerman, Bruce 
Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 634 (2000), as well as the 
absence of these bodies from the foundational casebook, VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999), and compendium of readings on comparative 
constitutional law, DEFINING THE FIELD, supra note 1. Ackerman does contemplate a role for 
independent but nonjudicial bodies such as electoral commissions and anticorruption 
commissions, but he seems to envision these bodies operating in administrative and 
enforcement capacities, rather than as sources of law reform. See Ackerman, supra, at 694–96 
(proposing an “‘[i]ntegrity [b]ranch’” to investigate corruption); id. at 718–21 (proposing a 
“‘democracy branch’” to administer and regulate elections); id. at 723–26 (proposing a 
“‘[d]istributive [j]ustice [b]ranch’” to administer a constitutionally entrenched program of 
income redistribution). 
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worries associated with constitutional judicial review. This Article 
gives one account of that potential and takes up some of the 
distinctive challenges and concerns that these institutions present. 
Along the way I raise many more questions than I answer. The object 
of my inquiry is a vast and varied array of institutions, but the 
ambitions of this Article are actually rather modest: to explain why 
the advisory counterparts should be of interest to constitutional 
scholars, and to advance some tentative hypotheses that will help to 
orient further inquiry and institutional experimentation. 
The attractions of the advisory counterpart model for 
institutionalizing a constitutional commitment to liberal democracy 
are twofold. First, the counterparts are or could be, in important 
respects, better positioned than constitutional courts to pursue 
structural remedies for (or prophylactics against) illiberality. This 
follows from the counterparts’ license to craft legislative solutions to 
the problems they ascertain; from the counterparts’ superior 
resources for identifying and understanding threats to liberality; and 
from the logical possibility that an independent advisory body could 
be more thoroughly insulated from the elected branches of 
government without incurring the countermajoritarian risks 
associated with constitutional judicial review. To be sure, the 
counterparts, as advisory bodies, are always at risk of being ignored, 
and an advice-giver that speaks to deaf ears cannot hope to 
accomplish much. There is some evidence, however, that elected 
officials fear the ballot-box consequences of ignoring counterpart 
recommendations on certain kinds of issues (election law and 
corruption control) at least at certain times (for example, following 
scandals).  
The second attraction of the counterpart model is dialogic. 
Although counterparts lack the constitutional court’s ability to bring 
about public confrontations with constitutional principle by striking 
down high-profile laws, some counterparts have other tools with 
which to engage mass opinion: the subpoena power, for example, or 
authority to set the legislative agenda or trigger a popular 
referendum. I shall argue too that certain counterparts may develop 
significant persuasive authority with the electorate regarding which 
constitutional issues are properly deemed high priorities, even though 
average voters are unlikely to follow presumptively the counterpart’s 
policy recommendations concerning the problem at hand. By moving 
new issues onto the public’s radar screen, counterparts may influence 
the course of law reform beyond the election-law and government-
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integrity domains. I shall suggest, moreover, that counterpart priority-
setting and law-proposing is, on plausible normative views, more 
attractive than constitutional judicial review as a means of 
institutionalizing occasional popular engagement with the meaning 
and application of nominally constitutive ideals. The argument turns 
on the selection of issues for debate; the costs of the debate-forcing 
activity; and the character and consequences of the debate itself. 
In addition to offering a sympathetic portrayal of what the 
counterparts have to offer, this Article provides a preliminary account 
of their characteristic weaknesses and downsides. Beyond the obvious 
risk of irrelevance—a risk that is also integral to the counterparts’ 
appeal—there are two primary concerns. First, the counterparts may 
have an institutional interest in discrediting the elected branches of 
government. This institutional interest could make some counterparts 
less than innocuous, especially if they have coercive investigatory 
powers with which to pry into the doings and dealings of top 
government officials. Any number of problematic consequences could 
follow, ranging from distracted government leaders, to loss of public 
support for large-scale public undertakings, to the release of 
otherwise latent authoritarian sentiments within the citizenry. 
Second, the political forces that help to sustain the de facto 
independence of constitutional courts may not operate similarly with 
respect to the counterparts. Whatever normative license a 
counterpart’s advisory status might provide for thoroughgoing 
insulation from the elected branches (at least as to counterparts 
whose investigatory powers are tightly circumscribed), independence 
in practice may be difficult to achieve. 
I will proceed as follows. Part I surveys the worldwide emergence 
of nominally independent investigative and advice-giving bodies with 
jurisdiction over subjects widely thought foundational to liberal 
democracy. The heart of the Article comes in Part II, which compares 
constitutional courts and advisory counterparts along three 
dimensions: crafting remedies, engaging public opinion, and achieving 
independence. Here I develop my account of the counterparts’ 
attractions, and also flag certain weaknesses and limitations. Part III 
briefly examines interactions between courts and counterparts. 
A few caveats are in order before moving on. First, in drawing 
comparisons between courts and counterparts, I will refer to the U.S. 
Supreme Court and associated ideas about and evidence regarding 
constitutional judicial review within the American legal tradition. 
This obviously will not be the most sensible point of reference for 
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many countries that have established or might yet establish advisory 
counterparts. But for now it is a useful way to begin, in part because 
the U.S. constitutional tradition is the one with which I am most 
familiar, and in part because of its influence elsewhere. 
Second, the advisory counterparts are as yet little-studied 
institutions. Although I will illustrate my arguments with suggestive 
anecdotes, this paper is best viewed as an exercise in informed 
conjecture. Insofar it succeeds, the payoff will take the form of a 
clearer understanding of questions worth investigating via empirical 
studies of the extant counterparts, and, relatedly, a better feel for the 
problems and possibilities with which proponents and designers of 
these bodies ought to be concerned. 
Third, in fleshing out my argument with examples, I am not 
going to dig into the historical experiences and political cultures of 
different polities. Such matters undoubtedly have much to do with the 
successes and failures of particular advisory bodies, but they lie 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
Fourth, although this paper is concerned with the functioning of 
different kinds of institutions in service of the “basic” ideals of liberal 
societies, I wish to bracket philosophical disputes about what, 
precisely, the concept of liberal democracy entails. I take it as given 
that the following characteristics are foundational, recognizing that 
there will often be philosophical disagreements about the liberal 
merits or demerits of specific policies: 
Accountability. Liberal states require their legislators to stand 
occasionally for popular election, under conditions conducive to 
holding incumbents accountable for their achievements and failures 
while in office. 
Political equality. Liberal societies enable their adult citizens to 
participate in the political process on equal footing. Excluding from 
the sphere of politics the inequalities that prevail in economic and 
social spheres is a necessary aspiration.9 A perfect separation of these 
spheres will never be achieved, of course, and any attempted 
separation should be evaluated with an eye to costs as well as 
benefits, particularly insofar as those costs come in the coin of other 
 
 9. Cf. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY 3–6 (1993) (developing an account of liberal democracy centered on the 
maintenance of distinct “spheres” of activity, each with its own regulative norms). 
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liberal-democratic aspirations, such as accountability.10 But a liberal 
polity will nonetheless attend to the goal of political equality, and not 
sacrifice it lightly—and never for illiberal reasons. 
Tolerance. Liberal states do not pass or implement laws for the 
purpose of beating up on ethnic or religious minorities, or other out-
groups. They provide space for individuals to live out their lives by 
the lights of their own basic values, even if those values are quirky. 
Civil liberty. Liberal democracies do not treat civil liberty with 
nonchalance. In detaining and punishing putative wrongdoers, liberal 
states make concerted efforts to identify their targets correctly. 
Liberal societies confronted with tradeoffs between liberty and 
security may well conclude that there is no essential core of civil 
liberties or associated procedural protections that must at all times be 
respected, but the liberal state will nonetheless value liberty, and will 
not be arbitrary or rash in deciding when or how to curtail it. 
I.  A SURVEY OF ADVISORY COUNTERPARTS 
Constitutional democracies have spawned numerous public 
advisory bodies whose missions pertain to basic liberal aspirations, 
but there is as yet no comprehensive, transnational survey of these 
institutions. The partial account provided here focuses on permanent 
and nominally independent governmental bodies whose advice-giving 
work concerns political accountability or equality, public integrity, 
personal autonomy, civil liberty, or the treatment of minority 
groups.11 It has been pieced together from the smattering of writings 
and Internet resources about national human rights institutions, 
electoral commissions, privacy commissions, anticorruption 
commissions, and information commissions.12 The existing scholarship 
 
 10. For an example of the (potential) clash between political equality and accountability, 
consider the question of whether individuals and organizations should be allowed to make large 
monetary donations to political campaigns. An unlimited right to donate favors the rich; at the 
same time, it may also help opponents of the government mount effective campaigns. Cf. 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 248 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002] prohibits the criticism of Members of Congress by those entities most 
capable of giving such criticism loud voice. . . .”). 
 11. Omitted from my survey are temporary, ad hoc bodies created in response to the 
exigencies of the day, as well as permanent bodies, such as science advisory boards, whose work 
is not closely connected to basic liberal-democratic aspirations. 
 12. Notably absent from this list are criminal sentencing commissions. It turns out that 
permanent advice-giving commissions with jurisdiction over criminal punishment have rarely 
been created outside of the United States, Michael Tonry, Parochialism in U.S. Sentencing 
Policy, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 48, 59–61 (1999), although government leaders in many countries 
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on these bodies is quite insular. Each subject seems to have its 
enthusiasts, and there is little cross-talk. The present survey, though 
undoubtedly incomplete, does tend to suggest that the establishment 
of an ongoing, independent body tasked with conducting research and 
investigations and giving advice is a recurring strategy for addressing 
threats to liberal-democratic values, and it also raises the question of 
what might be learned from studying these bodies in relation to one 
another. 
A. National Human Rights Institutions 
National human rights institutions (NHRIs)—governmental 
entities with a mandate to promote and protect human rights—are 
rapidly becoming commonplace around the world. One survey 
concluded that in 1990 there were only eight such bodies worldwide; 
by 2002, there were fifty-two.13 These bodies have emerged in all sorts 
of countries, from well-established democracies to the rudest of 
dictatorships, and they vary hugely in their structure, powers, and 
subject matter jurisdiction.14 Some cover human rights generally; 
others have narrower mandates concerned with, for example, prison 
conditions,15 illicit discrimination,16 or the status of women.17 
NHRIs emerged from two distinct traditions, the ombudsman 
and the commission of inquiry,18 and their activities differ 
 
have convened ad hoc advisory bodies for criminal law reform, Andrew J. Ashworth, Sentencing 
Reform Structures, 16 CRIME & JUST. 181, 202–09 (1992). 
 13. MORTEN KJAERUM, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS: IMPLEMENTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (2003). 
 14. For a voluminous survey of extant NHRIs, see HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS AND 
OMBUDSMAN OFFICES: NATIONAL EXPERIENCES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (Kamal Hossain 
et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter NATIONAL EXPERIENCES]. 
 15. In South Africa, for example, the Human Rights Commission initially did a 
considerable amount of work on prison conditions, but this responsibility has since been spun 
off to a statutory oversight body, the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
supra note 7, at 298–99; see also JUDICIAL INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, ANNUAL REPORT 1999 
§ 1, available at http://judicialinsp.pwv.gov.za/Annualreports/annual2000.asp (explaining the 
context in which the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons was established). 
 16. See INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that some 
countries that lack national human rights commissions have national anti-discrimination 
commissions). 
 17. South Africa’s constitution, for example, establishes a Commission on Gender 
Equality, in addition to a Human Rights Commission. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 
7, at 296; Commission on Gender Equality, http://www.cge.org.za (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 18. See INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra note 7, at 92. 
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accordingly.19 A Swedish invention, the classical ombudsman is 
supposed to function as “the people’s “representative” in the 
executive branch of government.20 The paradigmatic ombudsman’s 
office is headed by a single person, appointed by parliament, whose 
charge is to impartially investigate individuals’ claims of 
administrative unfairness and to help the affected persons secure 
relief.21 Commissions of inquiry, by contrast, are usually multi-
member bodies set up to study large-scale societal problems and to 
propose policy reforms.22 European NHRIs tend to operate like 
ongoing commissions of inquiry.23 They make policy 
recommendations to the legislature and executive agencies but most 
do not handle individual complaints.24 Outside of Europe, NHRIs 
typically respond to individual complaints in addition to launching 
investigations on their own initiative,25 and many are authorized to 
compel testimony and the production of documents.26 Whatever the 
 
 19. See Leonard F.M. Besselink, Types of National Institutions for the Protection of Human 
Rights: An Overview of Legal and Institutional Issues, in NATIONAL EXPERIENCES, supra note 
14, at 157, 160 (“[T]he perceived function of ombudsman institutions is usually to exert powers 
of investigation and scrutiny of administrative and other acts and omissions of the executive. 
Human rights commissions, however, usually have as one of their primary tasks to give advisory 
opinions to the legislature.”). 
 20. LINDA C. REIF, THE OMBUDSMAN, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 12 (2004); cf. Besselink, supra note 19, at 161 (regarding ombudsman 
accountability to parliament). 
 21. U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 8–9 
(1995). 
 22. Regarding the history of commissions of inquiry, particularly those in Great Britain, 
see generally CHARLES J. HANSER, GUIDE TO DECISION: THE ROYAL COMMISSION (1965), and 
THE ROLE OF COMMISSIONS IN POLICY-MAKING (Richard A. Chapman ed., 1973). 
 23. Morten Kjaerum, The Experiences of European National Human Rights Institutions, in 
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS: ARTICLES & WORKING PAPERS, supra note 7, at 
113, 114–19. 
 24. Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at 25; Kjaerum, supra note 23, at 114–19. 
 25. Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at 25. 
 26. I have not been able to locate data on the percentage of NHRIs with coercive powers 
of investigation, but proponents of NHRIs clearly contemplate the exercise of such powers. See, 
e.g., U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 32 (describing appropriate powers of 
investigation); C. Raj Kumar, National Human Rights Institutions: Good Governance 
Perspectives on Institutionalization of Human Rights, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 259, 274–75 
(2003) (lauding delegation to the National Human Rights Commission of India of the “powers 
of a civil court”). NHRIs with coercive powers of investigation are found, for example, in El 
Salvador, Barbara von Tigerstrom, Implementing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The 
Role of National Human Rights Institutions, in GIVING MEANING TO ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS 139, 146–47 (Isfahan Merali & Valerie Oosterveld eds., 2001); India, 
Kumar, supra, at 274–75; Uganda, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 357–58; and South 
Africa, id. at 294–95. The influential “Paris Principles,” described infra in the text accompanying 
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scope of their powers of investigation, however, the formal remedial 
power of most NHRIs is limited to giving advice.27 Some may also 
litigate claims on behalf of victims,28 or refer questions directly to the 
constitutional court,29 but very rare is the NHRI that may issue legally 
binding remedial orders.30 
Proponents of NHRIs have worked through the United Nations 
to establish benchmarks for the design of these institutions.31 Issued in 
1991 by a U.N. workshop, the “Paris Principles” prescribe that 
NHRIs shall be representative of “the [plurality of] social forces (of 
civilian society) involved in the protection and promotion of human 
rights”; functionally independent from the executive branch of 
government; and authorized to “submit to the Government, 
Parliament and any other competent body, on an advisory basis . . . 
opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on any matters 
concerning the promotion and protection of human rights.”32 The 
Principles also urge NHRIs to take on a public education role, with 
 
notes 31–33, instruct that NHRIs “shall [be authorized to h]ear any person and obtain any 
information and any documents necessary for assessing situations falling within its competence.” 
Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions, G.A. Res. 48/134, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/48/134 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Paris Principles], available at http://www.ohchr.org/ 
english/law/parisprinciples.htm. 
 27. Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights 
Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 28 
(2000) (“[M]ost national human rights institutions cannot make binding decisions and are 
confined to giving non-binding recommendations, advice and reports, plus sometimes being able 
to refer matters to tribunals for a legally binding decision.”); Carolyn Evans, Human Rights 
Commissions and Religious Conflict in the Asia-Pacific Region, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 713, 719 
(2004) (“[T]he ability to make binding decisions is not a feature of [National Human Rights 
Commissions] in the Asia-Pacific region . . . .”); Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at 26 
(noting that a majority of NHRIs “can recommend settlements of disputes or make decisions on 
complaints that are, however, not legally binding on the involved parties or the government”). 
 28. This power is typical of the Defensor del Pueblo, an office established under a number 
of Latin American constitutions. See REIF, supra note 20, at 191. 
 29. Such referral powers are possessed by a number of the “human rights ombudsman” 
established by the post-Soviet constitutions of Eastern Europe. Reif, supra note 27, at 40–41 
(Poland); id. at 43 (Slovenia). Human Rights Commissions in Australia, India, and Canada have 
also been authorized to intervene in court proceedings. Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at 
28–29. 
 30. Exceptions include the Ugandan Human Rights Commission, which by the terms of the 
constitution may “order the release of a detained person, payment of compensation or any 
other legal remedy or redress,” id. at 28, and the Ghana Commission for Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice and the Tanzanian Commission for Human Rights and Good 
Governance, which may obtain judicial orders enforcing certain of their recommendations, 
REIF, supra note 20, at 19. 
 31. Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at 10. 
 32. Paris Principles, supra note 26. 
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the aim of inculcating human rights norms, spreading awareness of 
violations, and encouraging the ratification of and compliance with 
“international human rights instruments.”33 
Within the United States, the nearest thing to an NHRI on the 
model of the Paris Principles is the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 
an investigatory and advisory body that dates back to the Eisenhower 
years.34 Although encouraging the ratification and implementation of 
international human rights conventions is assuredly beyond its 
mandate, the Commission on Civil Rights is concerned with matters 
fundamental to human dignity: It is charged with investigating sworn 
complaints of deprivations on the basis of color, race, religion, sex, 
age, disability, or national origin;35 and, more generally, with 
advancing equal-protection goals by “study[ing] and collect[ing] 
information,” “mak[ing] appraisals of the laws and policies of the 
Federal Government,” “serv[ing] as a national [information] 
clearinghouse,” and “prepar[ing] public service announcements and 
advertising campaigns to discourage” illicit discrimination.36 
B. Privacy Commissions 
Specialized bodies concerned with data privacy have been 
created in every European Union member state and at least a dozen 
other countries.37 These bodies help to implement and revise data 
protection laws. Some have licensing and related regulatory powers;38 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. An in-depth history of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to the present day has yet 
to be written. For an introductory look at the body and its work, see Jocelyn C. Frye et al., Note, 
The Rise and Fall of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
449 (1987). The early history of the Commission is told in FOSTER RHEA DULLES, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS COMMISSION: 1957–1965 (1968). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(a)(1) (2000). 
 36. Id. § 1975a(a)(2). 
 37. Robert Gellman, A Better Way to Approach Privacy Policy in the United States: 
Establish a Non-Regulatory Privacy Protection Board, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1183, 1185 (2003). A 
European Union data privacy directive requires that each member state establish an 
independent authority for “monitoring the application within its territory of the provisions 
adopted by the Member States pursuant to [the directive].” Council Directive 95/46, art. 28, 
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). European data protection institutions are surveyed briefly in Herbert 
Burkert, Institutions of Data Protection: An Attempt at a Functional Explanation of European 
National Data Protection Laws, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 167, 176–80 (1981), and in much greater 
depth in HERBERT BURKERT, THE ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICE OF DATA PROTECTION 
AGENCIES, EEC JOINT STUDY ON DATA SECURITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY (1980). 
 38. Regarding information-privacy institutions that combine advisory and regulatory 
functions, see Burkert, supra note 37, at 180–88. 
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others operate in a purely advisory capacity.39 Canada and Germany 
pioneered the advisory model.40 There, at both the state and the 
national level, “data privacy commissioners” with some degree of 
independence from the government, badger ministries to do a better 
job of privacy protection.41 
Within the United States, California recently established an 
advisory Office of Privacy Protection,42 and in late 2004, Congress, at 
the behest of the 9/11 Commission, chartered the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board.43 The Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board has data privacy responsibilities,44 but its potential 
reach is much broader than that. Congress found that “the “potential 
shift of power and authority to the Federal Government” [attendant 
to the “war on terrorism”] “calls for an enhanced system of checks 
and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way 
of life.”45 The scope of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board’s advisory jurisdiction is correspondingly large.46 There are, 
however, serious questions about whether the Board will prove 
meaningfully independent of the White House and capable of 
investigating intransigent bureaucracies.47 
 
 39. For case studies of the two models, see DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY 
IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES (1989). 
 40. See id. at 21–90 (West Germany); id. at 243–301 (Canada). 
 41. Id. at 21–22, 243. 
 42. Gellman, supra note 37, at 1189. 
 43. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,  
§ 1061, 118 Stat. 3638, 3684 (2004). 
 44. Id. § 1061(c)(2), 118 Stat. at 3685. 
 45. Id. § 1061(a), 118 Stat. at 3684. 
 46. “The Board shall ensure that concerns with respect to privacy and civil liberties are 
appropriately considered in the implementation of laws, regulations, and executive branch 
policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism.” Id. § 1061(c)(3), 118 Stat. at 
3685. 
 47. See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, Bipartisan Civil Liberties Board Fix Bill Long 
Overdue, Measure Would Take Oversight Panel Out of the “Hip Pocket of the President” 
(Mar. 15, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17570prs20050315.html 
(supporting proposed legislation that would make the Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
independent and bipartisan and give it more oversight power); Richard B. Schmitt, Privacy 
Guardian Is Still a Paper Tiger, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at A1 (“Foot-dragging, debate over 
its budget and powers, and concern over the qualifications of some of its members—one was 
treasurer of [President] Bush’s first campaign for Texas governor—has kept the board from 
doing a single day of work [for more than a year since its authorizing legislation was enacted].”). 
The proposed Protection of Civil Liberties Act, H.R. 1310, 109th Cong. (2005), would enhance 
the Board’s subpoena powers and condition presidential appointments to the Board on the 
Senate’s advice and consent. See HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRIVACY AND 
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C. Information Commissions 
Much as privacy commissions have been established to guide the 
implementation and revision of data-protection laws, “information 
commissions” have been chartered to monitor the legal and 
administrative framework concerning governmental transparency.48 In 
some nations, information commissioners serve as specialist 
ombudsmen, helping individuals to navigate the administrative 
labyrinth created by freedom of information acts.49 In others, such as 
Ireland and the United Kingdom, the commissioners can issue 
binding orders of disclosure—subject, however, to ministerial 
override.50 Whatever their administrative or regulatory 
responsibilities, information commissioners are typically charged with 
“general oversight of the [freedom of information] system [including] 
reviewing and proposing changes, training, and public awareness.”51 
Most information commissioners have authority to act sua sponte.52 
Within the United States, state-level information commissions 
have been established in New York and Connecticut.53 New York’s 
plays a largely advisory role, whereas Connecticut’s also investigates 
and adjudicates claims brought under the state’s open-government 
statute.54 
 
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD: 109TH CONGRESS PROPOSED REFINEMENTS 6 (2005), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22078.pdf. 
 48. One recent survey found that more than a dozen nations had established information 
commissions with some degree of independence from the government. DAVID BANISAR, THE 
FREEDOMINFO.ORG GLOBAL SURVEY: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND ACCESS TO 
GOVERNMENT RECORD LAWS AROUND THE WORLD 6 (2004), available at http://www. 
freedominfo.org/documents/global_survey2004.pdf (noting that such bodies exist in Belgium, 
Canada, Estonia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Mexico, Portugal, Slovenia, Thailand, the 
United Kingdom, and on the regional level in Canada and Germany). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. For a helpful overview of the enforcement role of information commissioners in 
Europe, see HERKE KRANENBORG & WIM VOERMANS, ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EC AND MEMBER STATE LEGISLATION 
22–23 (2005). 
 51. BANISAR, supra note 48, at 6. 
 52. KRANENBORG & VOERMANS, supra note 50, at 23–24. 
 53. See Robert G. Vaughn, Administrative Alternatives and the Federal Freedom of 
Information Act, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 192–209 (1984) (describing and comparing New York 
and Connecticut commissions). 
 54. Id. at 193. 
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D. Anticorruption Commissions 
Following the lead of Singapore and Hong Kong in the early 
1970s,55 a number of countries have created specialized agencies to 
control corruption.56 These bodies investigate criminal wrongdoing, 
design and encourage the adoption of reforms to reduce 
opportunities and incentives for corruption, and seek to challenge 
public complacency about the extent, permissibility, or inevitability of 
corruption.57 Variations on the Singapore/Hong Kong model have 
cropped up in Botswana, Macau, New Zealand, Nigeria, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Zambia, and several states in 
Australia.58 As with NHRIs, there is a transnational good-government 
movement spurring the establishment of anticorruption commissions 
and defining associated “best practices.”59 
Not all of the new anticorruption commissions are based on the 
Singapore/Hong Kong template.60 In the United Kingdom, for 
example, a Committee on Standards in Public Life was created by 
Prime Minister John Major in 1994.61 Essentially a permanent 
commission of inquiry, this body has no criminal investigation 
responsibilities, but it has played a significant role in crafting 
anticorruption legislation and related political process reforms.62 
 
 55. Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (“CPIB”) became active in 1970; 
Hong Kong set up its Independent Commission Against Corruption (“ICAC”) in 1974. See 
Michael Johnston, A Brief History of Anti-Corruption Agencies, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING 
STATE 217, 219–21 (Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999). 
 56. See generally id. 
 57. MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY DESIGN 36–52 (2004) (describing the activities of 
the Hong Kong ICAC); Johnston, supra note 55, at 218–19 (noting that the typical 
anticorruption commission does both enforcement and corruption-prevention work). 
 58. Johnston, supra note 55, at 219. 
 59. The leader here has been Transparency International. See, e.g., JEREMY POPE, TI 
SOURCE BOOK 2000, at 95–104, available at http://legacy.transparency.org/sourcebook. 
 60. Michael Johnston observes that “there is no single ‘ICAC strategy,’” in that the extant 
independent anticorruption commissions differ widely in their jurisdiction, their powers, and 
their relative emphasis on policy reforms, education, or the investigation and prosecution of 
individual cases of wrongdoing. Michael Johnston, Independent Anti-Corruption Commissions: 
Success Stories and Cautionary Tales, in CORRUPTION, INTEGRITY, AND LAW-ENFORCEMENT 
253, 254–55 (Cyrille Fijnaut & Leo Huberts eds., 2002). 
 61. Committee on Standards in Public Life, http://www.public-standards.gov.uk/about_us/ 
index.asp (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
 62. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory 
Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1392–93 & nn.117–21 (2005). 
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E. Electoral Commissions 
In most democracies, a nominally independent agency runs or 
regulates elections.63 Some electoral commissions double as advice-
givers, and a few are principally or exclusively concerned with 
research and advice-giving. 
South Africa’s Electoral Commission illustrates the hybrid 
model. In addition to administering elections, this body has a 
mandate to “conduct research on electoral matters and to 
continuously review electoral legislation” in the interest of 
“strengthening . . . constitutional democracy.”64 Likewise, Spain’s 
Junta Electoral Central, a regulatory agency, is authorized to “submit 
proposals for modifications to bills that are being discussed in 
Parliament.”65 The Australian Election Commission and Elections 
Canada, both election administrators, also have public education 
roles and a responsibility to report to parliament on the operation of 
the electoral laws following each general election.66 Uruguay’s Courte 
Electoral holds hearings on election law bills introduced in 
parliament.67 And at various times the election administration 
agencies of Botswana, Pakistan, and Russia have had a hand in the 
development of reform legislation.68 
The purely advisory variant on the independent electoral 
commission is exemplified by well-established districting commissions 
in the United Kingdom, Canada (at the provincial level), Germany, 
and Iowa.69 These bodies periodically propose new constituency maps 
to the legislature, but they lack de jure power to revise district maps 
unilaterally.70 Another example is the U.S. Election Assistance 
Commission, created in 2002, whose mission is to study “election 
 
 63. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 7, at 25–26. Most of these bodies are constitutionally 
entrenched. Id. at 20. 
 64. Id. at 40. The Electoral Commission’s power of review is only advisory. See Electoral 
Commission Act 51 of 1996 s. 5(j). 
 65. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 7, at 177. 
 66. See Colin A. Hughes, The Independence of the Commissions: The Legislative 
Framework and the Bureaucratic Reality, in REALIZING DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL LAW IN 
AUSTRALIA 205, 209–10 (Graeme Orr et al. eds., 2003); Jean Pierre Kingsley, The 
Administration of Canada’s Independent, Non-Partisan Approach, 3 ELECTION L.J. 406, 406–07 
(2004). 
 67. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 7, at 157. 
 68. Id. at 172–73, 199, 204–06, 217–19. 
 69. Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1386–90 & nn.76–101. 
 70. Id. 
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administration issues”71 and make associated recommendations to 
Congress.72 
F. Integrative Variants 
The degree of specialization among the advisory counterparts is 
curious. Although some nations make use of specialist electoral 
courts,73 I know of no constitutional democracy that has partitioned 
responsibility for enforcing the justiciable provisions of its basic 
document among privacy courts, human rights courts, gender equality 
courts, separation of powers courts, and so forth. Such specialization 
appears to be quite common among the advisory counterparts. I have 
not been able to identify any ongoing, independent advisory body 
whose jurisdiction is spelled out in terms meant to capture the full 
sweep of the society’s constitutive commitments or aspirations. There 
are, however, several real-world precursors for such an integrative 
advisory counterpart. 
For starters, a handful of the new investigative/advisory bodies 
have missions encompassing more than one of the issue areas this 
Article has examined. The mandate of Ghana’s Commission on 
Human Rights and Administrative Justice conjoins the protection of 
“fundamental rights and freedoms” with the fight against corruption.74 
Tanzania has assigned responsibility for advancing human rights and 
“good governance” principles” to a Commission for Human Rights 
and Good Governance.75 Nations that give human rights or 
anticorruption responsibilities to an ombudsman often stipulate that 
the person who holds this office should also carry out the traditional 
ombuds-duty of ensuring “legality and fairness” in government 
administration.”76 Uganda’s Inspectorate of Government, for 
example, has corruption detection and prevention functions, but is 
 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 15381(a) (Supp. III 2003). 
 72. Id. § 15381(c). In important respects, however, the EAC’s design is seriously flawed. 
See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1441–44. 
 73. Responsibility for adjudicating disputes over electoral outcomes is often lodged with 
the same independent body that administers elections. See, e.g., Fabrice E. Lahoucq, Can the 
Parties Police Themselves? Electoral Governance and Democratization, 23 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 
29, 36–37 (2002) (describing electoral tribunals in Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica). 
 74. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 154. 
 75. Leonard G. Magawa, Tanzania’s Commission for Human Rights and Good 
Governance: A Critique of the Legislation, INT’L OMBUDSMAN Y.B., Vol. 6, 2002, at 100, 101. 
 76. Reif, supra note 27, at 11–13 (describing emergence of “hybrid human rights 
ombudsman” institutions). 
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also tasked with “promoting fair, efficient, and good governance in 
public offices,” and “stimulating public awareness about the values of 
constitutionalism.”77 
The concept of human rights may itself be so labile as to enable a 
commission charged with their promotion and protection to take up 
the privacy, the electoral, or even the freedom-of-information 
concerns that many nations have assigned to specialist advisory 
bodies. Thus, South Africa’s Human Rights Commission has been a 
forceful proponent of transparency measures, drawing a linkage 
between freedom of information and human rights protection.78 
Another potential antecedent for the integrative advisory 
counterpart is the law revision commission. For hundreds of years it 
has been commonplace for governments to convene temporary 
commissions of legal notables to identify anomalies and ambiguities 
in the law and to develop clarifying, simplifying reforms.79 Starting 
mostly in the 1960s and 1970s, a number of countries—and a handful 
of states within the U.S.—established permanent commissions to 
carry out this legal housekeeping function.80 At first, these permanent 
 
 77. REIF, supra note 20, at 232–33. See generally Edmond R.B. Nkalubo, Uganda Human 
Rights Commission Including the Office of the Inspectorate of Government, in NATIONAL 
EXPERIENCES, supra note 14, at 579, 579–92 (describing the history and current powers of the 
Uganda Human Rights Commission and the Inspectorate of Government). 
 78. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 300; see also S. AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMM’N, THE GUIDE ON HOW TO USE THE PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT - 
ACT 2 OF 2000, at 2–3 (2005), available at http://www.sahrc.org.za/sahrc_cms/downloads/ 
PAIA%20GUIDE%20english.pdf (addressing linkages between information and human 
rights). 
 79. See generally Michael Kirby, Are We There Yet?, in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM 
433 (Brian Opeskin & David Weisbrot eds., 2005) (noting historical examples of consultation as 
well as the more recent development of substantial commissions); Hon. J. Bruce Robertson, 
Law Reform: What Is Our Knitting? How Do We Stick to It?, Address to the Association of 
Law Reform Agencies in East and Southern Africa Conference 1–5 (Mar. 15–17, 2005), 
available at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/SpeechPaper/7571ca2d-1bff-4af3-96da-
21174f89f6fd//ALREASA%20speech%20170205.pdf (describing the development, functions, 
operations, and goals of law reform commissions). 
 80. Prominent adopters include England and Scotland (Law Commission Act, 1965), see 
Robertson, supra note 79, at 2 & n.7; South Africa (South African Law Commission Act, 1973), 
id. at 4; Australia (1975; now governed by the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996), 
id.; Ireland (Law Reform Commission Act 1975); New Zealand (1985), id. at 5; and Canada 
(which created a permanent law commission in 1970, terminated it in 1992, and set up a new one 
in 1997), id. at 3–4 & nn.15–16. Countries with law revision commissions today include: 
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Canada, Cyprus, England & Wales, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Hong Kong, 
India, Ireland, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Northern 
Ireland, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Scotland, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia, and 
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law commissions bore little resemblance to the bodies I have labeled 
“advisory counterparts.” Their mission was interstitial, their agenda 
was typically subject to governmental control,81 and they were 
populated with lawyer-technocrats who served at the will of elected 
officials.82 
Many of the permanent law commissions have struggled to 
define their niche and justify their continued existence.83 Their 
difficulties have been variously attributed to loss of public confidence 
in technocratic modes of policymaking;84 to the emergence of new 
institutions for policy research and law reform within the legislative 
 
Zimbabwe. Austl. Law Reform Comm’n, Overseas Law Reform Sources, http://www.alrc.gov. 
au/links/overseaslawreform.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). U.S. states with permanent law 
revision commissions include: California, Cal. Law Revision Comm’n, History and Purpose, 
http://www.clrc.ca.gov/background.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007), Connecticut, Conn. Law 
Revision Comm’n, http://www.cga.ct.gov/lrc (last visited Jan. 17, 2007), Michigan, Mich. Law 
Revision Comm’n, http://www.council.legislature.mi.gov/mlrc.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2007), 
New Jersey, N.J. Law Revision Comm’n, http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us, (last visited Jan. 17, 
2007), Oregon, Or. Law Comm’n, http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/oregonlawcommission (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2007), and Utah, Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions 
Things of the Past? The Increasing Role of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional 
Change, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 1, 14–15 (1996). 
 81. See Peter Hennessy, Independence and Accountability of Law Reform Agencies, in THE 
PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 72, 80 (“The work program of most law reform 
agencies in [Commonwealth countries] is determined by the government.”). 
 82. Cf. Michael Tilbury, A History of Law Reform in Australia, in THE PROMISE OF LAW 
REFORM, supra note 79, at 3, 12–13 (discussing the focus of early reform commissions on 
“‘lawyers’ law’”—mere technical niceties—and their eschewing of the “embedded policy 
issues”). Permanent law reform commissions whose organic acts exemplify the classical model 
are found in Australia (Australian Law Reform Commission Act, 1996), Ireland (Law Reform 
Commission Act, 1975), and the United Kingdom (Law Commission Act, 1965), among other 
places. (Notwithstanding the formal structure of the body, the first chairperson of the 
Australian Law Reform Commission publicly rejected the “‘lawyer’s law’” model of law reform 
and sought to develop, instead, a more policy-oriented and public-involving modus operandi. 
Tilbury, supra, at 13–15.) 
 83. See Roderick Macdonald, Continuity, Discontinuity, Stasis and Innovation, in THE 
PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 87, 90 (“After a brief flourishing, many law reform 
agencies in Canada, Australia and other Commonwealth countries were disbanded, fiscally 
starved, or otherwise neglected during the 1990s.”). Canada’s Law Commission, which some 
observers consider exemplary, was disbanded in 1992, revived in 1997, and, as part of a 
Conservative assault on public institutions thought to have a liberal bias, abruptly defunded in 
2006. See John Ibbitson, Fatal Cuts to Law Panel Deeply Ideological, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 28, 
2006, at A4; Bert Archer, Laying Down the Law, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 30, 2006, at F2. 
 84. David Weisbrot sees the permanent law commissions as part and parcel of a 
“modernist” project, marked by faith in expertise, technocratic problem-solving, and big-
law/big-government solutions to social problems. David Weisbrot, The Future for Institutional 
Law Reform, in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 18, 19–20. To prosper in the 
present day, they must shift from technocratic to consultative and public-involving modes of 
decisionmaking. Id. at 29–35. 
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and executive branches of government;85 to anti-intellectualism;86 and, 
in the case of some commissions, to ideological anachronism.87 Yet as 
one commentator wryly remarks, “law reform commissions, like 
vampires, appear to be difficult to kill.”88 Some that were eliminated 
have been reconstituted anew,89 and the concept of a permanent law 
revision agency continues to draw adherents: today there are, by one 
count, more than sixty general-purpose law reform commissions 
worldwide.90 
As law commissions and their proponents seek contemporary 
foundations for the commissions’ continued existence, they 
increasingly invoke the ideal of a law-revision body “independent” 
from everyday politics and therefore (so it is said) capable of offering 
a uniquely long-term, multi-disciplinary, and public-involving 
perspective on societal problems.91 Some general purpose law 
commissions are beginning to assert their independence from the 
elected branches of government,92 and to have that independence 
 
 85. See, e.g., Macdonald, supra note 83, at 96 (“[T]here was no question that by the early 
1990s the [soon-to-be-abolished] Law Reform Commission of Canada was not doing anything 
substantively different from the Department of Justice.”); David Solomon, Relations with the 
Media, in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 175, 175 (“Law reform agencies are 
normally engaged by governments in particular tasks because the work is dry, technical and 
publicly unexciting. If the prospective reform is likely to excite public passion, it is far more 
likely to be handed over to a parliamentary committee to explore.”); Weisbrot, supra note 84, at 
20–21 (describing the emergence within Australia and her constituent states of joint ministerial 
councils, well-staffed and resourced parliamentary committees, specialist advisory bodies under 
the purview of the Attorney General, and more). 
 86. Macdonald, supra note 83, at 91 (suggesting that the critique of judges’ and law 
commissioners’ ability “to distil ‘neutral principles’” provided “convenient cover for the anti-
professionalism, anti-scientism and anti-intellectualism of many latter-day political 
movements”). 
 87. Michael Tilbury suggests that some Australian law commissions, being “product[s] of a 
political era of welfare liberalism,” failed to adapt to the “neo-liberal era.” Tilbury, supra note 
82, at 15. 
 88. Weisbrot, supra note 84, at 24. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Elton Singini, Foreword to THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at v, v. 
 91. Hennessy, supra note 81, at 78–80 (characterizing benefits of independence in law 
reform work); Kate Warner, Institutional Architecture, in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, 
supra note 79, at 55, 67 (“Ministerial and parliamentary committees cannot offer . . . 
independent advice based on the different experiences, approaches and outlooks that are 
available to an independent body.”); Weisbrot, supra note 84, at 27 (“It is fundamental to 
success that a law reform commission maintain its independence.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Palmer, The Law Reform Enterprise in New Zealand, 
Address to the Board of the New Zealand Law Society 2 (Feb. 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/SpeechPaper.aspx (stating that the New Zealand Law Commission 
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recognized.93 Some have been authorized to undertake law reform 
projects sua sponte, without prior government approval.94 And most 
intriguingly, a few law commissions now describe their mission in 
ways that echo the representation-reinforcing and fundamental-
rights-protecting work of constitutional courts. Thus, in a recent 
speech, the President of the New Zealand Law Commission indicated 
that his body would focus on issues as to which the ordinary political 
process is prone to failure.95 The Malawi Law Commission, which is 
 
“has the same sort of independence as Judges in formulating its recommendations”); Robertson, 
supra note 79, at 12 (“In my judgment a Law Commission must never be constrained in its 
ability to approach a problem as it sees fit, to assess an issue and all its ramifications and have 
the ability to recommend and report without inhibition or constraint.”). Law Comm’n of Can., 
Operations Protocol (on file with author) (“The Commission will develop its research 
programme around general themes that reflect problems as experienced, regardless of how 
these problems are cast in federal legislation. . . . The Commission seeks to maintain a balance 
between its policy independence from the Department of Justice, and its accountability to the 
Canadian public through the tabling of its Reports in the Parliament of Canada.”).  
 93. See, e.g., DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, THE LAW COMMISSION AND 
GOVERNMENT: WORKING TOGETHER TO DELIVER THE BENEFITS OF CLEAR, SIMPLE, 
MODERN LAW para. 1.9 (2006), http://www.dca.gov.uk/pubs/reports/lawcomm_vision.htm (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2007) (“The Government is committed to respecting the independence of the Law 
Commission as a statutory body.”); Austl. Law Reform Comm’n, About the ALRC, 
http://www.alrc.gov.au/about (last visited Jan. 5, 2007) (“[T]he ALRC is not under the control of 
government, giving it the intellectual independence and ability to make research findings and 
recommendations without fear or favour.”); Letter from Gov. Theodore R. Kulongoski to the 
Program Committee of the Oregon Law Commission (Nov. 12, 2003), available at 
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/oregonlawcommission/home/EthicsGovernorsProposal.pdf 
(explaining Governor’s decision, following veto of government ethics bill, to refer to Oregon 
Law Commission the issue of “comprehensive” reform to public ethics law—and noting that the 
Commission, being a “unique non-partisan partnership,” was “particularly well-suited to this 
task”). 
This is not to say that governments have consistently recognized and heeded the 
independence of those law commissions that lay claim to independence. In Canada, for 
example, the Conservative government of Stephen Harper completely defunded the Law 
Commission, a move that cheered his base but was attacked in other quarters as illegitimate and 
possibly illegal. Compare Tony Gosgnach, Conservatives Slash Secret Liberal Excesses, 15 
CATHOLIC INSIGHT 34 (2007), and Frances Russell, Harper Re-Engaging Far Right, WINNIPEG 
FREE PRESS, Oct. 11, 2006, at A13 with Lindsey Wiebe, Cutting Law Commission Funds May 
Be Illegal, Layton Says, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Oct. 6, 2006, at A5. See also Kirk Makin, 
Ontario Unveils Law Reform Commission, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 1, 2006, at A6 (reporting on 
efforts to establish a provincial law reform commission “impervious to future political 
meddling” in the wake of the defunding of the Law Commission of Canada). 
 94. This is the case in, for example, Canada and New Zealand. See Law Commission Act of 
Canada, S.C., ch. 9, § 4 (1996); Law Commission Act 1985, 1985 S.N.Z. No. 151. 
 95. See Palmer, supra note 92, at 4–5 (stating that the commission’s “comparative 
advantage” is to be found in “large, long-term projects that straddle electoral cycles”; projects 
that “[i]nvolve issues that span the interests of a number of government agencies and 
professional groups”; projects that “[n]eed to be done independently of central government 
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constitutionally entrenched, undertakes to “review all laws of Malawi 
for conformity with the Constitution and applicable international 
law.”96 The Law Commission of Canada claimed a mandate “to 
examine critically even the most fundamental principles of the 
Canadian legal system and to evaluate the performance of those 
institutions by which these principles are put into practice.”97 The 
Commission endeavored “to point out explicitly where the law is 
lacking in relevance and responsiveness, where it is inaccessible and 
where its principles or impacts are unjust.”98 This is a far cry from 
code-book housecleaning.99 
Following public consultations, the Law Commission of Canada 
chose to work on such foundational and politically fraught projects as 
“Order and Security,” “Electoral Reform,” and “From Restorative 
Justice to Transformative Justice.”100 The Commission proposed far-
reaching changes, including the replacement of first-past-the-post 
 
agencies because of the existence of vested interests”; and projects that “[r]equire independent 
consideration in order to promote informed public debate on future policy direction”). A 
similar theme recurs in the project selection criteria of the Law Reform Institute of Alberta, 
which include whether the “project [is one] that neither the political process nor the 
administrative process is likely to deal with effectively.” J. Bruce Robertson, Initiation and 
Selection of Projects, in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 102, 106. 
 96. Mwangala Kamuwanga, The Challenge of Law Reform in Southern Africa, in THE 
PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 422, 428. 
 97. Law Comm’n of Can., Mandate (on file with author). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Whether the Law Commission of Canada should be viewed as a harbinger of law 
commissions to come is an open question. On the one hand, the Commission was considered a 
model by leading figures in the law reform community worldwide. See Archer, supra note 83. 
But its ambitious agenda had an ideological sting, and led to conflicts with the Conservative 
government of Stephen Harper, which completely defunded the Commission shortly before this 
Article went to press. See supra note 83. Whether the Commission’s defunding was a death knell 
remains to be seen. Some observers attacked the defunding as illegitimate or even illegal. See 
Ibbitson, supra note 83; Lindsey Wiebe, Cutting Law Commission Funds May Be Illegal, Layton 
Says, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Oct. 6, 2006, at A5. Some pointed out that the Conservatives 
resorted to financial “chicanery” to hobble the Commission because they “kn[ew] they would 
lose” if they asked Parliament to repeal the act that created the Commission. See Ibbitson, 
supra. In Ontario, the provincial government responded to the Law Commission of Canada’s 
defunding with a proposal to establish a provincial law reform commission “impervious to 
political meddling.” Kirk Makin, Ontario Unveils Law Reform Commission, GLOBE & MAIL, 
Dec. 1, 2006, at A6. In short, while the Commission is presently defunct, it is entirely possible 
that the next government will provide it with new funding and perhaps introduce legislation to 
shore up its independence. For the Commission to prosper over the long run, however, it will 
probably be necessary for it to develop new decisionmaking criteria and procedures to combat 
the perception that it is a tool of left-liberal activists. 
 100. Law Comm’n of Can., Research Projects, (on file with author). 
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elections (for seats in Parliament) with a mixed-member proportional 
alternative.101  
Increasingly, law commissions are also being established to 
develop constitutional amendments and revisions. This has occurred 
at the state level in the United States,102 and at the national level in 
other polities.103 Constitution revision commissions are almost always 
ephemeral, disbanding upon the issuance of their recommendations, 
and in that sense unlike the other bodies surveyed here.104 But their 
use is broadly consistent with the trend toward employing law reform 
commissions for much more than housekeeping. 
A final institutional antecedent for advisory counterparts whose 
subject-matter jurisdiction would extend to the full sweep of the 
polity’s basic aspirations is the vestigial second legislative chamber, 
such as the U.K.’s House of Lords. Historically, it was quite common 
for bicameral democracies to provide for the selection of upper-house 
members by appointment, heredity, or indirect election by political 
elites.105 These selection procedures were designed so as to represent 
either the propertied classes or, in confederated nations, the 
constituent units of government.106 Second chambers organized on the 
propertied-classes model foundered in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.107 Increasingly out of step with democratizing 
cultures, some of these bodies were abolished, and many more were 
subjected to broad-based popular elections.108 Others saw their 
powers drastically curtailed.109 For example, the Parliament Act of 
1911 replaced the House of Lords’ power to block legislation with a 
 
 101. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., VOTING COUNTS: ELECTORAL REFORM FOR CANADA 90 
(2004). 
 102. See Williams, supra note 80, at 1–2 (“[T]he research leading to this article grew out of 
work performed for a state constitutional commission. Such appointed commissions and their 
growing impact on the evolution of state constitutions have not been adequately recognized.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Brij V. Lal, Constitutional Engineering in Post-Coup Fiji, in THE 
ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY 267, 268 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002); Bereket Habte 
Selassie, The Eritrean Experience in Constitution Making: The Dialectic of Process and 
Substance, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY, supra, at 357, 358–59; The Constitution of 
Kenya Review Commission (CKRC), http://www.kenyaelections.com/kenyareview.html (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2007). 
 104. One exception is Utah’s Constitution Revision Study Commission, which has been in 
operation since 1969. See Williams, supra note 80, at 14–15. 
 105. See generally GEORGE TSEBELIS & JEANNETTE MONEY, BICAMERALISM 15–43 (1997). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 34–35. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 34. 
01__ELMENDORF.DOC 3/9/2007  7:44 AM 
976 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:953 
“suspensive veto,” subject to override by the House of Commons 
following a modest interval of time.110 Populist pressures have not 
abated. Reformers continue to agitate for abolition or direct election 
of the “undemocratic” upper houses,111 making members of these 
bodies reluctant to exercise even the modest power of the suspensive 
veto.112 
It is possible, however, that if the process of appointing upper 
house members is reformed so as to strip away any remnants of 
propertied privilege and to ensure that the appointees are not just 
partisan hacks, the appointed second legislative chambers will come 
to play distinctive and useful roles as constitutional advice-givers, 
perhaps with a limited power of legislative delay.113 This is the future 
for the British upper house envisioned by the Royal Commission on 
the Reform of the House of Lords (also called the Wakeham 
Commission), which Prime Minister Blair convened in the late 
1990s.114 The Wakeham Commission made several intriguing 
suggestions. It urged that the House of Lords institutionalize its 
constitutional safeguarding role by setting up “an authoritative 
Constitutional Committee . . . of distinguished people who . . . are 
under a duty to produce independent, dispassionate, and 
authoritative reports on problem areas within the constitution and on 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. For case studies illustrating the tenuous position of the upper house in a number of 
advanced democracies, see generally SENATES: BICAMERALISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
WORLD (Samuel C. Patterson & Anthony Mughan eds., 1999) [hereinafter SENATES]. In their 
concluding chapter, Patterson and Mughan observe that a “general lack of democratic 
legitimacy” often leaves upper houses “in a weak position to defend themselves against political 
opponents demanding their reform.” Anthony Mughan & Samuel C. Patterson, Senates: A 
Comparative Perspective, in SENATES, supra, at 333, 340. 
 112. That a lack of democratic credentials has long made the House of Lords reluctant to 
exercise the suspensive veto is a recurring theme in British scholarship and commentary. See, 
e.g., Denis Carter, The Powers and Conventions of the House of Lords, 74 POL. Q. 319 (2003) 
(describing this thesis). 
 113. Note that the idea that upper houses have an important role to play in countering the 
momentary “passions” of the citizenry is one with a long and illustrious lineage. See Samuel C. 
Patterson & Anthony Mughan, Senates and the Theory of Bicameralism, in SENATES, supra note 
111, at 1, 13–15. Consistent with the idea that second chambers have a special constitutional 
safeguarding role, many have greater de jure authority to block or delay constitutional reforms 
than ordinary legislation. See MEG RUSSELL, REFORMING THE HOUSE OF LORDS 40 & tbl. 2.2 
(2002). 
 114. Blair’s initial agenda for House of Lords reform—including appointment of a Royal 
Commission to make recommendations—was set forth in MODERNISING PARLIAMENT: 
REFORMING THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1999, Cm. 4183, available at http://www.archive.official-
documents.co.uk/document/cm41/4183/4183.htm. 
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proposals for changing it,”115 and by establishing a parallel or sub-
committee “with a wide-ranging remit in relation to human rights.”116 
The Commission further argued that a mostly appointed House of 
Lords could play this constitutional safeguarding role better than an 
elected House, not simply because of the appointed body’s greater 
remove from partisan and electoral politicking, but also because an 
appointed body could in some respects be more representative of the 
citizenry as a whole than a directly elected body.117 The strains of 
modern-day campaigning have winnowed the pool of potential 
elected officials, the argument went, and a suitably appointed body 
could be comprised of persons with a much wider range of 
experiences and outlooks.118 
Issued in 2000, the Wakeham Commission’s report was not 
wholeheartedly embraced by the Blair government, which chafed 
against the body’s recommendation for separating the upper house 
from political party control.119 Yet there has been incremental 
movement in the direction of some of the report’s central 
recommendations,120 and as the House of Lords becomes more 
broadly representative of the British populace, it is starting to behave 
more assertively.121 
 
 115. ROYAL COMM’N ON THE REFORM OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, A HOUSE FOR THE 
FUTURE 53 (2000). 
 116. Id. at 56. 
 117. Id. at 96–103 (setting forth “characteristics” that would be desirable to have in the 
membership of a reformed House of Lords); id. at 106 (“A wholly directly elected second 
chamber could not be broadly representative of the complex strands of British society.”). 
 118. Id. at 106, 115. 
 119. See PAT STRICKLAND & OONAGH GAY, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, RESEARCH 
PAPER 02/002, HOUSE OF LORDS REFORM—THE 2001 WHITE PAPER 10–16 (2002), 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2002/rp02-002.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2007) 
(comparing Wakeham proposal and the official Government response). 
 120. Blair unilaterally established an appointments commission modeled on the Royal 
Commission’s proposal, and promised not to interfere with the Commission’s choice of 
“independent” peers. See OONAGH GAY & RICHARD KELLY, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, 
STANDARD NOTE SN/PC/2855, THE HOUSE OF LORDS APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION 2–5 
(2006), http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-02855.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 
2007). Blair has also promoted legislation that would provide a statutory foundation for the 
Appointment Commission’s role. Id. at 10–12. 
 121. See RUSSELL, supra note 113, at 315 (suggesting that a long-quiescent House of Lords 
is showing new signs of life following recent changes which (i) eliminated the hereditary peers 
and (ii) brought the partisan balance of the House of Lords into alignment with the party 
preferences of the British electorate). 
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G. Summary 
Any generalization about the gamut of institutions I have 
surveyed would be hazardous. But in the interest of concreteness, this 
Article will use the term advisory counterpart to refer to a publicly 
chartered body with the following attributes. First, as to subject 
matter: the body is concerned with one or more areas of law touching 
on the characteristic commitments of liberal democracy, such as the 
protection of minority groups, the maintenance of separate public and 
private spheres, the holding of fair elections, and the like.122 Second, 
powers: the body has some coercive powers of investigation, and 
authorization to act sua sponte. It is charged with developing law 
reform recommendations and conducting educational campaigns but, 
absent a revocable delegation of authority from the legislature, it may 
not promulgate rules with the force of law. Third, independence: the 
advisory counterpart is constitutionally entrenched or otherwise 
designed for some degree of independence from the elected branches. 
The advisory counterparts are kin to constitutional courts by dint 
of the foundational nature of the topics with which they are 
concerned and their putative independence from the other branches 
of government. In other respects, however, the advisory counterparts 
look much more like administrative agencies. But they are agencies of 
a peculiar breed, set up to challenge the elected branches rather than 
to do their bidding, encouraged not simply to implement statutes but 
to press for their reform.123 
II.  EXAMINING THE COUNTERPARTS: PROMISE AND PITFALLS 
This Part develops a comparison of constitutional courts and 
advisory counterparts along three dimensions: crafting remedies, 
engaging public opinion, and achieving independence from the 
 
 122. The body might invoke the text of a written constitution in justifying its proposals, but 
this is not strictly necessary. It might also flesh out its charge with reference to norms found in 
statutory law, cultural traditions, international conventions and treaties, and the moral intuitions 
of the body’s members. 
 123. Others have recognized that administrative agencies can play an important advisory 
role in law reform. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) (envisioning roles for a hypothetical risk-regulation 
super-agency); Rachel Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715 (2005) (exploring 
factors that make sentencing commissions successful). On Breyer’s and Barkow’s accounts, 
agencies wield influence by gradually building the trust of elected officials. I will argue, by 
contrast, that under the right conditions, advisory counterparts can wield influence by 
challenging elected officials, rather than by serving as the officials’ dutiful agent. 
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elected branches of government. My goal is to depict how the 
advisory counterparts, seen in a favorable light, could contribute to 
the project of liberal, democratic self-government, and also to identify 
some of the practical impediments to realizing this vision. The best-
light argument explains my excitement about these bodies and will, I 
hope, motivate other legal scholars to venture forth into this largely 
uncharted institutional terrain. The practical-problems arguments are 
designed to orient subsequent empirical research and institutional 
tinkering. 
The best-light argument for what the counterparts have to offer 
runs on two levels. The first level concerns the establishment of 
structural remedies for—or prophylactics against—illiberal political 
dynamics. I focus more particularly on problems of top-down 
illiberality, wherein elected officials either take advantage of citizen 
inattention to pursue illiberal policies or actively try to shape ill-
defined or plastic citizen preferences so as to create a base of support 
for the officials’ illiberal ambitions. 
With respect to the establishment of remedies for (and 
safeguards against) illiberal political dynamics, the counterparts have, 
or could have, four important advantages over constitutional courts. 
For one, the fact or the prospect of such illiberal dynamics is often 
best addressed through legal reforms that are “legislative” in 
character, in that they involve setting up and funding public 
regulatory or oversight bureaucracies (e.g., freedom of information 
laws), or complex adjustments to the design of electoral systems. 
Familiar concerns about the separation of powers discourage judicial 
efforts to craft such legislative remedies. By contrast, developing 
legislation is right up the counterparts’ alley. 
The counterparts are also better positioned than constitutional 
courts to figure out when and why liberal values are threatened, and 
how those threats might best be countered. Many counterparts wield 
coercive powers of investigation, and even counterparts that lack de 
jure authority to force top officials to testify or hand over documents 
are better positioned than appellate courts to assemble information 
on governmental conduct and societal conditions. The counterparts 
have the administrative resources and flexibility to commission 
studies, to consult with current and former political insiders, to hold 
public hearings, and otherwise to gather and filter information about 
government practices. 
A third counterpart advantage is that advisory bodies can, in 
principle, be designed for greater independence from the elected 
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branches of government than constitutional courts, without posing 
much threat to democratic self rule—for however great its 
independence from the elected branches, a purely advisory body is 
unlikely to derail a governmental initiative without mustering a base 
of popular support for its position. This potential for greater 
independence is of no small significance insofar as the central purpose 
for the body in question is to guard basic constitutional ideals against 
illiberal ploys by then-serving elected officials. 
Finally, the counterparts are, in certain respects, better 
positioned than constitutional courts to develop what I shall term 
persuasive authority with average citizens, such that citizens revise 
their own policy preferences (if any) in line with the independent 
body’s recommendation. I concede that counterpart persuasive 
authority is likely to be weak in absolute terms, even inconsequential, 
as to many issues much of the time. But there is some basis for 
thinking—and some evidence—that counterparts can exercise 
significant persuasive authority on election-law and government-
integrity questions, particularly in the wake of scandals. Enough, in 
fact, to get elected officials to accede to reforms they personally 
disfavor. 
Put these pieces together—the wherewithal to design legislative 
solutions to structural illiberality, great independence from the 
elected branches of government, and persuasive authority with the 
citizenry (at least as to certain issues, at certain times)—and the 
picture that emerges is of an institution that could effect reforms that 
are wholly beyond the ken of constitutional courts, and do so in a 
manner that does not do violence to democratic sensibilities. 
The second level of the best-light argument is concerned not with 
the counterparts’ achievement of particular legal reforms but rather 
with the nature of the public dialogue and debate that the 
counterparts may bring about. My foil is the thesis that the principal 
function of, and justification for, constitutional judicial review as 
practiced in the United States is to induce the public to confront—
and in the process to refine or even remake—constitutional principle. 
Judicial review is a potentially powerful tool for catching public 
attention, and an independent body whose powers are merely 
advisory would seem much less well positioned to direct attention to 
the issues it deems important. But some counterparts wield other 
public powers that may be employed for debate-forcing purposes. 
Examples include the subpoena power, and, much less commonly, 
“legislative process rights,” such as authority to trigger a vote of the 
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legislature or a referendum on counterpart-proposed reforms. 
Moreover, a suitably designed counterpart may be able to establish 
persuasive authority with the electorate regarding public priorities, 
even if the body wields little persuasive authority (outside the 
election law and government integrity contexts) regarding what, 
exactly, should be done about the “priority” problem it has identified. 
As a thought experiment, I propose a model under which a 
counterpart with jurisdiction over the full sweep of the polity’s basic 
commitments is authorized to make “determinations of exceptional 
need,” which determination (1) would operate as a condition 
precedent for the counterpart’s exercise of its legislative process right, 
and (2) would formally preclude the counterpart from exercising this 
right again for at least x years. By credibly signaling the counterpart’s 
big-picture judgment about constitutional priorities and by calling 
into a play a process that will result in a vote on whether to adopt the 
counterpart’s proposed reform, the determination of need may be 
expected to move the counterpart’s findings and recommendations to 
the center of public debate. 
I conclude the dialogic argument with a brief, schematic account 
of how institutions set up for the purpose of instigating public 
dialogue about the meaning and application of a polity’s nominally 
constitutive commitments might be compared and assessed. In terms 
of these normative criteria, it is at least plausible to think that vote-
forcing by a priority-setting counterpart would prove more attractive 
than judicial review by constitutional courts. This argument is frankly 
speculative, in both its positive and normative dimensions. The point 
of the exercise is not to say that the United States or any other 
constitutional democracy should jettison constitutional courts in favor 
of priority-setting counterparts with legislative process rights, but 
simply to illustrate how one might go about comparing alternative 
ways of institutionalizing constitutional dialogue, and to draw out 
what is plausibly distinctive about the counterparts. 
Taken together, the best-light arguments offer a vision of what 
advisory counterparts might realistically achieve. They do not purport 
to explain the successes and failures of counterparts extant in the 
world today. If the best-case scenario were uninspiring, there would 
be little point in trying to figure out how real-world counterparts 
measure up and why they sometimes fall short. 
There are, of course, practical problems, the most basic of which 
is relevance. The recommendations of many existing counterparts 
seem to have little political traction. These entities wield little if any 
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persuasive authority with the proverbial median voter, and they lack 
appropriate tools for forcing problems to the center of public debate. 
Advisory counterparts may also have an institutional interest in 
discrediting the elected branches of government, which could lead to 
overuse of their investigatory powers (if any), with worrisome 
consequences: distracted government decisionmakers, loss of public 
support for large-scale governmental initiatives, or even bottom-up 
illiberality. 
Third, whatever the normative appeal of providing counterparts 
with great independence from the elected branches, this may be quite 
a challenge to achieve in practice. Some of the forces supporting 
constitutional courts’ de facto independence from the elected 
branches are nonoperative as to the counterparts. And some of the 
institutional design strategies that might support the counterparts’ de 
facto independence would also make them rather more dangerous 
entities, which undercuts the normative argument for great 
independence in the first instance. 
*          *          * 
My presentation of the best-light and practical problems 
arguments is organized around the focal topics of remedies, public 
engagement, and independence. As to each, I seek to adduce both the 
relevant theoretical considerations and some real world illustrations. 
A. Crafting Structural Remedies for Illiberality 
It is no secret that constitutional courts are uncomfortably 
positioned to give effect to liberal commitments where doing so 
requires not the elimination of a problematic statute, regulation, or 
administrative practice, but rather supplementation of the offending 
item (e.g., adding a new section to a statute), or initiation of some 
new governmental undertaking. To be sure, constitutional courts do 
have tools for establishing affirmative reforms. The structural 
injunction is one possibility.124 As well, the nominally negative power 
of striking down statutes may be used to affirmative ends.125 (If the 
 
 124. For a classic treatment of U.S. practice, see generally OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978). 
 125. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN 
EUROPE 61–91 (2000) (explaining how, in several European democracies, judge-made norms 
come to be encoded in statutes as legislatures respond to court decisions); J. MITCHELL 
PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL 
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stricken law was popular and the court’s opinion instructs the 
legislature on some other, constitutionally permissible way of 
achieving the same or similar ends, a favorable legislative response 
will often ensue.) Some constitutional courts are authorized to issue 
advisory opinions in which they make policy suggestions,126 and others 
not so authorized may use dicta to much the same effect.127 
Yet judicial forays into the crafting of affirmative remedies for 
constitutional problems are often—and properly—of quite narrow 
reach. It is not necessary for present purposes to get mired in the 
debate about what distinguishes an appropriate judge-made remedy 
from inappropriate “judicial legislation.” Suffice it to say that there is 
considerable agreement that constitutional courts generally should 
not get into the business of crafting large regulatory programs, adding 
new provisions to statutes, setting budgetary priorities, and the like. 
These limitations are grounded in concerns about the likelihood of 
error (resulting from judges’ lack of policymaking and policy-
monitoring expertise and the limitations of their case-specific point of 
view), as well as normative ideas about democratic legitimacy and the 
separation of powers.128 
 
REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM (2004) (examining congressional response to judicial 
decisions). 
 126. Regarding the use of advisory opinions by state supreme courts within the United 
States, see Jonathan D. Persky, Note, “Ghosts that Slay”: A Contemporary Look at State 
Advisory Opinions, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1155 (2005). Abroad, there is at least one judicial system, 
New Zealand’s, in which bill-of-rights adjudication is only advisory. See generally ANDREW 
BUTLER & PETRA BUTLER, THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (2005); 
THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS (Paul Rishworth et al. eds., 2003). 
 127. Compare Neal K. Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998) 
(explaining how advicegiving in dicta can be a valuable alternative to aggressive forms of 
judicial review), with Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to 
Professor Neal Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825 (1998) (debating the propriety of Article III 
courts’ use of dicta for policy advicegiving). 
 128. For notable articulations of and variations upon these themes within the U.S. legal 
tradition, see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 136–
204 (2001) (discussing the problem of “strategic judgment” in constitutional adjudication and 
associated limits on reach of the courts); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE 
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 640–47 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (setting forth legal theses of the legal 
process school concerning problems “appropriate for adjudication”); SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 
221–37 (exploring possibilities for judicial enforcement of positive social welfare rights, 
consistent with familiar understandings of limits on the judicial role). For an important partial 
dissent from the prevailing view, see Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization 
Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004) (arguing that 
constitutional courts can and should pursue large-scale institutional reform remedies, at least in 
circumstances where the legislature or other actors have created or can be induced to create 
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The judiciary’s limited capacity to fix constitutional problems is 
implicitly acknowledged in many of the post-Civil War, rights-
creating amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which authorize 
Congress to enforce the article “by appropriate legislation.”129 
Constitution framers in other countries have recognized limits to 
judicial implementation of constitutional commitments by designating 
certain sections of the constitution as nonjusticiable.130 
Reliance on legislative implementation may be a sensible 
response to worries about judicial capacity for crafting effective 
remedies, or to anxieties about judicial overreach, but what is to be 
done when members of the elected branches have a political incentive 
not to enact “appropriate legislation”? If the incentive results from 
the clamoring of an inveterately illiberal populace, perhaps nothing 
can be done. But to the extent that the incentive is an artifact of the 
ways in which public institutions channel and inform political 
competition, and if actors external to the elected branches are 
positioned to revise the problematic structures of representation or 
otherwise to effect liberal reforms, there may be some basis for hope. 
This is, of course, the root hope of process-based theories of 
constitutional judicial review.131 But courts can only do so much, 
thanks to their limited remedial capacities. Independent advisory 
bodies that combine the constitutional court’s characteristic remove 
from everyday politics with the legislature’s capacity for designing 
 
monitoring and standard-setting institutions on which the courts can rely). Illuminating 
perspectives from commentators within other traditions are found in COURTS AND POLICY: 
CHECKING THE BALANCE (B.D. Gray & R.B. McClintock eds., 1995) (surveying the status, 
across several Commonwealth nations, of the “balance in constitutional functions between the 
legislature/executive and the courts”), JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
(Kenneth M. Holland ed., 1991) (providing case studies of eleven countries), and Dieter Grimm, 
Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy, in JUDICIAL REVIEW IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 103 (Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., 2000) (offering a German justice’s 
perspective on maintaining balance between legislative and judicial authority). 
 129. These include the Thirteenth Amendment, which bans slavery and involuntary 
servitude; the Fourteenth Amendment, which establishes the national and State citizenship of 
all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and which subjects the states to due process 
and equal protection obligations; and the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-
sixth Amendments, which guarantee that the right to vote shall not be abridged on account of 
race, sex, failure to pay a tax, or age (in the case of citizens who are 18 or older), respectively. 
 130. Often these sections establish positive rights. For an illuminating discussion of the non-
justiciable “directive principles” found in the constitutions of South Africa and Ireland, see 
Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 
1898–1902 (2004). 
 131. The classic statement is in JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
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reforms to public institutions and electoral structures have the 
potential to do much more. The balance of this Section makes this 
point concrete—and shows what’s at stake—by highlighting several 
scenarios in which (1) political dynamics threaten to undermine 
liberal aspirations such as public accountability, political equality, 
tolerance, and civil liberty, even absent a powerful and incorrigibly 
illiberal faction within the citizenry; and (2) “appropriate” reforms lie 
beyond reach of the courts. In the Section that follows, I take up the 
question of how advisory counterparts can build public support for 
their proposed reforms. 
1. Political Accountability.  That elected officials must face the 
voters every so often gives those officials an interest in adjusting the 
rules of political competition in ways that disfavor challengers.132 To 
be sure, a vigilant citizenry that closely monitors the doings of 
political insiders can retard this tendency. Voters who agree on the 
limits of legitimate behavior by elected officials, and who understand 
what those officials are doing, might be able to coordinate on a 
“throw the bums out” strategy.133 But politicians whose careers are on 
the line will typically have much more information than do voters 
about how political competition is likely to be affected by, for 
example, particular reforms to information-disclosure regimes, 
campaign-finance laws, ballot-access rules, or electoral district 
boundaries.134 Self-interested incumbents may take advantage of 
asymmetric information to erode political competition. 
It bears emphasis that political accountability depends not only 
on familiar negative freedoms, such as rights to criticize the 
government and form advocacy groups, but also on the various 
statutes and administrative apparatuses that make the rights to 
 
 132. Cf. Nathaniel Persily & Melissa Cully Anderson, Regulating Democracy Through 
Democracy: The Use of Direct Legislation in Election Law Reform, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 997, 997 
(2005) (“Perhaps more than any other political phenomenon, incumbents’ capture of political 
institutions through the manipulation of the rules of the electoral game has commanded the 
attention of scholars of the law of democracy in recent years.”). 
 133. But see JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: 
AMERICANS’ BELIEFS IN HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 36–60 (2001) (developing the 
idea of “process space”—a dimension of voter decisionmaking concerned with political process 
as such—and theorizing that two-party competition fails to generate convergence on the median 
voter’s position in process space, as such competition has long been thought to do in policy 
space). 
 134. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 709 (1998). 
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criticize and associate meaningful sources of accountability. These 
statutes often implicate exceedingly delicate questions about 
institutional design. Consider the cross-cutting issues at stake in what 
might be termed the “transparency regime”—the set of rules, 
administrative protocols, and enforcement mechanisms that provide 
citizens with information about what their government is up to, about 
who has contributed what to the campaigns of elected leaders, and 
about the financial entanglements of government officials. The 
crafting of transparency policy requires close attention to incentives 
and opportunities for obfuscation, to the packaging and timing of 
information disclosures, and to such countervailing values as privacy, 
intragovernmental deliberation, and security.135 Courts may be able to 
tinker productively at the margins of a statutorily created 
transparency regime,136 but no one seriously argues that constitutional 
courts should dictate the basic contours of the regime, 
notwithstanding that government leaders often will wish to conceal 
far more information than is justifiable in public-interest terms.137 
2. Political Equality.  The regulative ideal of political equality 
presents any number of difficult questions about collective obligation. 
Should the government undertake to register all eligible voters, as 
opposed to putting the onus on citizens to self-register?138 Should 
private campaign finance be augmented through voucher or 
matching-fund programs that would enable citizens of modest means 
 
 135. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and 
Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 918–23 (2006) (discussing the 
tradeoffs and policy problems presented by open government laws); Mark Fenster, The Opacity 
of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006) (same). Cf. Pablo da Silveira, Representation, 
Secrecy, and Accountability, 12 J. INFO. ETHICS 8 (2003) (linking information disclosure policies 
to theories of representation). 
 136. Samaha, supra note 135, at 956–76. 
 137. Much the same can be said about the role of courts vis-à-vis the technological and legal 
architecture requisite to the production, through digital speech, of what Jack Balkin terms 
“democratic culture.” See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 52–54 (2004) (arguing 
that, in the digital age, free speech advocates ought to shift their attention from “speech rights” 
to “speech values,” and claiming that it will fall to legislatures and administrative agencies 
rather than courts to protect these values, due to courts’ inability to craft suitably 
comprehensive and technologically informed regulatory arrangements). 
 138. Cf. Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election 
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 964–73 (2005) 
(calling for universal voter registration). 
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to be heard when politicians compete for dollars?139 Does a 
commitment to political equality entail a commitment to high quality 
and publicly financed education? 
However these questions are answered, two things are clear. 
First, judicial imposition of such affirmative remedies for political 
inequality would tax the technical competence and quite possibly the 
legitimacy of constitutional courts. Second, the elected officials and 
political parties who hold the reins of power will assess possible 
reforms to the laws that regulate political participation in terms of the 
likely electoral payoff. They will weigh the probable electoral fallout 
from denying political equality claims against the likely change in the 
composition and orientation of the electorate that would result from 
recognizing those claims. Consequently, electoral competition can 
generate sharp expansions or curtailments of political equality.140 
The early efforts of the United Kingdom’s recently established 
Electoral Commission illustrate how an independent advisory body 
can articulate a vision of political equality and encourage the passage 
of legislation responsive to that vision. With the aim of securing “the 
widest possible participation in democracy,”141 the Commission has 
proposed reforms that would facilitate voting by the blind and by 
non-English speakers;142 called for public matching funds for small 
political donations (up to £200);143 and encouraged experimentation 
 
 139. Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS (2002) (proposing 
voucher program); John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 591, 640–66 (2005) (proposing matching fund program); Spencer Overton, The Donor 
Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73 (2004) (same). 
 140. The curtailment dynamic is sadly illustrated by the history of the African-American 
franchise following Reconstruction. For a succinct history see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, 
Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2000). 
 141. ELECTORAL COMM’N, STANDING FOR ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 8 (2003), 
available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/Standing_9846-7972__E__N__S__ 
W__.pdf; see also ELECTORAL COMM’N, VOTING FOR CHANGE: AN ELECTORAL LAW 
MODERNISATION PROGRAMME 13 (2003) [hereinafter ELECTORAL COMM’N, VOTING FOR 
CHANGE], available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/Votingforchange_ 
16305-7978__E__N__S__W__.pdf (proposing more than one hundred “electoral law 
modernization” reforms, with the aim of “creat[ing] the best possible conditions for the widest 
possible range of political parties and candidates to engage with the electorate”). 
 142. ELECTORAL COMM’N, EQUAL ACCESS TO DEMOCRACY 4 (2003), available at 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/Access_9786-7962__E__N__S__W__.pdf 
(recommending that Braille and large-print paper ballots be made available, and that non-
English speakers be aided with foreign language instructions and pictorial guides). 
 143. ELECTORAL COMM’N, THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES 4–5, 97–101 (2004), 
available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/partyfundingFINALproofs_15301-
11394__E__N__S__W__.pdf. 
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with new voting technologies that could lower the cost (to voters) of 
casting a ballot.144 At the same time—and much to the chagrin of the 
Labour government—the Commission has forcefully advocated 
switching from a household to an individualized system of voter 
registration.145 The Commission has defended its registration-reform 
proposals not only on grounds of preventing fraud and coercion, but 
also on the “point of principle” that “the nature of voting itself is a 
fundamental individual right.”146 Because “[e]lectoral registration is 
the basis for voter participation,” the Commission explained, “it too 
should be based on the individual.”147 
3. Group Animus.  The holding of elections can affect, in 
predictable ways, the degree of tolerance or intolerance that prevails 
among the ethnic and religious groups that make up a citizenry. 
Donald Horowitz and others have shown that under the right 
conditions—basically, where the electoral system is structured such 
that politicians have to develop cross-group support in order to get 
elected—the effects can be very salutary.148 But where the electoral 
system aligns with preexisting social cleavages, enabling politicians to 
win office with the support of a single group, the effects can be 
devastating. Here, the fact that office-holders must periodically stand 
for election can result in a terrific incentive for politicians to foment 
 
 144. ELECTORAL COMM’N, SECURING THE VOTE 37–40 (2005), available at http://image. 
guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2005/05/20/eleccommission.pdf (assessing prospects 
for “multi-channel” elections); ELECTORAL COMM’N, VOTING FOR CHANGE, supra note 141, at 
34–35 (embracing voting technology pilot programs). 
 145. ELECTORAL COMM’N, DELIVERING DEMOCRACY? THE FUTURE OF POSTAL VOTING 
7 (2004), available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/DeliveringDemocracy 
finalcomplete_16306-10935__E__N__S__W__.pdf (describing individual electoral registration as 
“the key building block on which safe and secure remote elections can be delivered); 
ELECTORAL COMM’N, SECURING THE VOTE, supra note 144, at 41–42. On the Labour 
Government’s chagrin, see Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1396–1404 (describing tensions 
between Electoral Commission and Blair Government). 
 146. ELECTORAL COMM’N, COMMISSION’S RESPONSE TO DCA PAPER ON ELECTORAL 
ADMINISTRATION 6 (2005), available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/ 
ECresponsetoDCApolicypaper_17721-13100__E__N__S__W__.pdf. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See generally DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 601–52 (2d ed. 
2000); BEN REILLY, DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES: ELECTORAL ENGINEERING FOR 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (2001). Quantitative, cross-national results on the impact of electoral 
systems on cleavage politics—in particular, the choice of “bonding” or “bridging” strategies by 
political parties and the extent to which group membership determines voting behavior—are 
provided in PIPPA NORRIS, ELECTORAL ENGINEERING: VOTING RULES AND POLITICAL 
BEHAVIOR 97–124 (2004). 
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intergroup hatred,149 particularly insofar as out-group members have 
exit options, and can be harassed into leaving the jurisdiction.150 The 
important point for present purposes is that illiberal racial or religious 
sentiments are not just a given—a fact of life that politicians must 
deal with. They can be exacerbated or assuaged through political 
campaigns and public programs, and whether the dominant 
politicians happen to be flamethrowers or reconcilers is not just a 
matter of chance, but of the interplay between electoral and social 
structures. 
Horowitz indicates that ethnically and religiously fractured 
societies often fare best under democratic rule when legislators are 
elected from multimember districts using “alternative vote” 
balloting.151 The alternative-vote rule rewards candidates who manage 
to become the second choice of voters, which encourages cross-
cleavage electioneering.152 Districted elections can be advantageous 
too, in that they reward legislators who pursue low-conflict political 
strategies like constituent service and provisioning of pork, rather 
than more ideological programs.153 
 
 149. HOROWITZ, supra note 148, at 349–60; see also Rogers Brubaker & David D. Laitlin, 
Ethnic and Nationalist Violence, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 423, 433–34 (1998) (reviewing empirical 
literature on group leaders’ “deliberate staging, instigation, provocation, dramatization, or 
intensification of violent or potentially violent confrontations with outsiders” which is 
“ordinarily undertaken by vulnerable incumbents seeking to deflect within-group challenges to 
their position by redefining the fundamental lines of conflict as inter- rather than (as challengers 
would have it) intragroup”); cf. Tom Ginsburg, Democracy, Markets and Doomsaying: Is Ethnic 
Conflict Inevitable?, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 310, 330 (2004) (“Ethnic tension is generally a 
top-down phenomenon, not one that emerges from the grassroots.”). 
 150. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping 
the Electorate, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2005). 
 151. Donald L. Horowitz, Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers, 14 J. 
DEMOCRACY 115, 122–25 (2003); Donald L. Horowitz, The Alternative Vote and Interethnic 
Moderation: A Reply to Fraenkel and Grofman, 121 PUB. CHOICE 507 (2004) [hereinafter 
Horowitz, Alternative Vote and Interethnic Moderation]. 
 152. Horowitz, Alternative Vote and Interethnic Moderation, supra note 151, at 508. 
 153. NORRIS, supra note 148, at 11–13, 230–46. There is, of course, no one-size-fits-all 
“electoral solution” to the problem of ethnic conflict, and many other structural features of 
government (beyond the choice of a vote-aggregation rule) can affect the incentives for 
conciliation, or otherwise help to avert ethnic conflict. See generally Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic 
Conflict Management for Policymakers, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC 
SOCIETIES 115 (Joseph. V. Montville ed., 1990) (discussing federalism, devolution, vote 
distribution requirements, the reservation of positions for members of specific groups, and 
more); Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Pluralism: Strategies for Conflict Management, in FACING 
ETHNIC CONFLICTS: TOWARD A NEW REALISM 203 (Andreas Wimmer et al. eds., 2004) 
(cautioning against generalizing about ethnic conflicts). 
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Needless to say, it would be a radical move for a constitutional 
court to demand an end to at-large elections with proportional 
representation in favor of geographic constituencies, or to order the 
replacement of single-member district, first-past-the-post elections 
with a “specially designed for tolerance” multi-member district, 
alternative-vote setup.154 But as the Law Commission of Canada has 
demonstrated, some advisory counterparts are capable of pursuing 
wholesale reforms to the structure of representation.155 
4. Liberty and Security.  The question of what sorts of 
institutional arrangements best encourage prudent policymaking in 
the face of suddenly elevated security risks is very much open.156 I 
take it that a good arrangement would accommodate liberty 
infringements that yield genuine and roughly commensurate security 
benefits, while hindering the use of security measures for purely 
political gain (e.g., rally-round-the-flag effects, the harassment of 
political opponents, etc.). Whatever the particulars, it is certainly 
plausible to think that most such arrangements would subject the 
executive to oversight by a body (1) that is not controlled by persons 
who have an interest in the political success of the head of the 
government, and (2) that is positioned to evaluate the extent of 
liberty-infringement and the achievement of security benefits under 
the program in question. Constitutional courts might contribute at the 
margins to this process by, for example, policing the separation of 
powers as between the government and oversight bodies.157 But it 
 
 154. Note in this regard that while the Voting Rights Act has provided the U.S. Supreme 
Court with an open-ended statutory platform for redesigning representational structures with an 
eye to better integrating minority groups into the political process (so that Justices who wish to 
pursue this agenda need not resort to the big gun of a constitutional holding), the Court has 
been exceedingly reluctant to entertain structural remedies beyond (1) the substitution of 
districted for at-large elections; and (2) the redesign of single-member districts so as to ensure 
that geographically concentrated minorities are able to elect responsive representatives under 
conditions of polarized voting. Cf. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 881 (1994) (rejecting vote-
dilution challenge to structure of county government for want of a “principled . . . benchmark of 
comparison”). 
 155. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 156. For a useful compendium of views see THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND 
ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2005). 
 157. See infra Part III. Constitutional courts might also have an important role to play in 
categorically defending certain core liberties during tumultuous times, but their track record in 
this respect is checkered at best. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION 
AWAY FROM THE COURTS 162 (1999) (“We can look around the world for examples of 
[judicial] resistance [to extreme cases of oppression], and we will not find enough to take heart 
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strains credulity to think that courts could do a good job of seeing to 
the establishment of such bodies, let alone of assessing for themselves 
the achievements and limitations of different security initiatives. 
Constitutional judicial review is no substitute for sound framework 
legislation that limits or expands executive discretion in relevant 
respects; that imposes appropriate reporting and auditing 
requirements; that partitions responsibilities among electorally 
accountable and electorally insulated institutions, and majority and 
minority parties; and that sunsets or otherwise provides for its own 
periodic review and re-assessment.158 
India’s National Human Rights Commission illustrates how a 
persistent advisory body may afford a line of defense against the 
unwarranted curtailment of civil liberties. The Commission has 
contributed to the development of better interrogation practices, and 
has been a forceful critic of anti-terrorism legislation. Regarding the 
former, the Commission’s investigations into mistreatment and death 
of detainees led it to conclude that post-mortem examinations of 
persons who die in custody should be videotaped.159 Twenty Indian 
states have since adopted this policy.160 The Commission also 
convened a group of forensic experts to develop better postmortem 
procedures, and produced a Model Autopsy Form.161 These 
interventions may not resolve the problem of detainee abuse, but 
 
from.”); George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National Courts 
During Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1984) (reviewing the history of court 
involvement in the regulation of emergency situations arising in common law countries); K.D. 
Ewing, The Futility of the Human Rights Act, 48 PUB. L. 829 (2004) (critically surveying the 
contemporary and historical record of British judges in addressing liberty, privacy, and freedom-
of-association concerns in the face of national security threats). But see GEOFFREY R. STONE, 
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 550 (2004) (“[T]he [U.S. Supreme] Court has a 
long, if uneven, record of fulfilling its constitutional responsibility to protect civil liberties—even 
in time of war.”). 
 158. For illustrative framework-legislation proposals, see Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency 
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004) (proposing framework legislation to check executive 
powers during a state of emergency); John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, If Terrorists 
Attacked Our Presidential Elections, 3 ELECTION L.J. 597, 610 (2005) (proposing a framework 
for delaying presidential election in the event of a terrorist attack); Lawrence O. Gostin et al., 
The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and 
Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 622 (2002) (proposing a 
framework for emergency measures in the face of dire public health threats). See also Mariano-
Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227 (2006). 
 159. See Evans, supra note 27, at 720–21. 
 160. Id. at 721. 
 161. Id. at 721 n. 57. 
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they at least put in place a framework for monitoring what detainees 
have suffered through, and for exposing abuses to public scrutiny.162 
The Commission has also taken up the question of how India 
should answer terrorism. Soon after it was established, in 1993, the 
Commission conducted a major inquiry into alleged abuses under the 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, or TADA.163 
TADA came up for renewal in 1995, at which point the Commission 
sent a public letter to members of parliament recounting its findings 
and calling for “this draconian law [to be] removed from the [s]tatute 
book.”164 Parliament let the statute lapse.165 Pressure for expanded 
governmental powers to combat terrorism did not abate, however, 
and in 2001 a revised version of TADA was enacted over the 
Commission’s first equivocal and then forceful objection.166 
 
 162. For more on the Commission’s successful efforts to get Indian states to enact 
standardized procedures for reporting custodial deaths to the Commission, and videotaping 
interrogations, see the Commission’s annual reports for 1993–94, 1995–96, 1997–98, 1990–2000, 
2000–01, and 2002–03, available at http://nhrc.nic.in (follow “Archives” hyperlink). The 
Commission appears to have induced state cooperation through a combination of public 
pressure (naming laggard states in its annual report, and releasing frank and potentially 
embarrassing letters written to state officials), and threats of Commission-led investigations. 
The Commission has taken the position, for example, that a state’s failure to report a custodial 
death within twenty-four hours “give[s] rise to a presumption . . . that an effort was being made 
to suppress knowledge of the incident.” NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 
1993–1994 para. 5.4 (India) [hereinafter NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 
1993–1994], available at http://nhrc.nic.in (follow “Archives” hyperlink). While no legal 
consequences as such attach to a Commission “finding” of prisoner abuse resulting in death, the 
Commission may recommend compensation and/or prosecution, see, e.g., NAT’L HUMAN 
RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1996–1997 para. 3.26 (India), available at http://nhrc.nic.in 
(follow “Archives” hyperlink), and state leaders evidently seek to avoid being singled out for 
such misdeeds. 
 163. See NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1993–1994, supra note 162, 
para. 7.3; NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1994–1995 paras. 3.1–3.3, 4.1–4.6 
& annexure I (India), available at http://nhrc.nic.in (follow “Archives” hyperlink). 
 164. NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1994–1995, supra note 163, 
annexure I. 
 165. NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1995–1996 para. 4.1 (India), 
available at http://nhrc.nic.in (follow “Archives” hyperlink). 
 166. The new anti-terrorism bill was drafted by the Law Commission of India, a body which, 
unlike certain of the law commissions noted above, appears to be under the Government’s 
control. See Early Developments, http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/main.htm#POST-
INDEPENDENCE_DEVELOPMENTS (last visited Jan. 8, 2007) (indicating that “[t]he 
Seventeenth Law Commission was constituted through a Government order [and] will have a 
three-year term,” and that “[t]he Commission is empowered to have a few part-time Members 
and/or Consultants depending upon the need and on the Approval of the Government”). At the 
first meeting on the Law Commission’s draft, the chairperson of the Human Rights Commission 
apparently spoke of need for “safeguards” and “legislation with a human face,” but did not 
reject outright the Law Commission’s draft. LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, 173RD REPORT ON 
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B. Engaging the Citizenry 
That advisory counterparts are better positioned than 
constitutional courts to craft legislative remedies is of little moment 
unless the counterparts can also do something to bring about the 
enactment of their proposed reforms. Reforms meant to check then-
serving elected officials are unlikely to be adopted out of the 
goodness of those officials’ hearts.167 In this respect, however, the 
counterpart’s “problem” is not that different from the constitutional 
court’s. Neither commands a police force or military.168 For the court 
to win elected-branch compliance with its orders, or for the 
counterpart to win elected-branch enactment of its proposed reforms, 
the independent body generally must collaborate with some other 
actor that can apply sanctions to elected-branch officials. In principle, 
any number of actors might play the sanctioning role. For example, 
the military, which might threaten a coup; or foreign powers, which 
might withhold trade concessions or deny entry into trans-national 
organizations. Although there are important questions to investigate 
about how courts and counterparts might win compliance on account 
of international pressure,169 this Article focuses on that ultimate 
backstop of democratic political orders: the citizenry. 
 
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM BILL, 2000 ch. 3, para. 3 (2000), available at 
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/tada.htm. Later, however, the Human Rights Commission 
denounced the bill as “unnecessary.” See NAT’L HUM. RTS. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2000–
2001 annexure I (India), available at http://nhrc.nic.in/annexDoc00_01.htm#no2. 
 167. This is not to deny that advisory counterparts sometimes play a useful role by 
collaborating with like-minded but less well-informed legislators. Illustrative examples can be 
found among state-level sentencing commissions in the United States, see Barkow, supra note 
123, at 771–98 (2005); privacy commissions in Europe, see FLAHERTY, supra note 39, at 37–38, 
64–66, 89 (discussing the politics of privacy and security in Germany); and anticorruption 
commissions in Asia, see MANION, supra note 57, at 51–52, 204 (marveling at the 
“remarkable . . . role of [Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption] as a 
consultant at the stage of policy formulation or legislative drafting”). But this strategy for 
counterpart influence obviously will not do in circumstances where the dominant coalition in 
the legislature faces political incentives not to enact “appropriate legislation.” 
 168. “Rare and partial exceptions include the Commission on Elections in the Philippines, 
which has been authorized to deploy the armed forces when necessary to ensure the conduct of 
free and fair elections.” John Murphy, An Independent Electoral Commission, in FREE AND 
FAIR ELECTIONS 25, 36 (Nico Steytler et al. eds., 1994). 
 169. The Danish NHRI, for one, appears to have gotten reforms enacted by appealing to 
multinational organizations. See Kjaerum, supra note 23, at 115–16. Other countries have 
established human rights commissions to defuse international criticism of their rights records, 
see Sonia Cardenas, National Human Rights Commissions in Asia, in SOVEREIGNTY UNDER 
CHALLENGE: HOW GOVERNMENTS RESPOND 55, 58–70 (John D. Montgomery & Nathan 
Glazer eds., 2002), and it would not be surprising if a similar dynamic occasionally makes it hard 
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Suppose that the elected branches have enacted policy x, which 
the median voter does not oppose.170 The court or counterpart favors 
y instead. Broadly speaking, there are two different ways in which a 
court or counterpart might bring about pressure (mediated by public 
opinion) for the elected branches to accede to y. The independent 
body might do this by exercising authority with the median voter 
concerning policies x and y; alternatively, the body might foster public 
debate about the question at hand, as a result of which the median 
voter revises her views about the relative merits of x and y.171 
This Section develops a comparison of constitutional courts and 
advisory counterparts as loci of authority and as instigators of public 
debates about the meaning and application of a polity’s nominally 
constitutive commitments. My aims are both positive and normative. 
On the positive front, I advance some tentative hypotheses 
concerning (1) the counterparts’ comparative advantage in 
establishing what I shall term “persuasive authority” with the 
electorate; and (2) the circumstances under which counterparts are 
most authoritative. As well, I explore (3) how counterparts that do 
not wield much authority regarding what should be done about the 
policy question at hand may nonetheless get a public debate 
underway; and (4) how counterpart-instigated debates differ from 
court-triggered debates. On the normative front, I present a bare 
sketch of how institutions set up to foster public discourse about 
constitutional matters might be evaluated, and on this basis offer a 
tentative defense of one model for debate-prompting counterparts. 
1. Courts, Counterparts, and the Problem of Authoritative 
Prescription.  In a reasonably well-functioning democracy, it is to be 
expected that independent (i.e., politically insulated) institutions will 
often find it difficult to develop enough authority with the electorate 
to mount an effective challenge to policies that are favored by the 
 
to wave off the commission’s recommendations. Note also that foreign policy considerations are 
sometimes said to account for compliance with constitutional court judgments in new 
democracies. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 1, at 776–77 (arguing that elected branches in the 
new democracies of Eastern Europe accepted binding judicial review as the price of admission 
into the European Union). 
 170. Throughout this paper I will use “median voter” as shorthand to refer to the decisive or 
“swing” segment of the electorate. 
 171. I shall bracket for purposes of this discussion a third possibility, namely, that the 
independent body (e.g., a counterpart with investigatory powers) might be able to win elected-
branch acceptance of its proposal by threatening to reveal to the general public politically 
damaging information about elected-branch officials. 
01__ELMENDORF.DOC 3/9/2007  7:44 AM 
2007] ADVISORY COUNTERPARTS 995 
elected branches of government. There are, however, several 
different bases on which an independent body might claim the 
median voter’s allegiance in disputes with the elected branches. 
For one, the persons who serve on the body may occupy a social 
station that commands deference. Perhaps they lead a religious 
denomination to which the median voter belongs. Perhaps their class 
is one to which “common” people regularly defer. This basis for 
authority ought to wane, however, as national cultures democratize, 
and I will set it aside for purposes of this Article. 
Conventions about legality represent a second basis on which the 
independent body might found its claim to authority. Regardless of 
whether policy y (favored by the independent body) is a better fit 
with the citizen’s underlying interests and concerns than policy x 
(favored by the elected branches), citizens who understand the 
independent body to have legal authority to make policy on behalf of 
the polity, and who believe that the body has chosen y in the legally 
authorized manner, may be prepared to retaliate against elected 
officials who challenge that decision (unless the challenge itself runs 
through the legally authorized channels, e.g., negating a Supreme 
Court decision by constitutional amendment, or through the 
appointments process, rather than by flouting a court order). The 
vehemence with which citizens retaliate is likely to depend, inter alia, 
on their commitment to rule-of-law values, and their confidence that 
the independent body has complied with the relevant legality 
convention. 
Legal authority should be distinguished from persuasive 
authority.172 An actor exercises persuasive authority if her 
 
 172. Note that I am using the terms “legal authority” and “persuasive authority” to refer to 
bases on which an independent body may convince citizens to accept its prescriptions. Similar 
terminology is employed in the literature concerning when and how U.S. judges should employ 
foreign precedents for purposes of interpreting and applying the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., 
David Fontana, The Next Generation of Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law 
Scholarship: A Reply to Professor Tushnet, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 445 (2004) (using terms 
“persuasive authority” and “binding authority” to characterize treatment of foreign 
constitutional court decisions in U.S. constitutional adjudication). Needless to say, my analysis 
has little to do with that debate, and I do not mean to allude to it with my choice of terminology. 
I am concerned with the circumstances under which a public actor can get its target audience 
(citizens) to accede to its prescriptions; presumably foreign judges do not often issue decisions 
with the goal of seeing them followed in analogous cases by U.S. judges. In any event, the 
foreign-law-in-domestic-constitutional-interpretation literature is more concerned with the 
normative question of when and how U.S. judges should look to foreign precedents, rather than 
the positive question of the circumstances under which U.S. judges will treat foreign decisions as 
having persuasive or binding authority. 
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endorsement of a policy provides information to listeners about the 
balance of reasons that, from the listeners’ perspective, count in favor 
of that course of action.173 In short, persuasive authority is concerned 
with the substantive merits of the policy—whether it well suits 
contemporary conditions and needs—whereas legal authority 
provides a basis for following the authoritative actor’s directive 
independent of the directive’s wisdom.174 When an electorally 
accountable official and a politically insulated actor disagree about 
policy, the fact that the elected official must face the voters every so 
often should tend to make her judgment more persuasive with those 
voters. But under the right conditions, the independent actor may 
develop persuasive authority with the electorate superior to that of 
the nominally more accountable official.175 The independent actor 
should prove comparatively persuasive insofar as (1) citizens think 
the independent actor has information or expertise that the 
electorally accountable official lacks; (2) citizens doubt the efficacy of 
the electoral mechanism as a means of inducing public-regarding 
behavior by the elected official (either in general or as to the specific 
issue at hand); and/or (3) citizens regard the decisionmaking 
procedures adopted by the independent actor as substantially aligning 
that actor’s policy choices with the citizens’ concerns. 
a. The Counterparts’ Persuasive Authority Advantage.  The 
central difference between constitutional courts and advisory 
counterparts is that courts (in their adjudicative capacity) lay claim to 
legal authority whereas counterparts (in their advisory capacity) do 
not.176 But the counterparts are better positioned than constitutional 
courts to develop persuasive authority. The counterparts’ persuasive 
authority advantage derives from three factors: better information; 
 
 173. This idea is explored and formalized in ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, 
THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998). 
 174. Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 28–31 (1986) (contrasting 
“recognitional authority,” equivalent to what I have termed “persuasive authority,” with legal 
authority). 
 175. By “persuasive authority with the electorate,” I mean the capacity to shift aggregate 
public opinion (among likely voters) in the direction of the actor’s preferred policy. 
 176. This is not to say that constitutional courts, though they claim legal authority, will 
exercise much authority in practice. In well-established democracies with long-standing 
constitutional courts, the citizenry does tend to recognize the legal authority of those courts. In 
new democracies, the picture is mixed. See generally James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, 
Defenders of Democracy? Legitimacy, Popular Acceptance, and the South African Constitutional 
Court, 65 J. POL. 1, 3–6 (2003), and sources cited therein. 
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the ability (in the case of some counterparts) to initiate and carry out 
investigations of official wrongdoing; and greater flexibility to 
develop democratic credentials for the body’s decisions without 
undermining other sources of authority. 
i. Information.  Advisory counterparts can assure the public 
that their recommendations derive from careful study and an 
empirically grounded understanding of the problem at hand. The 
counterparts may commission studies, develop in-house technical 
expertise, hold hearings open to anyone interested or curious, talk 
through possible remedies with interest groups and lawmakers, and 
more. Appellate courts, by contrast, typically have little policymaking 
expertise and minimal fact-finding capacity. To be sure, policy 
expertise, without more, is unlikely to yield substantial persuasive 
authority for constitutional courts or advisory counterparts. The 
project of specifying and implementing a democratic society’s basic 
ideals, or, less grandiosely, of making human-rights or open-
government or election-law policy, is given to normative disputation. 
It is not a merely technocratic endeavor. But insofar as average voters 
overcome their initial skepticism about policymaking in such domains 
by a politically insulated body, they are more likely to be persuaded 
of the merits of counterpart-issued reforms than judge-made policies. 
The counterpart, as the better informed body, is less likely to miss its 
mark. 
ii. Investigations.  Several advisory counterparts have scored 
legislative victories following investigations that revealed high-level 
abuse of office. In Ghana, for example, an inquiry by the Commission 
for Human Rights and Administrative Justice into corruption among 
government ministers and the President’s staff was widely covered in 
the press and resulted in several resignations.177 The Commission 
urged the government to adopt new asset disclosure requirements.178 
Initially the government balked, but after a public outcry it reversed 
course and adopted the Commission’s proposals.179 In New South 
Wales, Australia, the anticorruption commission’s investigation into 
travel-allowance abuses by members of parliament created such a stir 
 
 177. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 160–61; INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
POL’Y, supra note 7, at 17. 
 178. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 161. 
 179. Id. 
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that, grudgingly, the legislature finally acceded to the commission’s 
proposal for a formal legislative Code of Conduct and changes to 
travel voucher administration.180 In Queensland, Australia, an 
investigation into police and electoral corruption by an ad hoc 
independent commission generated such a public outcry that “all 
political parties pledg[ed] to implement [the commission’s] 
recommendations, prior to the report being completed.”181 In the 
United Kingdom, governmental foot-dragging on the Electoral 
Commission’s ballot security recommendations became an issue in 
the 2005 general election campaign, thanks in part to the fortuitously 
timed conviction of six Labour Party city councilors on charges of 
vote fraud.182 
That independent advisory bodies have prevailed following 
scandal should not come as a surprise. Analyzing U.S. data, the 
political scientist Luke Keele has shown that scandals have large 
effects on public trust in government, often for a period of years, and 
that in the wake of scandals lawmakers typically put on a big show of 
supporting structural, putatively “good government” reforms.183 
Insofar as the elected branches have fallen into disrepute, reforms 
issuing from a politically insulated body should look comparatively 
appealing. 
This scandal dynamic could work to the advantage of courts as 
well as counterparts. The key difference is that counterparts with de 
jure authority to initiate and carry out investigations of governmental 
wrongdoing are better positioned than constitutional courts to 
“create” scandals in the first instance (by undertaking to reveal 
official malfeasance), and in so doing to claim credit and bolster their 
image in the public’s eye.184 
 
 180. Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1390–91. 
 181. Colleen Lewis & Jenny Fleming, The Everyday Politics of Value Conflict: External 
Independent Oversight Bodies in Australia, in GOVERNMENT REFORMED: VALUES AND NEW 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 167, 176 (Ian Holland & Jenny Fleming eds., 2003). 
 182. For a brief narrative of the politics of ballot security reform in the U.K., see Elmendorf, 
supra note 62, at 1396–1404. 
 183. Luke Keele, Social Capital, Government Performance, and the Dynamics of Trust in 
Government 20 (Oct. 23, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/ 
Politics/papers/2005/Keele%20MacroTrust.pdf. 
 184. Which is not to say that the creation of such scandals is normatively desirable. For a 
discussion of some of the problems, see infra Part II.B.2.a.ii. 
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iii. Tradeoffs Between Legal and Persuasive Authority.  That the 
median voter has suspicions about the good faith or competence of 
her elected representative does not mean that she will necessarily 
trust the policymaking judgment of some comparatively insulated 
body. She might just as well end up distrustful of both. The 
counterpart (or court) that seeks persuasive authority with the 
electorate must somehow establish that its own structure and method 
of decisionmaking result in sensible policy prescriptions—
prescriptions that respond to the citizenry’s ideals and concerns. 
To this end, many advisory counterparts consult extensively with 
the public in developing recommendations, and seek to defend their 
proposals on the basis of these consultation practices. At the 
forefront are the law revision commissions, which have no 
investigative or administrative responsibilities to go with their law 
reform role and, as such, must justify their existence entirely in terms 
of their contributions to law reform.185 Illustrative is the Law 
Commission of Canada, whose organic act establishes an Advisory 
Council composed of twelve to twenty-four persons “broadly 
representative of the socio-economic and cultural diversity of 
Canada.”186 The Council is to “advise the Commission on . . . strategic 
direction and long-term program[s] of stud[y] and [to] review . . . the 
Commission’s performance.”187 As well, the Commission is authorized 
to set up “study panel[s]” of affected or especially knowledgeable 
persons in relation to particular projects.188 The Commission 
embraced a participation-oriented vision for law reform. In its own 
words: the Commission aimed to “address the concerns of Canadians 
about the law, legal process and legal institutions,” by making 
“creative,” “balanced,” and “responsive” law reform 
recommendations.189 “Inclusiveness” came first on the Commission’s 
list of self-ascribed Guiding Principles.190 The Commission committed 
itself to “open[ness]” in its “day-to-day activities” and to 
 
 185. That law commissions are attempting to carve out niches grounded in public-
consultation practices is a recurring theme in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, a 
collection of essays on law reform commissions around the world. 
 186. Law Commission of Canada Act, R.S.C., ch. 9, § 18(1.2) (1996). 
 187. Id. § 19. 
 188. Id. § 20(1). 
 189. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., STRATEGIC AGENDA AND RESEARCH PLAN (on file with 
author). 
 190. Id. 
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“consult[ing] widely—not just with jurists and those who have a 
professional concern with the law—but with Canadians generally.”191 
In the U.K., the Electoral Commission has made a point of 
calibrating its campaign finance recommendations to the findings of 
Commission-sponsored public opinion studies.192 The Electoral 
Commission is no slave to public whim, however. The Commission 
has tried to draw attention to internal inconsistencies in the public’s 
policy preferences, and to differences between pre- and post-
deliberation opinion.193 I suspect that as new techniques for taking the 
measure of “informed” public opinion are tested and refined (such as 
James Fishkin’s Deliberative Polls194 and the British Columbia 
Citizens’ Assembly195), many advisory counterparts will prove to be 
enthusiastic adopters and will increasingly anchor their 
recommendations to public opinion so revealed. This, in turn, will 
bolster public confidence in the counterparts’ prescriptions.196 
For constitutional courts, however, the pursuit of persuasive 
authority through participatory decisionmaking procedures can be 
rather more hazardous. Persuasive authority is undoubtedly useful for 
policy-minded courts,197 but so too is legal authority, and the pursuit 
of one may come at some cost to the other. In the United States, for 
example, the citizens who most strongly support the Supreme Court 
subscribe to what political scientists John Scheb and William Lyons 
call the “myth of legality,” the notion that constitutional holdings are 
driven mainly by original intent and precedent.198 
 
 191. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 92. 
 192. See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1439–40 & nn. 313–316. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Information about which is available at Ctr. for Deliberative Democracy, Deliberative 
Polling: Toward a Better-Informed Democracy, http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/docs/summary 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2007). 
 195. Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, Improving Democracy in B.C., http://www. 
citizensassembly.bc.ca/public (last visited Jan. 6, 2007); see also DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC 
RENEWAL (Mark E. Warren & Hilary Pearse eds., forthcoming). 
 196. Cf. Fred Cutler et al., The B.C. Citizens’ Assembly as Agenda-Setter: Shaking Up Voter 
Choice, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL, supra note 195 (analyzing how perceived 
“legitimacy,” “ordinariness,” and “expertise” of the Citizens’ Assembly affected how poll 
respondents intended to vote on Assembly-proposed electoral reforms).  
 197. This is because orders whose substance the citizenry deems favorable are less likely to 
suffer foot-dragging implementation by the executive branch. Over the long run, moreover, 
constitutional courts that exercise persuasive authority should be able to pursue a wider range 
of policies without undercutting public support for the practice of constitutional judicial review. 
 198. John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public Evaluation of the 
Supreme Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928 (2000). 
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This creates something of a dilemma for the Court. On the one 
hand, the Court might well develop more persuasive authority if the 
Justices acknowledged their discretion and cashed out the open-
textured clauses of the Constitution in ways that appear substantially 
responsive to citizens’ concerns199—but doing so might undermine 
public faith in the idea that constitutional adjudication is a distinctly 
legal undertaking.200 Conversely, by acting as if decisions in 
constitutional cases are determined by text, precedent, and original 
intent, the Justices can shore up their legal authority, yet this hardly 
builds confidence that judicial rulings fit contemporary conditions and 
needs. There is also some basis for thinking that plain-old 
obscurantism about how judges reach decisions may reinforce the 
legal-authority convention,201 although judicial obscurantism certainly 
doesn’t help citizens to infer whether the court’s decisions are likely 
to make sense on policy grounds. 
To be sure, there is no logical incompatibility between a 
constitutional court’s development of persuasive authority and its 
maintenance of legal authority. One can imagine a legal order in 
which—as Ethan Leib has recommended—large questions about the 
 
 199. Cf. ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A 
POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 67–69 (2004) (recommending that the Supreme Court 
involve deliberative assemblies of citizens in identifying and fleshing out the contours of 
fundamental rights). 
 200. Cf. John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion: Popular 
Expectations Regarding the Factors That Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL. BEHAV. 
181 (2001) (demonstrating that citizens’ ratings of Supreme Court performance can be 
explained, in part, by perceptions about whether the Court relies on proper or improper factors 
in making decisions). 
 201. See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 
2617 (2003) (discussing work by political scientists suggesting that “diffuse support for courts is 
highest the less people know about what courts are doing”); id. at 2631–35 (discussing ways in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court may sustain diffuse support for the Court and its work by 
keeping a low profile). Some political scientists have argued that non-outcome-based support 
for constitutional judicial review is highest among persons who know enough to be familiar with 
judicial symbolism, but not so much that they grasp the substance of many court decisions. See, 
e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme 
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 658–60 (1992) (describing differential bases of support for U.S. 
Supreme Court among mass public and self-reported “opinion leaders”); James L. Gibson et al., 
On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 349–51 (1998) 
(describing results from a twenty-country survey which show that awareness of constitutional 
courts—which the authors interpret as “greater exposure to the legitimizing symbols associated 
with high courts”—tends to be correlated with diffuse support); cf. Scheb & Lyons, supra note 
198, at 934–35 (summarizing results from national survey showing that “the most attentive 
segment of the public is far more likely to espouse the myth of legality than are the less attentive 
segments”). 
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content of rights are referred by the constitutional court to 
deliberative assemblies composed of randomly selected laypersons.202 
But where citizens adhere to another, quite different idea about what 
it means for a court to decide constitutional questions in the legally 
authorized way, it is doubtful that constitutional courts can move in 
Leib’s direction without putting their legal authority at risk. 
Notice finally that the counterparts are less likely than 
constitutional courts to squander whatever persuasive authority they 
do accumulate by inadvertently alienating powerful blocs of voters. 
Before launching an all-out campaign for the enactment of reforms, 
counterparts can test the waters with public opinion studies, float 
tentative ideas, and monitor reactions to their investigations. The 
counterparts may time their selection of issues to moments of 
heightened public interest, and openly adjust their stance in response 
to public feedback (thereby demonstrating responsiveness).203 By 
contrast, the judicial conventions of speaking to an issue only when 
called upon, and only through the confines of a formal opinion, 
makes it comparatively difficult for the court to time its interventions 
adroitly and to defuse adverse public reactions to particular 
holdings—even as it reinforces the impression that constitutional 
courts act in uniquely legal (as opposed to political) capacity.204 
iv. Summary.  Policy-minded constitutional courts and advisory 
counterparts face somewhat different problems of authority. Courts 
 
 202. LEIB, supra note 199, at 67–69. 
 203. To be sure, justices of constitutional courts may choose to speak in a variety of ways, 
not just through judicial opinions. Thus, as Judith Resnik has shown, the late Chief Justice 
Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme Court actually employed a double-barreled, adjudication-plus-
advice-giving strategy to advance his federalism objectives: on the one hand deciding cases that 
establish new sovereign immunity doctrines and restrictive glosses on Congress’s Commerce 
Clause and Section 5 powers, and on the other using his annual report to Congress on the 
federal judiciary and his position as chair of the Judicial Conference to counsel against the 
creation of new federal rights of action (nominally on the ground that the federal courts are 
backlogged). See Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and 
Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269 (2000). It is significant, 
though, that when the Judicial Conference speaks to Congress, it does so nominally to address 
the institutional needs of the judiciary, not to weigh in on constitutional questions or priorities. 
See id. 
 204. Cf. Rosalee A. Clawson & Eric N. Waltenburg, Support for a Supreme Court 
Affirmative Action Decision: A Story in Black and White, 31 AM. POL. RES. 251 (2003) (noting 
that the U.S. Supreme Court “is in a remarkably weak position when it comes to constructing or 
‘framing’ the way in which the public understands its articulation of policy,” and testing effects 
of media-furnished frames on public response to the Court’s affirmative action decisions). 
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may enhance the probability of elected-branch compliance with their 
constitutional decrees by bolstering their legal authority, persuasive 
authority, or both. The counterparts depend on persuasive authority. 
Although this dependence puts the counterparts at some risk of being 
ignored, the counterparts are also, in certain respects, better 
positioned than constitutional courts to develop persuasive authority. 
This follows from the counterparts’ superior policy expertise; from 
(some) counterparts’ authority and capacity to undertake 
investigations of elected branch officials; and from the counterparts’ 
freedom to pursue strategies for enhancing their persuasive authority 
that, if followed by a constitutional court, could jeopardize the court’s 
legal authority. 
b. On Issue- and Occasion-Specific Influence.  That 
counterparts have a persuasive authority advantage over 
constitutional courts does not reveal anything about the conditions, if 
any, under which counterparts can mount an effective challenge to 
policies that are favored by the dominant faction in the elected 
branches. The U.S. Supreme Court exercises little persuasive 
authority.205 To say that a counterpart is likely to develop more 
persuasive authority does not mean that it will develop enough to 
make a difference. 
My working hypothesis, consistent with the available evidence 
(all anecdotal), is that advisory counterparts can wield significant 
 
 205. For summaries of the literature, see VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 8–9, 16–21 (2003); Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being 
Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1290–94 (2004). 
A few laboratory studies have indicated that persons who say they trust the Court will, after 
learning of a Court decision, adjust their views on the merits of the question at hand. See 
Valerie J. Hoekstra, The Supreme Court and Opinion Change: An Experimental Study of the 
Court’s Ability to Change Opinion, 23 AM. POL. Q. 109 (1995); Jeffery J. Mondak, Institutional 
Legitimacy, Policy Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court, 20 AM. POL. Q. 457 (1992); Jeffery J. 
Mondak, Perceived Legitimacy of Supreme Court Decisions: Three Functions of Source 
Credibility, 12 POL. BEHAV. 363 (1990); Jeffery J. Mondak, Political Legitimacy and the 
Supreme Court: The Sources and Contexts of Legitimation, 47 POL. RES. Q. 675 (1994); cf. 
Clawson & Waltenburg, supra note 204, at 251 (finding the effect mediated by media framing). 
But see Larry R. Baas & Dan Thomas, The Supreme Court and Policy Legitimation: 
Experimental Tests, 12 AM. POL. Q. 335 (1984) (finding no effect). Outside the laboratory, 
however, the evidence for such effects is weak. See HOEKSTRA, supra, at 87–93. Most Court 
decisions seem to go largely unnoticed beyond the community where the underlying dispute 
originated. Id. at 51–53. Within the community of origin, public awareness is often high, yet the 
Court’s influence on local opinion about the merits is small and not readily explained, id. at 87–
113, 151–53, although locally unpopular decisions have substantial and negative repercussions 
for local opinions about the Court itself, id. at 115–47, 154–55. 
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persuasive authority with the electorate on election law and 
government integrity questions, particularly in the wake of scandals, 
but that as to other kinds of issues counterparts will rarely develop 
enough persuasive authority to pressure elected officials into 
adopting counterpart-proposed reforms. 
I have already noted several examples of anticorruption bodies 
that, following scandals, rallied public opinion and prevailed upon the 
elected branches to adopt reforms about which the lawmakers were 
less than keen.206 Even without a boost from scandal, a number of 
election-law advisory commissions appear to have achieved a 
significant level of influence. The advisory redistricting commissions 
found in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the state of Iowa are 
cases in point.207 These bodies periodically draw up proposed revisions 
to constituency boundaries, which are then forwarded to the 
legislature for deliberation and a vote. Typically the advisory body’s 
proposal is accepted by the legislature—even if it disadvantages 
incumbents.208 Local observers report that lawmakers’ fear of a public 
backlash (should they ultimately reject the nonpartisan proposal) is a 
significant factor behind this pattern of deference.209 
In Canada, the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO)—the nonpartisan 
and long-tenured head of the national election administration 
agency—has become an influential figure in electoral reform 
debates.210 The CEO successfully prevailed upon the government to 
enact caps on independent expenditures in electoral campaigns, 
among other reforms. The government typically seeks CEO input 
before floating election law proposals to the public, and elected 
officials have been lampooned for disregarding the CEO’s 
recommendations. 
Consider also the still-unfolding controversy in the United 
Kingdom over postal voting and ballot security.211 Although the 
timing of the Labour city councilors’ vote-fraud conviction surely had 
much to do with making the Electoral Commission’s ballot-security 
recommendations an issue in the 2005 general election campaign, this 
 
 206. See supra Part II.B.1.a.ii. 
 207. See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1386–90. 
 208. Id. at 1388–90. 
 209. Id. at 1389. 
 210. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Election Commissions and Electoral Reform: An Overview, 
5 ELECTION L.J. 425, 426 (2006). 
 211. Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1396–1404. 
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was not the first time the government has come under pressure to act 
on Commission-proposed reforms. Since 2003, the Electoral 
Commission has been pressing the government to improve ballot 
security; the Commission proposes, among other things, switching 
from the current household-based registration system to one based on 
the individual.212 The incumbent Labour government apparently fears 
that adoption of the Commission’s preferred voter registration system 
might diminish turnout among traditional Labour constituencies.213 
The Commission itself has offered only muted criticism of the 
government’s failure to adopt its central recommendations.214 
However, leading opposition figures have been vociferous critics of 
the government’s foot-dragging on Commission recommendations, 
charging the government with venal partisanship and pledging their 
own support for the Commission’s proposals.215 (This despite the fact 
that the Commission and the government share many objectives, 
including lowering the cost of voting and introducing other measures 
to improve turnout among the disaffected.216) In focusing their attack 
on the gap between what the Commission has urged and the 
government has done, opposition figures have managed to ridicule 
the government for “playing politics” with the integrity of the 
electoral system, while insulating themselves against the symmetric 
countercharge.217 The government, in response, has labored to show 
its support for other Electoral Commission proposals.218 During the 
heat of the 2005 election campaign, the Labour government finally 
said that, if returned to power, it would introduce a voter registration 
bill in line with the Commission’s recommendations.219 Several 
months after the election the Government brought forth a bill that 
 
 212. Id. at 1395–1404. 
 213. During the spring 2005 general election campaign, a front-page story in the Sunday 
Times featured leaked minutes from a cabinet committee meeting the previous year, revealing 
that the government had drawn up legislation to enact key Electoral Commission 
recommendations, including individualized voter registration, but that the project was 
mothballed “after a government-commissioned study showed it would reduce the turnout of key 
Labour voters such as the young and poor.” Robert Winnett & David Leppard, Ministers 
Ditched Vital Measures to Stop Voting Fraud, SUNDAY TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, at 1. 
 214. See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1395–1404. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 1396–97, 1400. 
 217. Id. at 1397–1404. 
 218. Id. at 1400. 
 219. Id. at 1401–03. 
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goes part way toward the Commission’s position, and the debate 
continues.220 
The counterparts’ apparent strength on election-law questions is, 
I suspect, related to the scandal phenomenon. This is not just because 
scandals (in a temporal sense) and election-law questions (in an issue-
specific sense221) both draw into doubt the usual presumption that the 
prospect of a coming election is enough to make the elected branches 
responsive to the voters’ interests and concerns. I have argued in 
previous work that a politician’s opposition to an independent body’s 
electoral reform recommendation can signal that she has elevated her 
self interest above what she understands to be the public interest.222 
For the large number of voters who have weak policy preferences but 
a strong desire for lawmakers to behave in a public spirited fashion, 
this signal may function as a rare and important cue to the lawmaker’s 
character.223 
If I am right about this, the counterparts’ influence on election-
law and government-integrity issues may well depend on their 
exercise of persuasive authority, without being wholly explained by 
the exercise of authority. The body’s persuasive authority matters 
because if citizens didn’t think the counterpart-proposed reform was 
in the public interest, they would have little basis for inferring 
venality from their elected representative’s opposition. But the 
strength of the public reaction reflects much more than 
disappointment over the representative’s failure to support a sensible 
reform. 
Beyond the election law and anticorruption domains, the 
anecdotal evidence suggests that advisory counterparts rarely if ever 
wield enough authority with the electorate to generate bottom-up 
pressure for the enactment of counterpart-proposed reforms.224 
 
 220. Information about the recently introduced Electoral Administration Bill is available on 
the Electoral Commission’s website, Electoral Administration Act, http://www. 
electoralcommission.org.uk/elections/eladbill.cfm (last visited Jan. 7, 2007). 
 221. The risk is that incumbents will favor electoral regulations that thwart political 
competition. 
 222. Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1421–23. 
 223. Id. 
 224. To be sure, it does not follow that these bodies are inconsequential. They may 
contribute to public discourse in various ways. They might collaborate productively with like-
minded legislators, see supra note 167, or even with constitutional courts, see infra Part III. And 
some may be able to use their powers of investigation to pressure administrative agencies or 
even lawmakers into enacting reforms. For example, I suspect that the success of the National 
Human Rights Commission of India in reforming custodial interrogation practices may be due 
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Elected officials seem quite comfortable disregarding the 
recommendations of law reform commissions, human rights 
commissions, privacy commissions, and the like.225 This is not 
 
in part to the Commission’s declaration that it “is of a prima-facie view that the local doctor [in 
conducting autopsies] succumbs to police pressure which leads to distortion of the facts.” See 
NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1995–1996, supra note 165, annexure IV. 
By adopting the Commission-recommended videotaping protocol, local authorities may have 
been able to reassure the Commission of their good faith and thereby reduce the likelihood of 
costly and potentially embarrassing Commission-led investigations into custodial deaths. 
 225. Michael Kirby, the former chairperson of the Australian Law Reform Commission and 
a long-time observer of law commissions worldwide, remarks: 
There remains . . . an institutional flaw that has yet to be solved. This is how to secure 
governmental, legislative and official attention once law reform reports are produced. 
Nowhere has this issue been tackled institutionally and effectively. . . . [A]ll too often, 
law reform proposals go to the bottom of the ministerial and legislative pile. They 
secure much less attention than the political ideas and personality and party schemes 
that dominate contemporary politics. 
Kirby, supra note 79, at 445. The Chief Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission reports that while the Commission has established memoranda of understanding 
with many government agencies and commented on their practices to good effect, “we cannot 
honestly claim that the UK Government has taken our concerns on legislative proposals 
seriously.” Brice Dickson, The Contribution of Human Rights Commissions to the Protection of 
Human Rights, 47 PUB. L. 272, 278–80 (2003). “[S]ome of us,” he laments, “are beginning to 
wonder whether the effort we put into our work is worth it.” Id. at 280. Sonia Cardenas, who 
studied the NHRIs of India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, concludes: “All three national 
commissions have been unable to enforce their recommendations in the face of concerted 
government opposition . . . . When government officials have not had an interest in 
implementing the recommendations of these Commissions, they have simply not done so.” 
Cardenas, supra note 169, at 69. 
For their work on prison conditions, human rights commissions in South Africa and 
Mexico have been lambasted in the media as “soft on crime.” INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS POL’Y, supra note 7, at 96–97. South Africa’s parliament has declined even to debate 
the recommendations put forth in its human rights commission’s annual reports. HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 307–08. The commission, in protest, quit making legislative 
recommendations. Id. at 308. 
The examples can be multiplied. Early proponents of the United States Sentencing 
Commission envisioned a body with the practical moral authority to cool down the heated 
politics of crime and criminal sentencing. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL 
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 118–24 (1972). As well as issuing guidelines for judges to 
follow, the Commission would, over time, encourage the legislature to remove arbitrary 
disparities in the criminal code that “politics of crime” frenzies occasionally ensconce. Yet the 
Commission’s repeated efforts to get Congress to reduce the massive disparity in sentences for 
federal drug crimes involving crack and powdered cocaine, a disparity whose burden falls on the 
African-American community, have come to naught. Barkow, supra note 123, at 767–68. 
Barkow’s comparative study of state-level sentencing commissions suggests that some 
commissions have had an impact by producing fiscal-impact data for the consumption of 
budget-minded legislators. But there is no evidence that any commission has made a mark by 
appealing to the moral sensibilities of lawmakers or citizens. 
Similarly, David Flaherty’s careful study of privacy commissioners in Europe shows that 
they have worked effectively with privacy advocates in parliament, but Flaherty does not 
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surprising. The conflicts of interest that arise when elected officials 
legislate on matters concerning the ground-rules of political 
competition or legislative ethics do not generally contaminate human 
rights or privacy policy. There is little reason for voters to doubt the 
efficacy of the electoral mechanism in securing responsive 
policymaking in these domains (insofar as it secures responsive 
policymaking at all), or to infer that elected officials who reject the 
recommendations of an independent advisory body have done so out 
of self-interest. 
2. Commanding Attention, Focusing Debate.  Suppose I am 
right that independent advisory bodies can wield significant 
persuasive authority with the electorate regarding election law and 
government integrity policies—particularly in the wake of scandals—
but that such authority is improbable as to other policy problems, 
especially at other times. The next question to investigate is whether 
counterparts that lack persuasive authority concerning their proposed 
reforms might nonetheless move onto the public agenda the problems 
they’ve identified, and get a vigorous debate underway. 
Debate-triggering might enable counterparts to effect structural 
reforms beyond the election-law and government-integrity domains. 
Suppose that a counterpart calls for certain reforms which are likely 
to win favor with an engaged, informed public, but which currently 
have little citizen support. The instigation of a high-profile debate 
through which voters learn about the issues could produce bottom-up 
pressure for the enactment of those reforms. A counterpart’s 
fomenting of public debate might also be valued in its own right, 
whether or not it leads to the enactment of normatively attractive 
reforms. Some proponents of judicial review advance a related 
argument. Barry Friedman, for example, posits that “[p]rompting, 
maintaining, and focusing [public] debate about constitutional 
meaning is the primary function of judicial review.”226 
 
indicate that commissioner reports have in any way changed the politics of privacy. See 
FLAHERTY, supra note 39, at 37–38, 64–66, 89 (discussing the politics of privacy and security in 
Germany). Statist and security-minded legislators pay no heed to privacy recommendations and 
apparently suffer no political cost for this. Id. at 64–66. 
 226. Friedman, supra note 205, at 1295–96; see also EISGRUBER, supra note 128, at 96–107 
(explaining the Supreme Court’s role in framing constitutional questions for public debate); 
ROBERT J. LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS 228–237 (2000) (defending judge-led 
“constitutional revolutions” as means of inducing considered, society-wide reflection on 
meaning of constitutional commitments). But see TUSHNET, supra note 157 (defending 
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The convention of binding judicial review gives constitutional 
courts a powerful tool with which to attract public attention. Strike 
down a law that has a significant base of popular or interest-group 
support, and the people will hear about it. Opponents of the court’s 
decision will put up a fuss; politicians may threaten retaliation against 
the court (budget cuts, jurisdiction stripping); and the decision will be 
trotted out in future confirmation hearings.227 Or uphold a law in a 
manner that seems to curtail some widely treasured right, and in short 
order legislatures will be debating new rights-protective bills.228 
 
“populist” constitutional law, while suggesting that judicial interventions undermine rather than 
support popular engagement with constitutional meaning). 
 227. There is a nascent political science literature on the agenda-setting effects of Supreme 
Court decisions. Analyzing the impact of the thirty-one decisions concerning school 
desegregation, church-state relations, or free speech between 1947 and 1992 that were 
contemporaneously rated as “major” by Congressional Quarterly, researchers found that seven 
appeared to have a significant impact on the frequency of media coverage of associated issues 
(although in two of these instances, there were confounding events), and that four of the seven 
cases had a significant, long term “step effect” on media coverage. See Roy B. Flemming et al., 
One Voice Among Many: The Supreme Court’s Influence on Attentiveness to Issues in the United 
States, 1947–92, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1224 (1997) [hereinafter Flemming et al., One Voice Among 
Many]. Those four cases (which dealt with school desegregation, religious instruction in public 
schools, school prayer, and flag burning) put an issue on the agenda, and it stayed there. (Note 
that the authors used media coverage as a proxy for public attention, for want of adequate time-
series data on the public opinion concerning issue importance.) 
In a subsequent study of civil rights, civil liberties, and the environment, Flemming and 
his colleagues analyzed the interplay among the “systemic agenda” (media coverage) and the 
“institutional agendas” of the president, Congress, and the Supreme Court, as measured, 
respectively, by the president’s attention to the issue in State of the Union addresses, by the 
percentage of congressional hearing-days given over to the issue, and by the share of the Court’s 
docket pertaining to the issue. See Roy B. Flemming et al., Attention to Issues in a System of 
Separated Powers: The Macrodynamics of American Policy Agendas, 61 J. POL. 76 (1999). They 
concluded that “[t]he Supreme Court appears extremely important in the areas of civil rights 
and civil liberties policy,” affecting the attention paid to these issues by the elected branches and 
the media. Id. at 104. The results “suggest a pattern in which the Supreme Court alters attention 
by elected institutions, which in turn produces greater media attention for civil rights. This 
pattern also implies that Supreme Court attention may increase the level of conflict, 
subsequently drawing the president, Congress, and larger system into the fray.” Id. at 92. 
The intuition that the Supreme Court can draw attention to a problem by striking down 
high-profile laws and creating controversy is also suggested by empirical studies of the impact of 
the Court’s abortion and capital punishment decisions on public opinion concerning these 
issues, which show a polarization effect. See Danette Brickman & David A.M. Peterson, Public 
Opinion Reaction to Repeated Events: Citizen Response to Multiple Supreme Court Abortion 
Decisions, 28 POL. BEHAV. 87 (2006); Charles Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican 
Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
751 (1989); Timothy R. Johnson & Andrew D. Martin, The Public’s Conditional Response to 
Supreme Court Decisions, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 299 (1998). 
 228. Consider the responses to Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and 
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). The former, of course, gave rise to the 
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This Section discusses several methods by which advisory 
counterparts may generate public debate. Then, as a thought 
experiment, I suggest a model for debate-initiation predicated on 
what might be termed “constitutional priority setting.” The Section 
concludes with a preliminary treatment of the normatively significant 
differences between constitutional courts and priority-setting 
counterparts as dialogic institutions. 
One terminological note before moving on: I shall use the terms 
“debate forcing,” “debate triggering,” and “public agenda setting” 
interchangeably, to refer to any process by which an advisory 
counterpart or constitutional court bolsters an issue’s salience to the 
citizenry. 
a. Advisory Counterparts and the Public Agenda: Three 
Methods for Inducing Debate. 
i. Education.  Advisory counterparts have tried to move issues 
onto the public agenda using a range of educational and 
propagandistic techniques. In South Africa, the Human Rights 
Commission has promoted human rights awareness through major-
media advertising campaigns.229 Ghana’s NHRI has worked with 
traditional community leaders to change the customary mistreatment 
of women considered to be witches.230 NHRIs have also worked 
closely with public schools to introduce human-rights themes into the 
classroom.231 
On the public integrity front, Hong Kong’s Independent 
Commission Against Corruption is credited with dramatically 
transforming public opinion about both the extent and the propriety 
 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act at the national level, and eventually many “state RFRAs” 
as well. (For a compendium of state RFRAs, see Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and 
Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 607 n.4 (1999).) Regarding the response to 
Kelo, see David Barron, Eminent Domain is Dead! (Long Live Eminent Domain!), BOSTON 
GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2006, at D1; Marcilynn A. Burke, Much Ado About Nothing: Kelo v. City of 
New London, Sweet Home v. Babbitt, and other Tales from the Supreme Court 24–50 (Univ. of 
Houston Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 2006-W-02), available at http://search.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=895008 (last visited Jan. 16, 2007); the National Conference of 
State Legislatures, Eminent Domain, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/emindomain.htm 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2007). 
 229. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 297–98. 
 230. Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at 43. 
 231. Id. 
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of bribe-paying.232 The Commission’s early, high-profile investigations 
of police syndicates may have had much to do with this,233 but the 
Commission has also worked assiduously to convey its message 
through “television dramas, radio call-in shows, posters, and public 
announcements,” and by “meeting with community groups, visiting 
door to door, going to factories and schools, and working in a variety 
of other ways to directly contact ordinary citizens . . . .”234 
I am not aware of any academic studies that evaluate 
counterparts’ success in influencing the terms of political debate 
through such endeavors. One should not discount the possible 
efficacy of agenda-setting by noisy harping, however, particularly 
where the counterpart is well-funded and has authority to sponsor 
advertisements. There is a school of political psychology which holds 
that voters’ judgments about public priorities are partly sub-
rational.235 In any given election, the story goes, voters focus on issues 
to which they are “primed” to attend by mass media coverage, issue-
advertising campaigns, and the like.236 If this is so, a counterpart that 
can fill the airways may affect the issues that come to mind when 
voters evaluate candidates, even if the counterpart has no influence 
whatever on what voters consider to be sound policy with respect to 
the issue at hand. 
ii. Investigation.  Investigations offer another way for 
counterparts to move their issues to the center of public debate. 
Recall the hope of the lawmakers who launched the U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights: that a steady stream of Commission inquiries would 
reveal to the American people the true horrors of the Jim Crow 
South, generating public support for aggressive federal civil rights 
legislation. To a significant degree this hope was realized: early 
investigations by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights were widely 
covered in the press and helped to frame the first generation of 
 
 232. See generally MANION, supra note 57, at 27–83. 
 233. See id. at 34–36, 40. 
 234. Id. at 43–48. 
 235. See generally STEPHEN P. NICHOLSON, VOTING THE AGENDA: CANDIDATES, 
ELECTIONS, AND BALLOT PROPOSITIONS 15–23 (2005) (reviewing political psychology 
literature on agenda-setting and priming). 
 236. Id.; see also SHANTO INENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS (1987) 
(tracing effects of news coverage on citizen perceptions of issue importance). 
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national civil rights legislation.237 NHRIs in other countries have 
occasionally led high profile investigations as well,238 and 
investigations by anticorruption commissions often prove 
newsworthy. The Hong Kong ICAC’s probe into police syndicates 
received substantial public attention, and marked the beginning of the 
ICAC’s successful effort to transform public opinion about the extent 
and propriety of bribe paying.239 In Ghana and in New South Wales, 
Australia, investigations by anticorruption commissions forced top 
government officials to resign and spurred the adoption of new 
laws.240 
As an agenda-setting strategy, the carrying out of an 
investigation can work on two levels. Most basically, the investigating 
body may change the focus of public discourse by releasing into the 
public domain previously suppressed information. On another level, 
the very act of investigating may be dramatic and attention-grabbing, 
especially if top government officials are forced to testify under oath 
or turn over documents.241 The whiff of scandal—are the top guns 
telling the truth?—may be enough to corral public attention. 
 
 237. DULLES, supra note 34, at 38 (“[T]he Alabama [voting] registration officials’ 
contumacious defiance of the Civil Rights Commission and its Attorney General’s outspoken 
challenge to [the Commission’s subpoena] authority were headlined and editorialized about 
from coast to coast.”); id. at 63–64 (“Newspapers throughout the country gave the 
[Commission’s First] Report extensive coverage. . . .”); id. at 105 (“[The Commission] enjoyed, 
at least in the North, a very good press.”). 
 238. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 298 (noting that the South African 
Human Rights Commission stirred controversy with its investigation into alleged racism in the 
mainstream media); INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra note 7, at 73–74 
(describing inquiries pursued by Australian NHRI with goal of getting structural reforms on the 
public agenda); Evans, supra note 27, at 719 (noting general significance of NHRI 
investigations, and giving example investigation into military and police brutality in Indonesia); 
Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at 43 (noting successful investigation into police cells and 
prison conditions by Ghanaian NHRI, which led Government to introduce reforms). 
 239. MANION, supra note 57, at 39–41, 44, 46 (describing early investigations and noting role 
of “(favorable) media coverage of enforcement actions” in “publiciz[ing] the ICAC and its 
reliability as an anticorruption organization”). 
 240. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 160–61 (regarding resignations brought 
about by corruption investigations in Ghana); Lewis & Fleming, supra note 181, at 173–74 
(regarding resignations brought about by corruption investigations in New South Wales, 
Australia). 
 241. Cf. Jonathan Simon, Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory Commissions and 
Executive Power in an Age of Terror, 114 YALE L.J. 1419 (2005) (discussing the social and 
political impact of ad hoc commissions set up to investigate public wrongdoing, and remarking 
on the drama of testimony by top government officials). 
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As an institutional design solution to the “problem” of public 
disinterest in counterpart-proposed reforms, however, equipping the 
advisory body with coercive powers of investigation is both limited 
and problematic. It is limited because the release of information, as 
such, will only spur public debate insofar as there is latent public 
concern about the question at hand. It is problematic because 
politically insulated counterparts may have incentives to scandal 
monger—and, more particularly, to go on the attack against top 
government officials. Counterparts that succeed in “exposing” elected 
officials as short-sighted, corrupt, venal, in the hock to special 
interests, etc., stand to gain in effective authority.242 But such 
muckraking is far from costless. The officials under investigation may 
be seriously distracted from the business of governing.243 Public 
attention may be diverted away from the substantive problems that 
the polity actually faces.244 Citizen support for large-scale policy 
initiatives may dry up.245 Worst of all, there is some risk that scandal-
mongering could actually shock the citizenry in ways that release 
latent illiberality. A significant body of new research into the 
psychodynamics of authoritarianism shows that loss of confidence in 
government causes citizens who are predisposed to authoritarianism 
to turn against others who embody difference, be they racial and 
religious minorities, political dissidents, or moral deviants.246 Effective 
political leadership and the appearance of consensus in group opinion 
operate to suppress these authoritarian tendencies; leadership failures 
and normative dissensus draw them out.247 
 
 242. See supra Part II.B.1.a.ii. 
 243. This is a recurring theme in the U.S. legal academic literature on the former 
“independent counsel” statute, the Ethics in Government Act. See, e.g., Erin Daly, Review 
Essay: What We Knew or Should Have Known About the Independent Counsel, 5 WIDENER L. 
SYMP. J. 259 (2000) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF THE STATE: THE 
INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999), and BOB 
WOODWARD, SHADOW: FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE LEGACY OF WATERGATE (1999)). 
 244. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267, 2275–80 
(1998) (arguing that the (now former) Independent Counsel Act “diminishe[d] substantive 
discussion of real questions, by focusing attention on imagined scandals or wrongdoing”). 
 245. That the loss of public trust in government undermines public support for 
governmental problem-solving is an important new theme in public opinion scholarship. See 
MARC HETHERINGTON, WHY TRUST MATTERS: DECLINING POLITICAL TRUST AND THE 
DEMISE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (2006); Virginia A. Chanley et al., The Origins and 
Consequences of Public Trust in Government, 64 PUB. OPINION Q. 239 (2000). 
 246. The research is recapped in KAREN STENNER, THE AUTHORITARIAN DYNAMIC 
(2005). 
 247. See id. 
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None of this goes to say that it is a bad thing for advisory 
counterparts to possess coercive powers of investigation. Equipping a 
counterpart with such powers may do much to enhance the 
informational base of the body’s law-reform recommendations. But in 
view of the risks, the delegation of coercive powers of investigation to 
advisory counterparts will need to be carefully circumscribed and 
checked, particularly where the body’s investigations may reach or 
implicate elected officials.248 
iii. The Exercise of Legislative Process Rights.  A third tack for 
empowering counterparts to “prompt, maintain, and focus” public 
debate about basic societal commitments is to give these bodies a 
limited, formal role in the legislative process—what I shall term a 
“legislative process right.” A counterpart’s exercise of its legislative 
process prerogative could have public discourse effects in virtue of 
what the counterpart causes to happen as a formal matter, and, as 
important, in virtue of what the counterpart’s action signals. I shall 
take up each of these points in turn, and then offer a few comparative 
remarks on constitutional courts and “legislative process” 
counterparts as public-agenda setters. 
Formal Roles. There are three extant models for counterpart 
legislative process rights. First is the delay paradigm, exemplified by 
the House of Lords’ suspensive veto.249 (Or consider the milder 
possibility of a fixed period for counterpart comment on pending 
legislation.250) The suspensive veto and other modalities of delay may 
have discourse effects simply by increasing the amount of time and 
rounds of voting that lawmakers must give over to the bill in question 
before it can become law. The longer the bill remains the subject of 
legislators’ attention, the more debate and discussion among the 
wider public it and possible alternatives are likely to receive. 
 
 248. To some degree, the check may be provided by governmental immunities against being 
called to account for actions taken in an official capacity. Cf. MARC VAN DER HULST, THE 
PARLIAMENTARY MANDATE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 63–78 (2000) (offering a 
comparative perspective on the legislative privilege); Steven F. Heufner, The Neglected Values 
of the Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221 (2003) (discussing 
the status of legislative privilege among the U.S. states). 
 249. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
 250. Cf. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 7, at 157 (noting the practice in Uruguay of election 
commission hearings on pending electoral legislation); Simon Evans, Improving Human Rights 
Analysis in the Legislative and Policy Process (Univ. of Melbourne Legal Studies, Research 
Paper No. 124, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=771225 (proposing procedure 
for human-rights analysis of pending legislation). 
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The second paradigm, initiation, is exemplified by redistricting in 
Iowa. Following each decennial census, the Iowa redistricting 
authority draws up a proposed map of legislative districts, which it 
forwards to the legislature.251 Lawmakers are free to vote down the 
proposed map, but they may not take up a reapportionment bill of 
their own creation until they have twice rejected, by closed-rule vote, 
successive offerings from the redistricting authority.252 
Although a vote of the legislature hardly guarantees public 
attention for a counterpart’s proposal, it should, at the margin at 
least, boost that proposal’s political salience.253 It may also help 
challengers make a campaign issue out of the incumbent’s stance on 
counterpart recommendations, particularly if, as in Iowa, the 
legislative vote takes place under a closed rule.254 And if the 
incumbent’s vote does become a campaign issue, the counterpart will 
have prevailed in its battle for public attention. 
 
 251. IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.3 (West, Westlaw through Acts of 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
 252. Id. 
 253. The political science literature is divided on the extent to which votes of the legislature 
register with (and affect) the voting public. A number of studies have found that roll call votes 
in Congress do have consequences for public opinion and ballot-box outcomes—that someone 
seems to be paying attention. See, e.g., ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, SENATE 
ELECTIONS (1982); Alan I. Abramowitz, Explaining Senate Election Outcomes, 82 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 385 (1988); Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning in U.S. House 
Elections, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 136 (2001); Walter Dean Burnam, Insulation and Responsiveness 
in Congressional Elections, 90 POL. SCI. Q. 411 (1975); Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out of 
Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting, 96 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 127 (2002); John K. Dalager, Voters, Issues, and Elections: Are the Candidates’ Messages 
Getting Through?, 58 J. POL. 486 (1996); Robert S. Erikson, The Electoral Impact of 
Congressional Roll Call Voting, 65 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1018 (1971); Robert S. Erikson & Gerald 
C. Wright, Representation of Constituency Ideology in Congress, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
IN HOUSE ELECTIONS 148 (David W. Brady et al. eds., 2000); John R. Johannes & John C. 
McAdams, The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is It Casework, Policy Compatibility, or 
Something Else? An Examination of the 1978 Election, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 512 (1981); George 
Serra & David Moon, Casework, Issue Positions and Voting in Congressional Elections: A 
District Analysis, 56 J. POL. 200 (1994); Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Candidates’ Policy Positions and 
Voting in U.S. Congressional Elections, 3 LEGAL STUD. Q. 445 (1978). Other studies portray an 
electorate that pays little attention to issues and candidates’ voting records in most elections. 
For a survey of this literature, see HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 133, at 19–34, 150–56; 
NICHOLSON, supra note 235, at 10–13. Various attempts have been made to reconcile the two 
sets of findings. See generally VINCENT L. HUTCHINGS, PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY: HOW CITIZENS LEARN ABOUT POLITICS 5–15 (2003) (reviewing theories 
concerning electoral district homogeneity, collective intelligence through preference 
aggregation, interest group activity, and the potential for activation of “latent” political 
preferences). 
 254. This argument is elaborated in Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1382–85, 1418–21. 
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The third paradigm, end-run, has the advisory body issuing 
legislative proposals to citizens at large, who then vote on whether to 
enact the proposal. Illustrative is the Florida Constitution Revision 
Commission, convened once every twenty years to consider the need 
for constitutional change.255 The Commission has authority to draft 
reforms and put them to a vote of the people.256 Proposals that receive 
a majority vote take effect as constitutional amendments.257 
As a general matter, one should expect more citizen engagement 
and learning from a counterpart-triggered referendum than a 
required vote of the legislature. Direct democracy has been shown to 
enhance voter knowledge and rates of political participation; citizens 
also come to feel a greater sense of political efficacy.258 
Signaling Priorities. The extent to which an advisory 
counterpart’s exercise of its legislative process right catches and holds 
public attention seems likely to depend, in large measure, on what 
cues voters receive about the issue’s importance. Some votes of the 
legislature receive scant public attention. Referendum questions may 
not be all that different, at least in jurisdictions like California where 
they have become quotidian.259 Ultimately, the counterpart’s ability to 
“prompt, maintain, and focus” debate through the exercise of 
legislative process rights may be closely connected to the issue of 
persuasive authority: though the counterpart need not convince 
 
 255. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (2006). See generally Symposium, The 1997–98 Constitution 
Revision Commission, 52 FLA. L. REV. 275 (2000). 
 256. FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 2, 5 (2006). 
 257. Id. § 5(e). 
 258. Regarding voter knowledge, see DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, 
EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND 
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2004); Matthew Mendelsohn & Fred 
Cutler, The Effect of Referendums on Democratic Citizens: Information, Politicization, Efficacy 
and Tolerance, 30 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 685 (2000); Mark A. Smith, Ballot Initiatives and the 
Democratic Citizen, 64 J. POL. 892 (2002). Regarding participation, see Mark A. Smith, The 
Contingent Effects of Ballot Initiatives and Candidate Races on Turnout, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 700 
(2001); Caroline J. Tolbert et al., The Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout in the 
American States, 29 AM. POL. RES. 625 (2001). Regarding the sense of political efficacy, see 
Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, Democracy, Institutions, and Attitudes About Citizen Influence 
on Government, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 371 (2002); Mendelsohn & Cutler, supra. Ballot initiative 
campaigns can also have a large influence on voters’ sense of the relative importance of 
different issues, even to the point of “setting the agenda” for seemingly unrelated campaigns for 
elected office. See generally NICHOLSON, supra note 235 (setting forth and testing this 
hypothesis). 
 259. See Stephen P. Nicholson, The Political Environment and Ballot Proposition 
Awareness, 83 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1393 (2003) (reviewing California ballot propositions between 
1956 and 2000). 
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voters of the ultimate wisdom of its proposed remedy, it must be able 
to persuade them that the problem it has identified really matters (or 
at least deserves a serious second look). 
This leads to a pair of questions. First, what counterpart 
attributes would tend to make the body more persuasive (with the 
median voter) as a priority setter? Second, is it plausible to think that 
even a relatively persuasive counterpart’s claims about priorities 
would be taken seriously by average voters in the teeth of elected 
officials’ statements to the contrary?260 
As to the first question, four attributes would seem key. The first 
is breadth of jurisdiction. Other things equal, the larger the domain 
over which the counterpart ranges in comparing issues and setting 
priorities, the more likely it is that the counterpart’s judgment of 
priorities will correspond to that of hypothetically omniscient voters. 
The second is information. Voters are more likely to take seriously 
the counterpart’s statement of priorities to the extent that they 
believe it to be well informed.261 The third is ideology. The median 
voter is more likely to credit a statement of priorities from a body she 
regards as ideologically mainstream or first-order diverse.262 The 
fourth attribute is a credible and easily understood signaling device.263 
To illustrate, imagine a counterpart authorized to make a 
“determination of exceptional need,” perhaps by qualified majority, 
which determination would qualify the body to exercise its legislative 
process right while simultaneously precluding the body from 
exercising that right again for at least x years, perhaps five or ten or 
twenty.264 Under these conditions, the counterpart’s decision to call 
 
 260. Compare my earlier treatment of the problem of persuasive authority concerning 
proposed reforms. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 261. Note that there may be a tradeoff between breadth of jurisdiction and information. The 
broader the body’s jurisdiction, the less likely it is to have special expertise as to any given issue. 
 262. Here I follow the terminology introduced by Heather Gerken. See Heather K. Gerken, 
Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1106–08 (2005) (distinguishing between first-
order and second-order diversity, defining the former as proportional representation of the 
relevant variation within the citizenry on a public decisionmaking body, and the latter in terms 
of “variation among decisionmaking bodies, not within them”). 
Notice that a first-order diverse body—in contrast to a centrist body—might be 
persuasive with voters well to the left and right of the median, assuming that members of the 
body reach substantial consensus on a priority. 
 263. On credible communication and citizen learning, see LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 
173. 
 264. Another, more fanciful possibility is to set up the counterpart with a dedicated funding 
source and authority to run advertising campaigns. The body would then have the option of 
hoarding its resources in anticipation of rare “big bang” campaigns on issues it deems truly 
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into play the special legislative procedure would communicate that of 
all the manifold issues with which it is concerned, this one, right now 
is the most important it expects to encounter for at least x years.265 
This model is, admittedly, pretty far removed from most extant 
counterparts, and even from advocates’ proposals for the creation of 
one or another such body.266 As noted earlier, specialist advisory 
bodies predominate.267 Proposals abound for new privacy 
commissions,268 information commissions,269 anticorruption 
commissions,270 human rights commissions,271 and electoral 
commissions.272 But one rarely sees proposals for merging existing 
bodies or creating new advisory bodies whose jurisdiction would span 
these various domains.273 Also, proponents of human rights 
commissions, privacy commissions, and the like typically seek to 
populate such bodies with advocates for the proponents’ special 
 
momentous. Cf. id. at 209–210 (explaining how an actor’s expenditure of resources on ballot 
campaigns credibly signals how much it cares about the ballot question). Of course, the signal 
would be weaker insofar as the funds expended were restricted in the uses to which they could 
be put. 
 265. Or, at least, the most important as to which a solution/improvement is politically 
feasible or potentially so. 
 266. Note, though, that the concept of remedying constitutional problems through a special 
legislative procedure also has a precedent in the U.K. Human Rights Act, see David Fontana, 
Secondary Judicial Review (Jan. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law 
Journal), though the Human Rights Act does not afford a privileged position to any 
independent advisory body. 
 267. Though in the law commissions and perhaps in some human rights commissions there 
are precursors for a counterpart whose jurisdiction would be co-extensive with the society’s 
basic commitments, somehow defined. See supra Part I.F. 
 268. E.g., Gellman, supra note 37. 
 269. E.g., Vaughn, supra note 53. 
 270. E.g., Petter Langseth et al., The Role of a National Integrity System in Fighting 
Corruption (Econ. Dev. Inst. of the World Bank, Working Paper, 1997), available at 
http://www.respondanet.com/english/anti_corruption/publications/documents/nis_e.pdf; cf. 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT 161 (1999) (“Independent 
anticorruption agencies are a popular reform proposal in developing countries.”). 
 271. E.g., INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra note 7, at 1 (“These days every 
country has to have a national human rights commission.”); UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (1995) (setting forth 
recommendations for NHRIs); C. Raj Kumar, Developing a Human Rights Culture in Hong 
Kong: Creating a Framework for Establishing an Independent Human Rights Commission, 11 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 407 (2004) (proposing human rights commission for Hong Kong). 
 272. E.g., Elmendorf, supra note 62. 
 273. One exception is that in South Africa, the proliferation of independent bodies 
concerned with different aspects of human rights has led some to call for partial consolidation 
under the umbrella of the national human rights commission. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
supra note 7, at 306–07. 
01__ELMENDORF.DOC 3/9/2007  7:44 AM 
2007] ADVISORY COUNTERPARTS 1019 
concerns, rather than to compose centrist or first-order diverse 
institutions.274 Finally, I am not aware of any extant counterpart with a 
legislative process right designed as I suggest.275 So what I envision 
here as a counterpart designed for constitutional priority setting is 
really no more than a thought experiment. 
That said, is it plausible to think that such a counterpart’s 
determinations of need could move sidelined issues to the center of 
public attention and debate? Would the issue that the counterpart 
flags still be worth a second look for voters whose electorally 
accountable representative flatly rejects the counterpart’s judgment 
of priorities? An affirmative answer is plausible. For one, if the 
counterpart’s determination debars it from exercising the legislative 
process right for a number of years, the counterpart’s assertion is not 
just “cheap talk.” It is a step to be taken with great care. By contrast, 
the legislator who simply waves off the counterpart’s statement of 
priorities puts nothing on the line. (Unless she mounts an expensive 
advertising campaign to defeat the counterpart’s recommendation—
in which case, the counterpart has already scored a victory in the 
battle for public attention.) Second, legislators are pushed and pulled 
by all sorts of day-to-day pressures: meeting with constituents, raising 
money, dealing with the umpteen bills circulating through the 
legislature or in the offing, searching out media opportunities, and 
more. The legislator’s institutional position encourages 
responsiveness to her constituents’ demands, but does not conduce to 
 
 274. See, e.g., FLAHERTY, supra note 39, at 390–91 (arguing that the job of a privacy 
commission is simply to articulate concerns that a legislature might give short shrift, rather than 
to strike a balance among competing considerations); Kumar, supra note 26, at 294 (arguing that 
NHRIs are needed because “the judiciary is concerned with all disputes in society and may not 
have sufficient time and resources to focus exclusively on human rights issues”); cf. MANION, 
supra note 57, at 201 (“Policy analysts tout . . . . the exclusive anticorruption mission of the 
[Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption]: The ICAC is not embedded in the 
civil service or any larger organization with multiple goals.”). The influential Paris Principles for 
NHRIs instruct: 
The composition of the [NHRI] and the appointment of its members . . . shall be 
established in accordance with a procedure which affords all necessary guarantees to 
ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of civilian society) involved in 
the protection and promotion of human rights . . . . 
Paris Principles, supra note 26, § 1 (emphasis added). A degree of diversity is welcome, but not 
if that means the appointment of commissioners who think that human rights proponents 
generally suffer tunnel vision and undersell competing values. 
 275. Compare Iowa redistricting and Florida constitution revision, where the special 
legislative procedure has been routinized, recurring automatically once every ten years in Iowa 
and twenty years in Florida, and as such conveys little information about priorities. 
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sustained study and big-picture reflection on priorities. The 
counterpart’s remove from the day-to-day struggles of politics may 
put it in a better position to identify important issues that for one 
reason or another have remained peripheral to the course of political 
debate—especially if the importance of the issue is only manifest to 
observers whose time horizon extends well beyond the next election. 
b. Constitutional Courts and Priority-Setting Counterparts 
Compared.  There is some basis for thinking that priority-setting 
counterparts (with suitably circumscribed legislative process rights) 
would compare favorably to constitutional courts (with authority to 
enjoin duly enacted laws) as institutions for prompting, maintaining, 
and focusing public debate about the meaning and application of the 
polity’s nominally constitutive commitments. Before proceeding with 
the argument, let me emphasize the limited and tentative nature of 
the claims I shall advance. My ambition is, first, to illustrate how one 
might go about comparing different ways of institutionalizing a 
commitment to constitutional dialogue, and, second, to advance a few 
preliminary conjectures about how the debate attendant to a priority-
setting counterpart’s determination of need is likely to differ, in 
normatively relevant ways, from the debate that follows a 
constitutional court’s striking down of high-profile laws. My argument 
certainly does not prove anything. It will have served its purpose if it 
provokes further thought about how dialogic institutions should be 
assessed—and about the merits and demerits of different ways of 
designing advisory counterparts and involving them in the legislative 
process. 
The following considerations are, I think, germane to the 
normative inquiry, and I will pursue the comparison of courts and 
counterparts in these terms: (1) whether the issues that get served up 
for debate are important or trivial; (2) whether the debate-forcing 
activity is costly; and (3) the character and consequences of the 
debate itself. 
i. Issue Selection.  Because citizens’ energy and enthusiasm for 
thinking about public matters is limited, a counterpart’s (or a 
constitutional court’s) foisting of a previously peripheral issue into 
the center of public debate will inevitably displace public and 
legislative attention from other matters. It may be argued, then, that 
one measure of a “good” mechanism for inducing public debate about 
constitutional questions is whether the issues that end up getting aired 
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are issues that would, upon considered and informed reflection, be 
deemed truly important by a majority of the citizenry. 
Constitutional litigation represents a fairly haphazard way of 
“selecting” constitutional issues for public debate. In the United 
States, the Supreme Court decisions that register on the public 
agenda are generally marked by two qualities: (1) they concern 
“highly affective” topics (e.g., flag burning, school prayer, school 
desegregation, capital punishment, abortion, the use of eminent 
domain against owner-occupied homes),276 and (2) they antagonize 
well-organized interest groups or the citizenry at large.277 The Justices 
may well make an implicit determination about priorities before they 
take the risky step of striking down a law that has substantial popular 
or interest-group support, yet the Court is not well equipped to 
function as a priority setter. It lacks the requisite breadth of 
perspective, resources for legislative fact-finding, and exposure to the 
concerns of citizens.278 
There is, of course, no guarantee that a priority-setting 
counterpart’s judgment about priorities would correspond to the 
considered views of a hypothetically well-informed citizenry. But at 
least the counterpart, unlike the constitutional court, would be both 
well positioned to make priority determinations (because of its fact-
finding resources), and structurally encouraged to do so (because of 
the temporal limitation on its legislative process right). And if I am 
right that the counterpart’s determination of priorities would itself 
garner public attention, the range of issues that the counterpart might 
move onto the public agenda should prove considerably broader than 
the range of issues to which the courts attract attention. Important 
but less affectively salient issues concerning, for example, the 
structure of representation and government accountability, may lie 
within the counterpart’s reach. 
 
 276. Flemming et al., One Voice Among Many, supra note 227, at 1247; see also supra notes 
227–28 and accompanying text. 
 277. Cf. Flemming et al., One Voice Among Many, supra note 227, at 1243–46 (contrasting 
the meager public-agenda impact of the “accommodationist” church/state decision in Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), with the large and enduring impact of the “separationist” 
church/state decisions in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), 
and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)). 
 278. Yet to some degree the Court may gauge an issue’s importance based on the number of 
amicus briefs filed by interest groups. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized 
Interest and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988). 
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ii. The Cost of the Debate-Forcing Activity.  Debate-forcing 
comes at a price. Beyond the opportunity cost of displacing other 
issues from the public agenda, there are costs that the independent 
body may incur or impose in the very act of putting questions on the 
agenda. These costs may be financial (e.g., if the issue is moved onto 
the agenda with an advertising campaign), or democratic (e.g., if the 
issue is moved onto the agenda by striking down laws whose 
constitutionality is subject to reasonable disagreement).279 The 
priority-setting counterpart is normatively attractive in that the 
body’s debate-forcing technique does not incur the democratic costs 
of judicial invalidation.280 Nor does it require the counterpart to make 
large financial outlays; the body should be able to credibly convey its 
judgment about priorities by invoking its legislative process right, 
without more. 
iii. The Character and Consequences of the Debate.  The trickiest 
questions—positive and normative alike—presented by any project of 
institutional reform on behalf of dialogic constitutionalism pertain to 
the character and consequences of the debate itself. What 
differentiates “good” from “bad” public discourse about 
constitutional questions is not altogether straightforward, nor is it 
easy to predict the dialogic consequences of replacing one 
independent institution with another or adding a new institution to 
the existing mix. 
As a way to get started, I would suggest the following normative 
criteria: 
• Learning. Debate that results in citizens assimilating new 
information and revising their views accordingly is preferable 
to debate in which the participants merely vent and the 
onlookers cheer and jeer. 
• Heart of the Matter. Debate that hones in on the meaning 
and application of the nominally constitutive commitment is 
preferable to debate that skirts the big issues. 
 
 279. There will also be financial costs to the debate itself, as interest groups and others join 
the fray. But it is not clear that these costs depend in any systematic way upon the “trigger 
mechanism” for getting the debate started. 
 280. One might discount these “democratic” costs in the case of judicial invalidations of laws 
whose unconstitutionality is beyond doubt. But if there is not a reasonable basis for disagreeing 
with the court’s determination, it is unlikely that the determination would induce much debate. 
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• Political Efficacy. Debate that leaves citizens feeling that 
they can understand politics and participate effectively is 
preferable to debate that gives rise to a sense of political 
alienation. 
• Tolerance and Mutual Respect. Debate that fosters tolerance 
and mutual respect among citizens with disparate worldviews 
is preferable to debate that ratchets up feelings of animus or 
disgust. 
• Policy Support. Debate that results in enhanced citizen 
support for “good” policy reforms—insofar as there exists an 
objective, ascertainable metric for what is good policy—is 
preferable to debate that does not. 
Bracketing for now the last of these criteria (I certainly do not 
claim privileged knowledge of the requisite metric), I would submit 
that a priority-setting counterpart may well fare better than a 
constitutional court along the first four dimensions. Consider how the 
court- and counterpart-triggered debates might differ on account of 
(1) differences in constitutional context; (2) the existence (or lack 
thereof) of areas of public agreement concerning the problem at 
hand; and (3) the legibility of what the independent actor offers up 
for discussion. First off, let’s be clear about these underlying 
distinctions. 
Constitutional context.  Assuming that norms of legality have 
been established and that the constitution is entrenched, the court’s 
decision will not be reversible through the ordinary legislative 
process. The public response to the issue served up by the court is a 
response to a policy settlement that is difficult to override. By 
contrast, the public response to the advisory counterpart’s 
determination of need would be a reaction to a pending decision, still 
up for negotiation, which will be made (if at all) by the people or their 
elected representatives and which may later be reversed in the same 
way as any other legislative enactment. 
Areas of agreement. Insofar as the counterpart succeeds in 
rallying public attention to the problem at hand, this will probably be 
due, in large measure, to the fact that the electorate is initially 
persuaded by the counterpart’s judgment about constitutional 
priorities. Also, the counterpart is unlikely to waste its rare legislative 
process right on problems for which there is no reasonable prospect 
of forging a politically saleable remedy. By contrast, judicial holdings 
of unconstitutionality need not be predicated on any broad 
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agreement concerning the importance of the issue or the viability of 
political compromise. 
Legibility of the offering.  Courts present conclusions about how 
the constitution applies to the facts of the case at hand, along with an 
explanation—typically obscure to the nonspecialist—cast in terms of 
legal doctrine and precedent.281 The priority-setting counterpart, by 
contrast, offers an account of why the problem at hand matters—why 
it deserves the public’s attention—and some ideas about how the 
problem might be remedied. Because the counterpart’s claim to 
authority, if any, is persuasive rather than legal, the body’s offering is 
more likely to be framed in terms that are intelligible to average 
citizens, and more likely to be developed through a process of public 
consultation.282 
The upshot. The debate following the counterpart’s intervention 
should ultimately have a very different flavor and focus than the 
debate that ensues in the wake of prominent constitutional court 
decisions. High-profile Supreme Court decisions are polarizing.283 
Think of abortion, the death penalty, and the like. Social scientists 
have argued that public opinion polarizes because political 
contestation in the wake of the Court’s decisions helps previously 
inattentive citizens to align their policy preferences with their 
underlying normative intuitions.284 I suspect, however, that the Court’s 
high-profile interventions have also been polarizing because they are 
uniquely threatening to supporters of the laws struck down. 
Individual decisions are difficult for opponents to get reversed, and 
possess a generative potential for “worse” decisions down the line. 
The likely course of a new line of jurisprudence is hard to foretell, 
 
 281. Cf. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION (1992) (lamenting that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has failed to justify its holdings in terms that are intelligible to the citizenry 
at large); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 
1381 (2006) (“[C]ourts . . . tend to be distracted in their arguments about rights by side 
arguments about how a text like the Bill of Rights is best approached by judges.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 282. See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
 283. See, e.g., Brickman & Peterson, supra note 227 (regarding abortion); Franklin & 
Kosaki, supra note 227 (same); Johnson & Martin, supra note 227 (regarding abortion and 
capital punishment); Vincent Price & Anca Romantan, Confidence in Institutions Before, 
During and After “Indecision 2000,” 66 J. POL. 939 (2004) (regarding Bush v. Gore); cf. Michael 
J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HISTORY 81 
(1994) (regarding “backlash” to Supreme Court desegregation decisions). 
 284. Variations on this argument are developed in Brickman & Peterson, supra note 227, 
and Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 227. 
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and the case-or-controversy norm discourages judicial conversations 
with the elected branches of government (or citizens, or interest 
groups) about cases yet to come, conversations that might alleviate 
some of the opponents’ worst fears. 
A counterpart’s statement about the constitutional values at 
stake in a particular problem—think here of the determination of 
exceptional need—should not be nearly so threatening. The 
statement does not portend anything more disruptive than, for 
example, the introduction of counterpart-drafted legislation, or a 
referendum ballot, or a suspensive veto. The statement really does 
operate as an invitation to a conversation, rather than as a demand to 
speak up on pain of suffering through a string of adverse 
constitutional rulings. Also, the processes by which the counterpart 
develops its proposed remedy—public hearings, focus groups, 
consultations with interest groups and politicians, and the like—
facilitate the consideration of alternatives and can accommodate 
compromise. And, as noted above, the counterpart is unlikely to 
expend its legislative process right on issues as to which there’s little 
hope of forging a compromise that could win majority support in a 
vote of the legislature or of the citizenry. 
On balance, the counterpart’s intervention is likely to foster a 
rather pragmatic, solution-oriented debate about the problem that 
has been identified. The image of a pragmatic, solution-oriented 
debate in which possibilities for compromise stand out may be 
contrasted with the kind of debate that attends high-profile judicial 
determinations of unconstitutionality. The contestants in Court-
unleashed debates focus mainly on vivifying the stakes, questioning or 
bolstering the legitimacy of the Court’s intervention, and trying to 
locate some viable doctrinal basis on which to design and defend a 
replacement for the law struck down.285 The main object is to move 
the Court, and the politicians who appoint Justices to the Court, not 
to figure out how best to remedy the problem the Court purports to 
have identified. 
 
 285. Cf. TUSHNET, supra note 157, at 58–60 (explaining how a Supreme Court flag-burning 
decision, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), engendered “distort[ed]” legislative response, 
in which the question that mattered—“whether the flag’s symbolic value is so great that we 
should protect it even at some cost to the protection of free expression”—was never squarely 
faced because the Court had removed it from the menu of permissible bases on which to found 
the regulation of flag-burning). 
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How does all this fit with the normative criteria outlined above? 
Very quickly (and speculatively): 
Learning. A debate in which neither side is relegated to fighting 
against a constitutionally entrenched policy, and which admits of 
compromise, seems more likely to foster open-mindedness on the 
part of the participants and their audience. 
Heart of the Matter. As Mark Tushnet and Jeremy Waldron have 
argued, constitutional dialogue free of “judicial overhang”—and 
therefore free of institutional concerns specific to the electorally 
unaccountable, precedent-oriented, and informationally 
impoverished judiciary—is much more likely than court-oriented 
discourse to air the issues of political morality and shared obligation 
that the idea of a constitutive political commitment evokes.286 To be 
sure, one might object that politically prudent counterparts will try to 
avoid fomenting debate over the most contentious of questions, 
whereas the same tendency among constitutional courts is now and 
then happily overcome thanks to ideological litigants or the courts’ 
political obtuseness. Whether public institutions should be designed 
to encourage the airing of the citizenry’s most intractable values 
disagreements is, however, open to doubt. Political discourse that gets 
at the heart of those matters may be harmful to social tolerance and 
mutual respect.287 
Political Efficacy. A constitutional dialogue in which citizens are 
called to participate by a visibly responsive institution (as by a 
counterpart seeking democratic credentials for its recommendation) 
should contribute to the development of citizens’ sense of “external” 
political efficacy.288 Efficacy will be further enhanced if the decision to 
enact or reject the counterpart’s recommendation turns on a 
referendum vote.289 By contrast, constitutional court decisions that 
 
 286. TUSHNET, supra note 157, at 57–65; Waldron, supra note 281, at 1384–85. 
 287. See infra note 291 and accompanying text. 
 288. Political scientists define “internal efficacy” as the citizen’s sense of her ability to 
comprehend politics and governmental institutions, and “external efficacy” as the citizen’s sense 
of whether governmental institutions are responsive to the respondent and others similarly 
situated. See, e.g., STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, 
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 15 (1993) (explaining these concepts). 
 289. On the linkage between direct democracy and efficacy, see Bowler & Donovan, supra 
note 258, and Mendelsohn & Cutler, supra note 258. 
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reallocate policy questions from the legislative to the judicial arena 
are likely to undermine citizens’ sense of external efficacy.290 
Social Tolerance and Mutual Respect. The relationships between 
constitutional discourse, social tolerance, and mutual respect are 
undoubtedly complex, perhaps too complex for this criterion to be 
useful as a normative referent. However, there is a significant body of 
evidence which suggests that tolerance for difference is enabled by 
public confidence in the institutions of government, and, ironically, by 
the papering over of deep values disagreements among different 
groups of citizens.291 With these precepts in mind, one might suppose 
that constitutional discourses are more likely to be tolerance-
enhancing insofar as they culminate in policy decisions that 
ideologically disparate factions can support on the basis of 
“incompletely theorized agreements”292—and that actually get 
implemented (such that government looks like it works). 
Constitutional dialogues predicated on determinations of need that 
command widespread assent, and aimed at shaping a compromise 
legislative response, offer the prospect of some such denouement. 
3. Engaging the Citizenry: Conclusions.  This Section has 
explored how advisory counterparts may engage public opinion in 
pursuit of legal reforms. Though the counterparts lack the 
constitutional court’s legal authority to negate duly enacted law, they 
are, in certain respects, better positioned to develop persuasive 
authority with the electorate, such that voters revise their policy 
preferences in line with the counterparts’ prescriptions. The evidence 
to date is only anecdotal, but it appears that elected officials 
sometimes face ballot-box sanctions for rejecting counterpart-
proposed election law and anticorruption reforms, particularly in the 
aftermath of scandals. This dynamic arguably reflects both the 
counterpart’s exercise of persuasive authority with the electorate 
concerning the merits of the reform in question, and voters’ suspicion 
that legislators whose oppose the reform have done so out of self 
interest. 
 
 290. There is, however, the exception of constitutional rulings designed to increase 
opportunities for political participation. 
 291. See generally STENNER, supra note 246 (developing and testing theories of what causes 
intolerance and its expression as, for example, racism, punitiveness, and/or political and moral 
hostility to difference). 
 292. For elaboration of the concept, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized 
Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). 
01__ELMENDORF.DOC 3/9/2007  7:44 AM 
1028 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:953 
Beyond the election law and anticorruption domains, it is 
doubtful that counterparts exercise much persuasive authority 
concerning their preferred reforms. Counterparts that are not 
persuasive in this way may nonetheless play an important role in 
moving new issues to the center of public debate. Depending on the 
counterpart in question, this might be achieved through public 
education and advertising campaigns; through the carrying out of 
high-profile investigations into governmental malfeasance and cover-
ups; or through the exercise of a legislative process right, such as 
authority to delay enactment of pending legislation or to put a 
proposed reform to a vote of the legislature or the citizenry. A 
counterpart’s effort to get a vigorous debate underway is more likely 
to succeed insofar as (1) the issue chosen for debate emerges from a 
priority setting process; (2) the counterpart has broad subject-matter 
jurisdiction and a membership that is ideologically centrist or 
representatively diverse; and (3) the counterpart has a credible and 
easily understood device with which to signal its determination of 
priorities, such as a legislative process right that may be exercised no 
more frequently than once every x years. 
The public discourse attendant to such a counterpart’s exercise 
of its legislative process right is likely to have a rather different flavor 
and focus than the debate following high-profile judicial holdings of 
unconstitutionality. There is some basis for thinking that 
constitutional dialogues engendered by priority-setting counterparts 
would be normatively preferable to the debates occasionally 
unleashed by constitutional courts, but this claim is quite tentative.293 
C. The Puzzle of Independence 
At the outset of this Part, I suggested that one of the attractions 
of the “advisory counterpart method” for giving life to basic liberal 
 
 293. Indeed, one might argue that counterparts should be set up not to foster debate in 
which deep values disagreements are bracketed, as I have suggested, but rather to induce 
popular majorities occasionally to confront problems and proposed solutions as defined by 
minorities—whether or not there is a reasonable prospect of compromise or accommodation. 
Cf. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990) (developing a 
normative account of a just society centered on citizens’ respect for and appreciation of group 
differences); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005) 
(defending forms of political organization that enable political minorities to make certain 
decisions on behalf of the citizenry as a whole, on the theory that “dissenting by deciding” can 
“generate a productive conversational dynamic between dissenters and the majority, between 
the periphery and the center”). 
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commitments is that an advisory body may be more thoroughly 
insulated from the elected branches of government without risking 
the creation of an anti-democratic monster. Any democracy that 
delegates to its constitutional court the power to negate statutes and 
enter remedial orders binding on the government will also ensure that 
the elected branches of government have an array of tools for 
checking the court’s power.294 Familiar examples include the power of 
the purse, impeachment, and jurisdiction stripping.295 Constitutional 
courts do their work in the shadow of a power of retaliation that 
inheres in the elected branches. 
As Barry Friedman, Mark Tushnet, and others have pointed out, 
the twin narratives that frame generations of debate about 
constitutional judicial review—one of countermajoritarian hope, the 
other of countermajoritarian threat—both badly misrepresent the 
actual practice of judicial review (in the United States, at least).296 The 
Supreme Court has rarely fought the combined will of the president 
and Congress. This is not surprising in view of the forms of control 
that the elected branches retain over the Court. These controls are 
entirely appropriate given the Constitution’s high hurdle for reversing 
a Supreme Court holding of unconstitutionality. 
If, however, the prospect of top-down illiberality provides the 
most compelling reason for establishing independent bodies to tend 
to basic liberal commitments, then perhaps the risk of overreach 
would be better addressed by making the body’s power more directly 
dependent on public opinion—e.g., by relegating the body to an 
advisory role, perhaps with limited powers of legislative initiation or 
 
 294. Cf. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: 
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 972 (2002) (cataloguing political checks 
on the power of the Article III judiciary). 
 295. Id. 
 296. TUSHNET, supra note 157, at 129–53 (offering an historical perspective on judicial 
review in the United States); MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 33–112 
(2004) (assessing the Rehnquist Court and future possibilities); Friedman, supra note 205, at 
1267–82 (discussing insights from political science); see also Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making 
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) 
(evaluating the relationship between judicial decisionmaking and political ethos); Neal Devins, 
The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (Summer 2004) (examining 
the social and political forces that impacted Rehnquist Court decisionmaking). 
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delay—rather than by giving the elected branches a large measure of 
control over the body.297 
But there is a catch. Effective independence depends on more 
than de jure protections, and some of the political dynamics that 
support the de facto independence of constitutional courts may not 
work similarly for advisory bodies. This Section sketches an account 
of the problem of de facto independence for advisory counterparts, 
framing a number of questions for future research. 
The existing counterparts are muffled with disappointing 
regularity. Some human rights commissions have one shining 
moment, after which the government responds with budget cuts, 
personnel replacements, and the like.298 When the heat is on, human 
rights commissions frequently emphasize education or conciliation, in 
lieu of the investigation of serious abuses.299 Anticorruption 
commissions have overemphasized the prosecution of bureaucrats, at 
the expense of structural reforms that would reduce incentives and 
opportunities for corruption.300 
Quiescence is not simply an emerging-democracy phenomenon. 
Anticorruption commissions in New South Wales and Queensland, 
Australia, both suffered severe retaliation after challenging 
legislators’ abuse of travel privileges, and have since avoided 
controversy.301 Some observers complain that the Australian Electoral 
Commission has “settled for a condition of peaceful coexistence” with 
elected lawmakers, rather than pestering them to adopt loophole-
closing measures the Commission has suggested.302 In the United 
Kingdom, it was opposition leaders and a daring judge who blasted 
 
 297. In previous work, I have described a range of formal techniques by which independent 
advisory bodies might be made exceptionally independent from the elected branches of 
government. See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1405–14. 
 298. This is a recurring theme in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7. See also Cardenas, 
supra note 169, at 69 (noting that “national governments have curtailed the power of [all three 
NHRIs the author studied], albeit to varying degrees”). 
 299. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 5 (discussing human rights commissions in 
Africa); INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra note 7, at 50–51 (noting that the 
Mexican Human Rights Commission has shied from investigating human rights abuses in the 
military in favor of providing human-rights education). 
 300. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 270, at 162. Regarding the importance of structural 
reforms in dealing with corruption, see id. at 227–28. 
 301. See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1392 & nn. 111–118. 
 302. BARRY HINDESS, DEMOCRATIC AUDIT OF AUSTL., REPORT NO. 3, CORRUPTION AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AUSTRALIA 18 (2004), available at http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/papers/ 
focussed_audits/200408_hindess_corruption.pdf. 
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the Government for its failure to adopt the Electoral Commission’s 
ballot security reforms, not the Commission itself.303 
There are several respects in which the de facto independence of 
specialist investigatory and advisory bodies seems likely to be more 
precarious than that of a constitutional court with the same de jure 
independence protections. 
First, the effectiveness of investigative/advisory bodies may be 
more budget-sensitive. Advisory counterparts need substantial 
financial resources for conducting investigations, for sponsoring 
research, for traveling and holding public hearings, for publishing 
reports and pamphlets, for advertising their existence and 
achievements, etc., all in the service of building a base of support for 
their recommendations. They cannot make law simply by deciding 
cases and entering remedial orders, like a constitutional court. 
Second, the de facto independence of constitutional courts is 
often attributed to the fact that these courts can be useful as well as 
threatening to the elected branches, and it’s not clear that 
counterparts can be useful in the same ways. Matthew Stephenson 
theorizes that courts help to sustain informal pacts between the major 
political parties, whereby the parties agree not to govern too far from 
the center or to lock out the party that at a given moment is out of 
power.304 Stephenson’s theory finds support in his 80-country dataset, 
and maps nicely onto Alec Stone Sweet’s discursive account of the 
ascendance of constitutional judicial review in Western Europe.305 
Marc Graber argues that constitutional courts can help otherwise 
fractious governing coalitions hold together by reducing the 
dimensionality of ordinary politics.306 Roe v. Wade, he suggests, 
enabled low-tax libertarians to cohabit with social conservatives in 
 
 303. Perhaps it is significant, though, that none of these bodies has been formally 
entrenched by a written constitution. 
 304. Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of 
Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2003). 
 305. SWEET, supra note 125, at 73–79, 139–52 (2000) (explaining how minority legislative 
factions strategically refer statutes to constitutional court, and how the court then “splits the 
difference” between contending factions so as to build legitimacy); see also Jodi Finkel, Judicial 
Reform in Argentina in the 1990s: How Electoral Incentives Shape Institutional Change, 39 
LATIN AM. RES. REV. 56 (2004) (arguing that ruling parties seek to establish independent 
judicial review as an “insurance policy” when their hold on power becomes tenuous); Jodi 
Finkel, Judicial Reform as Insurance Policy: Mexico in the 1990s, 46 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 
87 (2004) (same). 
 306. Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 
7 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993). 
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the Republican Party.307 With abortion effectively off the table, 
libertarians were willing to stomach the symbolic social conservatism 
of Republican lawmakers—a small price to pay for lower taxes. Keith 
Whittington suggests that in political systems with multiple veto 
points (characteristic of federal and separated-powers regimes), 
constitutional courts can win political support over time by 
“interposing a friendly hand,” helping national coalitions to overcome 
regional obstructionism and entrenched interests, as well as 
fractiousness within the coalition.308 
Whether specialist advisory counterparts can fulfill these 
functions seems doubtful. Lacking the constitutional court’s power of 
negation, they cannot undertake old-statute demolition on behalf of 
current legislative majorities, or strategically remove coalition-
splitting issues from the domain of ordinary politics. Restricted by 
their narrow subject-matter jurisdiction, they cannot roam across the 
range of issues that are germane to informal pacts among competing 
political parties. 
Moreover, the advisory counterparts stand to threaten the 
electoral fortunes of incumbent lawmakers. A body that is authorized 
to hold public hearings and develop statutory proposals in 
consultation with the citizenry may encroach on legislators’ control 
over the policymaking agenda. It may effectively force legislators to 
address questions they would prefer to avoid, exposing lawmakers to 
political risk. By contrast, a constitutional court’s overruling of the 
legislator’s pet enactment often creates political opportunity. The 
legislator can make hay by criticizing the court’s decision and 
pledging her support for a different kind of judge come the next 
round of appointments.309 
None of this means that quiescence is the inexorable fate of the 
advisory counterparts. But students of these bodies ought to be 
attentive to the problem of de facto independence, and to study the 
design choices that bear on this critically important attribute. In 
addition to assessing such important formalities as (1) appointment 
and removal procedures; (2) conflict-of-interest rules; and (3) 
 
 307. Id. at 53–60. 
 308. Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the 
Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583 
(2005). 
 309. Cf. SWEET, supra note 125, at 77 (mentioning legislators’ use of constitutional courts as 
scapegoats). 
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mechanisms for guarding budgets;310 one should pay attention to how 
the design of an advisory counterpart affects the likelihood (4) that it 
will develop a base of support within the electorate that discourages 
assaults on its independence;311 and (5) that elected-branch officials 
will come to see the body as politically useful in some respects, even if 
threatening in others. 
In particular, I would urge close attention to several issues which 
on the surface might not appear germane to independence: breadth of 
subject-matter jurisdiction; constitutional entrenchment of non-
advisory responsibilities in the counterpart; and constitutional 
limitations on the legislature’s authority to delegate further 
responsibilities—especially non-advisory ones—to the counterpart. 
As to the breadth-of-jurisdiction issue, there is some basis for 
thinking that de facto independence will be less of a problem for 
generalist than specialist advisory bodies. A broad-jurisdiction body 
should have a wider range of constituencies to fall back on in the 
event that its independence is threatened. One might also anticipate 
that broad jurisdiction would, over time, help the counterpart to 
achieve a higher public profile,312 such that attacks on its 
independence are more likely to register with the citizenry. Finally, a 
body with broad jurisdiction should be better positioned to palliate 
 
 310. Appointments procedures, conflict-of-interest rules, and mechanisms for guarding 
budgets are treated in Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1405–14. That article concerns advisory 
electoral commissions, but the “design guidelines” adduced therein would seem more generally 
applicable. 
 311. Note that the base of citizen support needed to sustain de facto independence differs in 
key respects from the base of support needed to get counterpart-proposed policies adopted. For 
citizen support to sustain a counterpart’s independence, citizen support must be (1) ongoing (as 
opposed to arising now and then at opportune moments, such as in the wake of scandals, or at 
the time of the counterpart’s exercise of a legislative process right); and (2) comprehending of 
how various legal reforms or budgetary decisions would affect the counterpart’s independence. 
That these conditions can be difficult to satisfy is suggested by the saga of the anticorruption 
commissions in New South Wales and Queensland, Australia, which despite apparently broad 
popular support suffered severe retaliation in the wake of their conflicts with parliament over 
parliamentary travel voucher administration and legislative ethics. See Elmendorf, supra note 
62, at 1391–92 & nn. 102–118. 
 312. Broad jurisdiction may help the counterpart achieve a higher public profile for two 
reasons. First, the broader the advisory body’s jurisdiction, the more likely it is to reach 
whatever happens to be the political “issue of the day,” and hence newsworthy. Over the long 
run, then, the broad-jurisdiction advisory body is likely to enjoy more media attention than any 
given specialist body. Second, the combination of interestingly varied subject matter and 
newsworthiness is likely to make the broad-jurisdiction counterpart a more attractive perch for 
many persons of significant public renown, and the appointment of luminaries to serve on the 
body is one way of boosting public awareness about the body itself. 
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the powers that be. It has more room to soften the impact of its more 
threatening proposals (e.g., redistricting reform) by recommending 
friendly measures on other fronts (e.g., a bill to raise lawmakers’ 
salaries so as to make them harder to bribe). Yet the literature on law 
revision commissions—whose jurisdiction is not subject-limited at 
all—suggests that these bodies have often struggled to build popular 
support.313 The same goes for second legislative chambers whose 
members were not popularly elected.314 Broader jurisdiction, then, 
does not necessarily equate to stronger de facto independence. To 
generate popular support for counterpart independence, then, it may 
be necessary to define the body’s responsibilities in terms of issues as 
to which the ordinary political process is thought prone to failure. The 
rationale for independence should be transparent to average citizens. 
Turn now to the constitutional entrenchment of nonadvisory 
responsibilities in the counterpart. The universe of governmental 
functions and powers that might plausibly be assigned to a politically 
insulated body is large, including, for example, authority to audit 
public accounts, to initiate and carry out investigations of high-level 
malfeasance, to prosecute corruption, to exercise what I have termed 
“legislative process rights” in relation to the body’s law reform 
recommendations, to administer and regulate elections, to direct a 
central bank, or even to perform constitutional judicial review. 
Within the confines of this introductory Article I cannot hope to 
say much about the optimal combination of advisory and non-
advisory responsibilities as a constitutional matter. The answer is 
likely to vary from one polity to the next. Suffice it for now to point 
out some of the interesting questions that merit further study. The 
constitutional combination of advisory and non-advisory functions 
within the same independent body might serve the goal of 
independence by raising the public profile of the nominally 
independent body;315 by giving citizens who discount the body’s law-
reform role other reasons to defend the body’s independence;316 by 
giving legislators an affirmative reason to support the body’s 
 
 313. See supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra notes 105–12 and accompanying text. 
 315. Recall that Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption made a big 
splash early on with its investigations into police syndicates. See supra note 239. 
 316. Perhaps the value of independent election administration or anticorruption 
enforcement is, for example, more tangible to many citizens than the value of an independent, 
constitutionally inflected voice for law reform. 
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independence;317 or by equipping the independent body with tools 
with which it may credibly threaten elected officials who might 
otherwise encroach on the body’s independence.318 
On the other hand, to the extent that the counterpart has 
significant non-advisory powers, the normative case for exceptional 
political insulation would seem more tenuous. This is especially true if 
the body’s nonadvisory powers include coercive authority to 
investigate high level malfeasance, given that advisory counterparts 
can have an institutional interest in discrediting the elected branches 
of government.319 Note also that administrative or regulatory powers 
with which the counterpart could threaten particular elected 
officials—think here, in particular, of authority to administer 
elections, or to investigate alleged corruption—might be employed 
not simply to secure the body’s independence, but also to advance its 
law reform agenda without recourse to public opinion.320 Such powers 
might also make the counterpart a more attractive target for would-
be partisan capturers of the institution. 
The de facto independence of a constitutionally entrenched 
advisory counterpart may be affected not only by whether the 
constitution delegates non-advisory responsibilities to the 
counterpart, but also by whether it authorizes the legislature to do so. 
Elected lawmakers sometimes seek to avoid political controversy by 
delegating contentious questions to government agencies, or to the 
courts. Occasionally it is helpful to delegate the matter at hand to an 
agency with a public reputation for being non-political. Consider the 
 
 317. For example, electoral competition and oscillation in party control of government may 
create incentives for the delegation of election administration to independent agencies. See 
Elmendorf, supra note 210, at 431. 
 318. For example, coercive powers of investigation that may be deployed against then-
serving elected officials or their aides or supporters. (To be sure, it is not altogether clear 
whether de jure authority to exercise such powers will tend to make the counterpart more or 
less independent over time. While it could discourage some assaults on the body’s 
independence, it might also make legislators more eager to hamstring the body when doing so 
looks politically feasible.) 
 319. See supra Part II.B.2.a.ii. (discussing costs of “scandal mongering”). 
 320. The leverage that electoral administration may provide is suggested by the remarkable 
success of Benin’s new constitutional court, which is regarded as one of the most powerful in 
Africa. See generally Anna Rotman, Benin’s Constitutional Court: An Institutional Model for 
Guaranteeing Human Rights, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 281, 289–90 (2004). Rotman attributes the 
elected branches’ acquiescence to the fact that the court has authority under the constitution not 
only to exercise the power of judicial review, but also to administer elections. Id. No politician 
wants to be on the outs with the vote counter. 
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setting of lawmakers’ salaries.321 Lawmakers hoping to detoxify what 
voters would otherwise take to be a self-serving reform (such as a pay 
raise) probably would do better to delegate the decision to a well-
regarded and constitutionally ensconced independent body than to an 
ad hoc entity of the lawmakers’ own making.322 
To be sure, a constitutional structure that authorizes the 
delegation of statutory responsibilities to the advisory counterpart 
may have costs as well as benefits for the body’s independence. 
Lawmakers empowered to delegate might try to divert the advisory 
body from its constitutionally mandated responsibilities by weighing 
it down with make-work. Or perhaps the possibility of augmenting an 
advisory body’s powers through delegation would increase the 
incentives for lawmakers to try to capture the advisory counterpart 
and redirect it for partisan purposes. With an eye to judicial 
independence, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Article III to 
substantially restrict congressional delegations of non-judicial 
functions to the federal courts.323 Perhaps it would be best for 
legislatures to be similarly precluded from delegating non-advisory 
responsibilities to constitution-chartered counterparts. I raise the 
possibility of non-advisory delegations only to point out that, in the 
case of advisory counterparts, these risks might be worth incurring.324 
 
 321. Roger H. Davidson, The Politics of Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Compensation, 
in THE REWARDS OF PUBLIC SERVICE 53, 76–87 (Robert W. Hartman & Arnold Weber eds., 
1980) (discussing congressional efforts to establish “objective, automatic decisionmaking 
process,” led by appointed commission, to set lawmakers’ salaries). 
 322. Congress’s efforts to lodge responsibility for lawmakers’ pay in obscure commissions 
have not succeeded in quelling voter outrage over pay increases. See David W. Brady & Sean 
M. Theriault, A Reassessment of Who’s to Blame: A Positive Case for the Public Evaluation of 
Congress, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 175, 178–80 (John 
R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001) (sketching the history of congressional 
strategies to raise lawmakers’ pay). 
 323. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677–78 (1988) (“As a general rule, we have broadly 
stated that executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on 
judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution. The purpose of this limitation is to help 
ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch and to prevent the Judiciary from encroaching 
into areas reserved for the other branches.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 324. It might be possible to achieve some of the benefits of legislative delegation without the 
independence costs by stipulating in the constitution that additional, non-advisory tasks may be 
delegated to the advisory counterpart but only if consented to by that body. 
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III.  COURTS AND COUNTERPARTS TOGETHER: CONFLICT  
OR COMPLEMENTARITY? 
In comparing constitutional courts and advisory counterparts in 
terms of remedy design, public opinion, and independence, I have 
treated courts and counterparts as if they were institutional 
alternatives for giving effect to basic liberal aspirations. 
Constitutional judicial review is, however, a firmly established 
practice in most democracies today. When institutional reform 
opportunities do arise, the available choice is less likely to be “court 
or counterpart” than “court and counterpart, or court alone.” It is 
worth asking what problems or synergies might arise from courts and 
counterparts working side by side. I see two plausible bases for 
concern, which I shall briefly address in this Part (recognizing that the 
topic deserves much closer attention than I have space to give it 
here). 
To begin, one might worry that courts and counterparts will 
collaborate to create more interventionist bodies of constitutional law 
than the court alone would otherwise have created. The judiciary’s 
willingness to use its remedial powers to pursue large-scale policy 
reforms is plausibly constrained, in part, by judges’ sense of the 
limitations of their case-specific point of view, their meager fact-
finding abilities, and the difficulties they would face in monitoring 
policy implementation.325 These factors together create a likelihood 
that judge-made policies would miss the mark. If the court could lift a 
remedial scheme, as it were, out of the policy recommendations of an 
advisory counterpart, and if the court could further rely on the 
advisory body to monitor or even administer the policy’s 
implementation, the court might become more aggressive.326 
 
 325. Cf. Grimm, supra note 128, at 116–18 (arguing that courts’ informational limitations 
and the sequencing of legislative and judicial decision soften the “democratic risks” associated 
with constitutional judicial review). 
 326. Cf. Kirby, supra note 79, at 439 (“In 20 years as an appellate judge, I have noticed a 
distinct change of attitude among the Australian judiciary concerning the citation and use of law 
reform reports. Whereas two decades ago this was comparatively rare and treated with 
suspicion or even hostility, today that attitude has virtually disappeared. Partly, this is . . . [due 
to the fact that] law reform agencies have the time and purpose to identify the issues of principle 
and policy that are otherwise neglected in . . . the submissions that courts typically receive from 
the Bar table.”); id. at 440 (speculating that law commission report concerning aboriginal 
customary land rights, and the attendant “national discussion of the operation of Australian law 
upon the indigenous people of the nation,” “resulted in attitudinal changes in the legal 
profession and judiciary,” culminating in a High Court decision which, reversing a century of 
land law, determined that the acquisition of sovereignty over the continent by the British Crown 
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By way of illustration, consider how the Indian Supreme Court 
has made use of the National Human Rights Commission. In a case in 
which the plaintiffs alleged “flagrant violations of human rights on a 
mass scale,” the Court delegated to the Commission the task of 
investigating abuses and ordering compensation.327 Though the 
Commission was time-barred by its authorizing legislation from 
investigating the alleged killings, the Court held that insofar as the 
Commission was acting on the Court’s behalf, the Commission was 
sui generis and had “a free hand . . . not circumscribed by any 
[statutory] conditions.”328 In this capacity, moreover, the Commission 
could issue orders binding on the government, notwithstanding the 
lack of any statutory or constitutional authorization for the 
Commission to play a more-than-advisory role.329 As the Commission 
proposed, and the Court held, “[t]he shackles and limitations of the 
[Commission’s organic act] are not attached to this body [when] it . . . 
function[s] under the remit of the Supreme Court.”330 
On the other hand, it may be doubted that the presence of the 
Commission made the Court more aggressive than it otherwise would 
have been. A famously activist body,331 the Indian Supreme Court has 
 
did not fully extinguish aboriginal title); Sir Anthony Mason, Law Reform and the Courts, in 
THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 314, 325 (“[A]s a judge and as a lawyer, I 
have derived very considerable assistance from reports and issues papers published by law 
reform commissions . . . . To the extent that community standards, values and policy 
considerations are relevant, the reports of the law reform commissions . . . provide a source of 
material that the courts otherwise lack.”); Michael Sayers, Cooperation Across Frontiers, in THE 
PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 243, 252 (“Law reform agency reports . . . have a 
significant effect in changing views and in providing guidance to the courts . . . . This can lead to 
a gradual change in the law by developments through the courts. In a recent two-year period, 
over 40 reported English cases referred to the work of the Law Commission for England and 
Wales.”). 
 327. CRL. M.P. No. 4808 of 1998 in Writ Petitions (Criminal) Nos. 447 & 497 of 1995 
(Oaramjit Kaur v. State of Punjab), at 2 (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 328. Id. at 3–6. 
 329. Id. at 3, 6. 
 330. Id. at 4, 6. 
 331. See generally Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The Operation and Limits of 
the World’s Most Active Judiciary, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 77 
(Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 1992) (explaining the practice of “social action 
litigation” fostered by the Indian Supreme Court); S.P. Sathe, India: From Positivism to 
Structuralism, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS 215, 258 (Jeffrey Goldsworth ed., 2006) 
(describing Indian Supreme Court’s use of “direction” remedies in cases challenging legislative 
and executive inaction); Vijayashri Sripati, Toward Fifty Years of Constitutionalism and 
Fundamental Rights in India: Looking Back to See Ahead (1950–2000), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
413, 439–59 (1998) (chronicling fundamental rights jurisprudence of Indian Supreme Court since 
1970s). 
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on other occasions “appointed . . . social activists, teachers, scholars, 
journalists, bureaucrats, and judicial officers, to act as 
‘commissioners’ and assist in . . . gathering evidence.”332 The Court has 
also solicited remedy recommendations from ad hoc, Court-
appointed commissions.333 
The extent to which informational and administrative limitations 
curtail judicial activism is uncertain. Judicial restraint or its absence 
may depend much more on powers of retaliation that inhere in the 
elected branches,334 and on normative understandings about the 
judicial function that develop organically.335 In the abstract, then, it’s 
hard to say whether the prospect of court-counterpart collaboration 
resulting in an emboldened court should be viewed as problematic. 
The answer may vary with the details of different constitutional 
orders and traditions. Indeed, one cannot rule out a priori the 
counterhypothesis that establishing a substantially independent 
advisory counterpart will result in less aggressive judicial review. 
Perhaps the chartering of a counterpart would cause some justices to 
adopt less expansive understandings of their representation-
reinforcement responsibilities, for example, figuring that there is now 
a complementary institution positioned to play that role in other 
more democratic ways. 
There is a second basis for objecting to court-counterpart 
collaboration: the prospect of victory through the courts could dilute 
the counterpart’s incentive to develop effective practices for engaging 
popular opinion.336 The Indian experience suggests that in countries 
with strong constitutional courts, advisory counterparts will 
undertake their work with an eye to judicial review. In challenging 
the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), 
the National Human Rights Commission “pursued a threefold 
strategy,” which consisted of (1) “monitor[ing] closely the manner in 
 
 332. Sripati, supra note 331, at 456; see also Baar, supra note 331, at 80 (describing the use of 
monitoring agencies by the Indian Supreme Court). 
 333. Sripati, supra note 331, at 456 (mentioning the case of Tarun Bhgat Sangh, Alwar v. 
Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 293, in which the Supreme Court sought from the commission 
“appropriate recommendations for addressing potential threats to the environment”). 
 334. See generally Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 294. 
 335. Cf. KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 20–71 (1999) (explaining that the Samuel Chase impeachment 
served to “construct” an understanding, shared by judges and members of the elected branches, 
about both the limits of the judicial role and permissible grounds for impeachment). 
 336. Thanks to David Fontana for raising this issue in commenting on an early draft. 
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which the Act was being implemented”; (2) “prepar[ing] a dossier 
[for] possible recourse to the Supreme Court”; and, as the date 
neared for the legislature to extend the Act (3) “prepar[ing] a direct 
approach to all Members of Parliament seeking an end to this law.”337 
But the opportunities presented by an activist and sympathetic 
constitutional court haven’t led the Commission to forsake broadly 
stated appeals to political morality and national self-understanding. 
The public letter that the Commission circulated when TADA came 
up for renewal focused on the Act’s “draconian . . . effect and 
character . . . .”338 The letter portrayed TADA as inconsistent with 
basic ideals embedded in India’s constitution and long-standing 
statutes, and honored throughout history by “civilized beings and 
civilized nations . . . .”339 Likewise, the Commission’s formal opinion 
against the proposed Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2000, undertook to 
analyze the bill “not strictly from the point of view of constitutional 
validity . . . which, if necessary, would be a matter for the courts to 
decide, but on the need and wisdom of enacting such a law 
particularly in the light of the earlier experiences with TADA . . . .”340 
The gist of the Commission’s opinion was that India’s liberal 
traditions, her obligations under international covenants, and the 
security of her people, would all be better served if terrorism were 
battled through institutional reforms to the police, public prosecutors, 
and the courts, and by passing new laws targeting terrorist finances, 
rather than by doing what the bill proposed to do—to wit, creating 
presumptions of guilt, allowing confessions before police officers to 
be admissible in evidence, and extending the period for which 
terrorist suspects could be held uncharged and without bail. 
In short, what Mark Tushnet calls “judicial overhang”341 may 
cause advisory counterparts to peg some of their findings to judge-
made doctrine, and perhaps even to defer to judges on the ultimate 
question of what the constitution requires or prohibits, but overhang 
seems unlikely to lead the counterparts to abandon other promising 
strategies for influencing the course of events. If the goal is to foster 
 
 337. NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1994–1995, supra note 163, para. 
4.5. 
 338. Id. annexure I. 
 339. Id. 
 340. NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 166, para. 3.0. 
 341. Tushnet uses the phrase “judicial overhang” to refer to the impact of anticipated 
judicial review on legislators’ constitutional deliberations and their crafting of statutes. See 
TUSHNET, supra note 157, at 57–65. 
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popular engagement with questions about foundational ideals, then 
the answer, from an institutional design perspective, is to give the 
counterparts tools and resources that facilitate such engagement.342 
Perhaps Tushnet is correct that this goal also counts in favor of 
abolishing constitutional judicial review. But however aggressive the 
constitutional court, it seems doubtful that adding an advisory 
counterpart to the institutional mix would, on balance, debilitate 
popular engagement with questions about the polity’s basic 
commitments and how well they are being served. 
It should be noted, finally, that constitutional courts and advisory 
counterparts may prove to be complementary institutions in many 
respects. Constitutional courts could be quite useful for policing the 
separation of powers between counterparts and the elected branches, 
defending the political independence of the counterparts while also 
checking the counterparts’ use of potentially disruptive powers of 
investigation.343 Conversely, the counterparts’ research and 
recommendations, and the public’s reaction thereto, could usefully 
inform constitutional court decisionmaking without leading the court 
to be more aggressive overall.344 
 
 342. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 343. See, e.g., New Nat’l Party v. Gov’t of Republic of S. Afr., 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC) at 231 
(S. Afr.) (stating that Electoral Commission is entitled to “financial independence,” defined as 
“funding reasonably sufficient to enable the Commission to carry out its constitutional 
mandate,” and “administrative independence,” defined as “control over those matters directly 
connected with the functions which the Commission has to perform under the Constitution and 
the [Electoral] Act”); cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
Dec. 15, 1983, 65 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGe] 1 
(F.R.G.), translated in 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 94 (1984) (introducing the concept of “informational 
separation of powers,” and contending that “basic [information privacy] rights protection 
cannot be left purely to the discretion of the [government] administration” but rather “effective 
control by data protection commissioners is required”). 
 344. Cf. Elmendorf, supra note 210, at 434–40 (exploring ways in which independent 
electoral commissions may help constitutional courts more effectively to regulate the political 
process). Also of interest in this regard is Charles Sabel and William Simon’s argument that 
institutional reform litigation is most productive where (1) there are standard setting 
organizations on which the courts may rely in making liability determinations; and (2) 
legislatures assist the courts by setting up ongoing monitoring agencies. See Sabel & Simon, 
supra note 128, at 1063–64 (regarding liability determinations); id. at 1072 (contrasting 
education and public housing, where litigation has been aided by public monitoring agencies, 
with police conduct and prisons, as to which “sophisticated monitoring systems” do not yet 
exist); id. at 1051–52 (regarding exclusionary zoning litigation and the legislative establishment 
of monitoring agencies). Advisory counterparts might usefully contribute to the 
“experimentalist” mode of public law litigation championed by Sabel, Simon, and others by 
recommending standards, by undertaking monitoring, and perhaps even by rallying public 
attention to the issues at hand. Cf. id. at 1072–73 (discussing difficulties with judicial formulation 
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Finally, the existence of a court with de jure authority to enjoin 
the implementation of unconstitutional statutes may help to sustain 
the convention that the counterpart’s recommendations really are just 
advisory. Were there no constitutional court to stand in as the 
ultimate backstop against the abuse of state power, a convention 
might emerge under which certain kinds of counterpart 
“recommendations” are understood to bind the elected branches. A 
widespread popular fear of untrammeled state power, plus a few 
historically salient occasions on which the counterpart successfully 
challenged such abuses, might be enough to bring such a convention 
into being. 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years, constitutional theorists have begun to question 
the longstanding premise that constitutional courts occupy a 
privileged epistemic position with respect to the meaning of 
constitutional texts.345 Calls for dialogue between the court and the 
citizenry, or the court and the elected branches of government, are 
increasingly widespread.346 Yet very little attention has been paid to 
the question of what kinds of non-judicial institutions might be—or 
are being—employed to elaborate or enforce the basic commitments 
of liberal democracies.347 This Article has started to explore one such 
class of institutions. Advisory commissions are familiar to Americans 
mostly in their ad hoc, crisis-response incarnation, but ongoing 
 
of sanctions and concluding that the experimentalist model for public law litigation ultimately 
“pins its hopes largely on the effects of transparency . . . exposing poor performance as clearly as 
possible [and thereby] open[ing] the system to general scrutiny”). 
 345. Among the recent and noteworthy works exploring non-judicial constitutional 
interpretation are: SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY (1991); 
NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004); LARRY D. 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); TUSHNET, supra note 157; JEREMY WALDRON, 
LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); WHITTINGTON, supra note 335. 
 346. See generally Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative 
Potential of Theories of Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109 (2006) (surveying 
theories of dialogic constitutionalism in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand). 
 347. Cf. Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True 
Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897 (2005) (surveying political science literature 
and raising doubts about the practicality of popular engagement with questions of constitutional 
meaning); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 676 (2005) (“[T]he new theoretical scholarship [on extrajudicial 
constitutional interpretation] has largely overlooked questions of how the political branches 
effectuate the Constitution, or how they might do a better job of it.”). 
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investigatory and advice-giving bodies with jurisdiction over 
foundational commitments of liberal democracy are becoming 
fixtures of many constitutional democracies. 
I have advanced a preliminary account of what the advisory 
counterparts might offer by way of sustenance to liberal democracy. 
Instrumentally, the counterparts are or could be, in key respects, 
better positioned than constitutional courts to put in place structural 
safeguards against illiberality. This follows from their capacity to craft 
“legislative” remedies; from their resources for scrutinizing the 
government and engaging public opinion; and from the normative 
possibility of greater independence from the elected branches of 
government. To be sure, the circumstances under which a purely 
advisory body can build a base of public support sufficient to 
transform the political calculus of elected officials vis-à-vis the 
counterpart’s preferred reforms are probably quite narrow. But there 
is anecdotal evidence that, in the wake of scandals and on election 
law and government integrity questions, elected officials’ flouting of 
counterpart recommendations sometimes elicits public backlash. 
Advisory counterparts may also perform a dialogic function, 
prompting, maintaining, and focusing public discourse about the 
import of nominally constitutive ideals for contemporary problems. 
Counterparts may foment debate by conducting educational 
campaigns, by carrying out high-profile investigations, or by 
exercising legislative process rights. Counterparts whose jurisdiction 
covers the gamut of the polity’s constitutional aspirations would seem 
particularly well-suited to play a debate-forcing role; such bodies may 
be able to exercise significant persuasive authority with the electorate 
regarding constitutional priorities even if they are not ultimately 
persuasive concerning what should be done about the problem at 
hand. 
As dialogic institutions, the counterparts have a number of 
plausibly attractive properties when compared to constitutional 
courts. For one, the reform proposals that counterparts offer up for 
discussion are more likely than judicial opinions to be intelligible to 
the general public, and more likely to emerge from an open, 
participatory process. This follows from the counterparts’ dependence 
on persuasive rather than legal authority. As well, the constitutional 
context in which the counterpart makes its proposal is more likely to 
sustain a public discourse that focuses on the substance of the 
constitutional obligation in question (rather than judicial roles), and 
which is conducive to learning, compromise, and mutual respect. 
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My account of what the counterparts have to offer is fueled by a 
fair amount of conjecture. It is meant to provoke further inquiry, not 
to settle anything. Looking ahead, I see three avenues for future 
research. First, there is a pressing need for careful empirical work, 
both quantitative and qualitative, on the extant counterparts. 
Empirical studies could help to illuminate the nature of counterpart 
effects on public opinion; the methods by which counterparts seek to 
credential their recommendations; the modalities of counterpart 
influence on the decisionmaking of constitutional courts;348 the impact 
of activist constitutional courts on counterparts’ choice of strategy; 
the sources of political support for counterpart independence; and 
more. Basic questions I have bracketed in this paper remain to be 
explored, including the ways in which counterparts might bring about 
the enactment of proposed reforms without appealing to domestic 
public opinion.349 Another path for future research—this one 
normative in nature—is to more clearly define the basis for thinking 
that some sort of public engagement with questions of constitutional 
policy is a good thing, and on this basis to offer a more refined 
comparison of courts and counterparts, and better prescriptions for 
counterpart design. The present Article has given an account of how 
courts and counterparts may differ as dialogic institutions, but my 
normative premises remain underdeveloped. Nor have I traveled very 
far down the path of institutional possibility: there is a wide range of 
possible de jure relationships among courts, counterparts, and 
legislatures that remain to be explored and evaluated.350 
 
 348. It would be useful to understand the conditions under which counterparts either 
embolden the courts, make the courts more forgiving of the democratic process, or simply 
encourage the courts to pursue different regulatory strategies. 
 349. For example, by appealing to international opinion and thereby putting the home-
country government’s foreign policy objectives at risk; or by using administrative or 
investigative powers to pressure government leaders or recalcitrant bureaucracies. 
 350. To give but one example: might there be something to be said for constitutional orders 
in which the constitution contains three kinds of provisions: the justiciable, the nonjusticiable, 
and the justiciable but not judicially remediable? Perhaps the constitutional court would have 
authority (upon concluding that a provision in the third category had been violated) to 
authorize the counterpart to trigger a special legislative procedure through which counterpart-
proposed remedies could be adopted. Call this a variation on the political question doctrine. 
Although it would be utterly foreign to present-day constitutional practice in the United States, 
there is already a near precedent in the United Kingdom. Under the U.K. Human Rights Act, a 
judicial determination of “incompatibility” between the challenged law and the Human Rights 
Act does nothing to alter the legal effect of that law, yet it does authorize the relevant 
government minister to introduce (in her discretion) remedial legislation which proceeds on a 
fast track. See Fontana, supra note 266. 
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The third avenue for future research is country-specific 
institutional tinkering: What opportunities exist for creating new 
counterparts, or improving existing ones? Within the United States 
there already exists a range of public advisory bodies, with varying 
degrees of political insulation, whose missions (again to varying 
degrees) touch on basic constitutional ideals. Examples include the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the Election 
Assistance Commission, the Inspectors General, the Government 
Accountability Office, and sundry state-level law reform 
commissions, information commissions, privacy commissions, 
electoral or redistricting commissions, and sentencing commissions. 
There is a lot to ask about how these bodies might be enhanced. 
In light of the global spread of investigatory and advice-giving 
bodies concerned with the basic aspirations of liberal democracy, the 
anecdotal successes of some of these bodies, and the limitations of 
constitutional courts as participants in public discourse and as sources 
of statutory and administrative reforms, the advisory-counterpart 
model for giving effect to liberal ideals merits new attention from 
scholars of constitutionalism. 
